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In this dissertation, I seek to answer the following questions in relation to party strength
and redistricting: (1) how can we better measure sources of party organizational strength over
time; (2) how do the three legs of the tripartite structure reinforce each other (3) why do some
state legislatures lose their power to redistrict; and (4) how can districts be drawn to influence
who runs successfully for higher office. First, I offer two new measures of party strength, one
for organizations and one for party competition. These new measures, the weighted funds
party campaign committees have on hand and the marginal majority measurement (MMM)
provide improved measures of party stability and capacity over time. I then demonstrate
in regards to the second question that while increased competition can strengthen party
organizations, increased polarization can displace organizational strength.
Third, I posit that redistricting is a collective action problem, with too many self interested
legislators amidst a complex technical issue. Only though decreasing the time necessary to
deliberate and avoid common redistricting pitfalls via strong party leadership can the state
legislature hold onto redistricting authority.
Finally, I argue that whether a legislator runs for office is very dependent upon where
districts are drawn, as legislators can carry over their incumbency advantage via shared
constituencies between multiple levels of districts.
To support these chapters, I employ time series and multistage survival modeling of party
committee funds, body in charge of redistricting, and when legislators run for higher office.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Parties serve as the primary entry and end point to American political representation.
As formulated by Key (1958), political parties can be viewed as three component parts:
party in the electorate, party in government, and the party organization. Party identifiers
within the electorate select their preferred candidates in the primary stage and vote as a
general electorate during the general election, shaping the party in government. The party in
government aims to enact policies necessary to hold onto power, enjoy the goods of office (Cox
and McCubbins, 2005) and possibly advance legislation in line with their base’s preferences
(Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995). Finally, party organizations largely link together the electorate
with office holders, maintaining the electoral viability of the party through the organization
of voters and recruitment/support of candidates for higher office (Cotter et al., 1989; Key,
1958; Hernson, 2009). As Schattschneider (1942) notes, “[D]emocracy is unthinkable save
in terms of parties.” Additionally, it is through state parties and their tripartite structure
that to varying degrees mediate the selection of office holders at the state and national level.
States provide the confines for political conflict at the state level, and provide the nexus for
multilevel political conflict.
Therefore, it is concerning that political parties within the states appear to be in a state
of disarray in maintaining their responsibility as a linkage institution and means to organize
social conflict necessary to govern efficiently. State parties in government are increasingly
polarized (Shor and McCarty, 2011), with more rigid unity and procedural power (Aldrich
and Battista, 2002; Anzia and Jackman, 2012), with outcomes of legislative gridlock (Klarner,
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Phillips and Muckler, 2012). The party electorate, as organized into districts, increasingly are
placed into constituencies where electoral responsiveness largely trends downwards (Shufeldt
and Flavin, 2012; McGann et al., 2016; Engstrom, 2013), with institutions structured to give
disproportionate weight to the primary electorate and ideologically extreme candidates (Krasa
and Polborn, 2018; Banda, Carsey and Curiel, 2019). Additionally, more ideological actors
increasingly displace party organizations, providing increased polarization, and thwarting the
mechanisms behind the recruitment for competitive candidates and races (La Raja, 2008;
La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Insofar as parties diverge from their traditional responsibilities,
roles, and sources of strength, politics across the United States and ensuing representation are
at stake. Given that state politics in turn shape who makes it to national office (Carson et al.,
2011, 2012; Berkman, 1994), and the capacity and actions of local politics (Miller, 2008), it is
imperative to measure and understand the direction of state parties and the implications on
policy outcomes.
However, the sources of party strength and behavior are multifaceted and complex. The
poor performance of a pillar of party strength in one area can feed into the next over time,
collapsing the entire structure. Political parties shape, especially within the legislature, their
own procedures and institutions (Smith, 2007; Roberts, 2010; Roberts and Smith, 2003;
Aldrich, 2011; Mooney, 2012; Anzia and Jackman, 2012; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994), with
the intent to induce outcomes. In turn, the actions of party in government and which party
is in control affects the appeal of political office, which in turn affects who runs for office
(Jacobson, 2004; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2011). Who runs for office strongly influences which
races are competitive (Jacobson, 1989; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2006; Engstrom
and Kernell, 2005). Whether races are competitive influences the extent to which party
organizations can stake a claim to being necessary for the maintaining party majorities
(Rosenthal, 1995; Gierzynski and Jewell, 1992), and decreased party organization presence
cedes power to ideological organized interests (La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Additionally,
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state legislatures within most states can directly affect the extent to which state legislatures
and Congressional offices are competitive (Gelman and King, 1994a; McGann et al., 2016;
McDonald and Best, 2015; Levitt, 2010a). Redistricting outcomes and ensuing political
competition over a decade in turn shapes policy outcomes (Volden and Wiseman, 2014; Krasa
and Polborn, 2018) and the role of party organizations and organized interests (Daley, 2017;
Skinner, 2007; Skinner, Masket and Dulio, 2013).
Therefore, the task to understand party power over time and the quality of representation
that one receives is a dynamic and multivariate process. This dissertation seeks to further
develop the field of state politics and party strength through the following steps. First,
establish measures of party organizational strength and the intersection of party in government
as related to the tripartite structure. These measures as developed are then employed to
analyze the extent to which the intersection of individualistic motivations and state institutions
shape the power of parties, as framed using the rational hydraulic framework of campaign
finance, which in turn directly affects the capacity of political parties. I next employ these
newly developed measures to explain the bias towards the party in power as mediated through
redistricting. I posit that it is through the power of a strong party organization in combination
with unified government that is able to overcome the obstacles to redistricting, thus preventing
court intervention, which in turn affects who controls legislative and Congressional delegations.
Finally, given the individualistic approach to deciding who runs for office, I demonstrate
how the way in which districts are drawn affects whether and where state legislators run for
higher office, which in turn affects the competitiveness of electoral races at the micro scale.
The ensuing chapters build off our preexisting understanding of parties, redistricting,
and structured progressive ambition with theoretically driven quantitative measures and
multistage time series modeling. The variation over time coupled with advancements in how
one measures the explanatory variables of interest permits these articles to better ascertain
the dynamics of party change and electoral competition across space and time within the
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American states.
State Tripartite Structures and Representation
Key (1958) is among the first to establish the importance of the three different legs
of a state party, the party in government, electorate, and organization. The party in the
electorate provides the voting coalition necessary to elect the party in government. The party
in government in turn enacts laws in line with party preferences (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995)
and/or secures the goods of government while maintaining the party’s reputation necessary
to hold onto power (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Heberlig and Larson, 2012). The party
organization in turn is responsible, to varying extents, to identify and acquire new voters,
recruit new candidates, and fundraise in order to maintain the organization itself in addition
to electioneering efforts. Each of these legs to party strength are interdependent on each
other. As Key (1949) notes in his studies of the least competitive states during his writing,
the American South, to establish a party organization requires some feasible claim to having
a competitive chance at securing political office. To secure political office requires some
type of party organization and voters in the electorate. Voters in the electorate in turn will
be less likely to turn out and vote in absence of quality candidates with name recognition
(Miller and Stokes, 1962; Jacobson, 1989; Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992; Roberts
and Carson, 2013) or voter outreach efforts (Green, 2004; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr., 2000;
Broockman, 2014). Therefore, no single part of the tripartite structure can successfully be
analyzed, especially over time, without some consideration to the other components of the
tripartite structure.
Therefore, the field of research on the tripartite structure and its depends upon quality
measures and theoretical mechanism to ascertain its sustainability across time. Should
research into tripartite structures lack macro level measurements of parties across the states,
then a range of obstacles inhibit a wide variety of other potential avenues of research.
These include the ability of a party’s ability to overcome collective action problems within
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government amidst contentious and potentially divisive issues, like redistricting. Further,
given the role of party organizations to recruit and field quality candidates, what are the
mechanisms behind which potential candidates might be encouraged to do so? Further, can
the construction of the electoral environment through redistricting be set up to advantage
or encourage some candidates over others? Should the answers to these questions receive
the affirmative, it would suggest that the research fields of party strength, elections, and
progressive ambition are even more intertwined than previously thought.
Tripartite Structure Research to Date Within state politics, advancements have been
made to measure and identify the political implications of party strength and competitiveness.
Ranney (1971) developed the Ranney Index, an average of Democratic control of state
government as calculated via the percentage of seats that Democrats hold within the legislature,
Democratic gubernatorial popular vote percentage, and duration of Democratic unified
control of government. The measure straightforwardly indicates Democratic presence within
government. At the level of legislator competition, Holbrook and Dunk (1993) developed
the HVD index as the average of the average legislator winning percent margin, percent of
uncontested seats, and percentage of safe seats. The HVD index therefore measures the
aggregated average of district level competition, a micro scale measurement.
Measures of party organizations are unfortunately lacking due to the changing nature of
party organizations from when Key (1958) first theorized the tripartite structure. Whereas
at their prime during the Gilded Age most party organizations decided the ideal candidates
to recruit without interference of primaries, ballot design, tracking of loyal versus disloyal
voters and more (Swenson, 1982; Summers, 2004), party organizations lost most of their
powers during the progressive era and the rise of electoral reforms (Roberts and Carson, 2013).
Although scholars such as Cotter et al. (1989) and La Raja (2008) have tracked the pivot
to candidate centered campaigns and a supporting role for party organizations, consistent
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measurements of party organization capacity and sustainability are absent in the research.
La Raja and Schaffner (2015) and Masket (2009) offers in depth research into individual level
support of party organizations versus competing intra party actors, though these estimates
are not readily aggregated into macro level measures of party organizational strength.
Further, the lack of consistent macro-level estimates inhibit research as to how the strength
of one part of the tripartite structure impacts the next. Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) find
the Ranney and HVD indices to operate largely independent of each other, and the Ranney
index itself is prone to measurement problems due to the variability of a state’s gubernatorial
vote and candidate centered effects (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer, 2002; Holbrook and
Dunk, 1993). These measurement problems also lead to complications with studying the
impact of party in government and the electorate effect’s on policy outcomes (Barrilleaux,
Holbrook and Langer, 2002). Therefore, the field of party competition within state politics
cannot effectively test the extent to which state legislative polarization detracts from party
organizations, the extent to which highly competitive states impact capacity of state party
organizations, and more.
Redistricting and Legislative Inaction Amongst one of the most valuable goods of
office that a party might be able to attain through a strong organization and electorate
supporting members in office is the opportunity to redistrict. Central to influencing the
competitiveness of the political environment within state legislative and Congressional maps
is redistricting. The manner in which maps are drawn can heavily influence whether parties
win different proportion of districts relative to their support within a state (Gelman and
King, 1994b; Cain, 1985; McDonald and Best, 2015). Through a combination of spreading
the opposition across multiple districts via cracking, or forcing the other party’s voters into
one district via packing, the party in charge of redistricting can win a disproportionate
number of seats for well over a decade (Cox and Holden, 2011; Cain, 1985; McGann et al.,
6
2016). A state might appear competitive when looking at a state’s presidential vote share
statewide, but in reality be drawn in such a way as to make it all but impossible to change
majority control. Although redistricting in the past might systematically benefit one party
or set of incumbents early within a cycle and decay over time (Cox and Katz, 1999, 2002;
Chen and Rodden, 2013), recent maps passed by unified state governments resulted in
partisan bias strong enough to last the entire decade (McGann et al., 2016). The effect of
redistricting can be seen in the 2018 midterm elections, where of the districts that Democrats
won during a wave election, 73 percent were drawn by independent courts or commissions.1
The results of the 2018 election also highlight the importance of who redistricts, with unified
party governments overwhelmingly drawing partisan biased maps, and independent court or
commissions maps indistinguishable from no effect (Cox and Katz, 2002).2 Crespin (2005)
finds a strong association between the probability that a Congressional district is competitive
and the presence of a non-legislative drawn map. Carson, Crespin and Williamson (2014)
goes onto reconfirm theses results from 1972–2012.
Therefore, it appears that to know who redistricts is to in part know the extent of bias with
in maps, and therefore which party controls state legislatures and Congressional delegations.
1Michael Li, “Why the Midterm Results Should Concern You Regardless of Which Party You
Support,” Brennan Center for Justice, November 16, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
why-midterm-results-should-concern-you-regardless-which-party-you-support (accessed April
16, 2019).
2Data from (McGann et al., 2016) as to whether a map reaches a systematic partisan bias reveals a significant
difference between state legislatures and courts/commissions drawn maps for Congressional districts. Their
early work applying these results to state legislative maps also reveal the same association. See,
Alex Keena, Michael Latner, Charles Anthony Smith, and Anthony McGann, “Here’s how to fix
partisan gerrymandering, now that the Supreme Court kicked it back to the states,” Washing-
ton Post Monkey Cage, July 2, 2019 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/02/
heres-how-fix-partisan-gerrymandering-now-that-supreme-court-kicked-it-back-states/
?utm_term=.956628bdb21e (accessed July 9, 2019).
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However, with the Supreme Court ruling, Rucho v Common Cause, litigation against partisan
gerrymanders was ruled as non-justiciable,3 seemingly locking in partisan biased maps as they
arise. A long standing finding and well justified belief within the redistricting community is
that when a party controls both the governor’s office and state legislature, a highly partisan
biased map will be enacted (Cox and Katz, 1999, 2002; McDonald, 2004). So long as the
legislature meets basic redistricting criteria, such as population equality, and potentially
racial minority representation, the map cannot be overruled (Levitt, 2010a).
However, since the year 2000, courts and independent commissions have redistricted
approximately 20 percent of legislative and Congressional maps where the default redistricting
authority is held by the legislature. The reason for the judicial and other non-legislative
body intervention is due to the state legislature passing maps that fail to adhere to technical
criteria of equal population and/or Voting Rights Act (VRA) criteria in time for elections.
Even the Roberts court accepted the premise that to prevent malapportionment of population
within legislative and Congressional maps, it is the duty of courts to act when the state
legislature does not.4 Therefore, to know when redistricting is to know who redistricts. To
know who redistricts is to know which party has a better hold on power.
Strategic Progressive Ambition and Electoral Institutions Redistricting and party
strength within the system of legislative and Congressional elections in large part work through
quality candidates capable of providing voters a meaningful electoral choice. Competitive
elections are a necessary condition for democratic accountability (Pitkin, 1967; Miller and
Stokes, 1962). Party identity largely determines voting patterns, though a voter’s familiarity
318 U.S. 422 (2019)
4Gill v Whitford, 16 U.S. 1161 (2018)
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with a candidate can reduce the overwhelming effect of partisanship (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr.
and Stewart III, 2000; Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992; Miller and Stokes, 1962).
Whether an electoral challenger can overcome the strength of an incumbent and attain
the name recognition necessary to have a winning chance is their experience as a previous
elected office holder (Cox and Katz, 1996; Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992; Jacobson,
1989; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2006). As Roberts and Carson (2013) find, a large
part of party organizations ability to successfully compete in districts was the ability to
field quality candidates with previous elected office holding experience. Within Congress,
the most common competitor and background for members is a career within their state’s
legislative chambers (Berkman, 1994; Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999). Therefore, insofar
as one can estimate the conditions in which candidates with previous elected office holding
experience, such as state legislators, run for higher office, one can estimate the competitiveness
of elections.
A multitude of factors impact whether one decides to run for higher office. The central
theory behind candidate entry is strategic politician theory, where candidates run for higher
office when the projected utility exceed the opportunity costs (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983).
Whether a candidate desires to run for higher office is affected by their personal ambition, as
some are progressively ambitious and seek higher office when the conditions are ideal to do so
(Schlesinger, 1966), whereas others might be content with their current office and statically
ambitious. Ultimately, to know whether a candidate desires higher office is progressively
ambitious relies upon in depth survey research (Maestas, 2003; Maestas et al., 2006), which is
also susceptible to change depending on changes in life at a given time (Fox and Lawless, 2011).
Therefore, much of the decision to run can be highly individualistic and not captured by
institutional features. Modern day potential candidates can be especially cautious in running
for office given the inability of party organizations to offer insurance should a candidate run
and lose (Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2006).
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However, if one accepts the base premise of strategic politician theory in that politicians
will await for the most ideal conditions to run for higher office, then one can expect them
to only run when the benefits and probability of victory outweigh the costs (Rohde, 1979).
Of especial interest are state legislators, given that most members of Congress are former
state legislators (Berkman, 1994). Additionally, state legislators work within a variety of
environments and institutions that mediate their potential runs for higher office. Analyzing
the opportunity structure reveals the decision making infrastructure that state legislators
work within. All elected state legislators fall within the category of quality candidates, though
some tend to be better situated than others to handle campaigns. State legislators from
professional legislators tend to be in a strong position to run for higher office, they tend to be
more risk averse towards running given the increased costs of potentially losing (Maestas et al.,
2006; Lazarus, 2006; Fox and Lawless, 2005). Typically state legislators wait for an open
seat viable for their party (Black, 1972; Roberts and Carson, 2013). Candidates might also
take advantage of times in which the congressional incumbent is weak, following redistricting
(Hetherington, Bruce and Globetti, 2003; Cox and Katz, 2002) or when the incumbent no
longer represents the preferences of the median voter (Boatright, 2004; Canes-Wrone, Brady
and Cogan, 2002). State legislators likewise are more likely to run when the utility of their
current seat declines, such as the loss in security incurred following legislative redistricting
(Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr. and Stewart III, 2000) or term limits force them out of office
(Lazarus, 2006).
Previous research on progressive ambition tends to fall within either the candidate or
political environment categories in attempts to measure strengths and weaknesses of the
candidate or political opportunities or threats. However, there is conceptual overlap between
political opportunities and candidate strengths in regards to redistricting. All state legislators
necessarily share some of their constituents within a higher level district. For example,
there is overlap between state house and state senate, and state senate and Congressional
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districts. Where legislators share constituents with a higher level district, there is the
potential opportunity to carry over their strengths as an incumbent. Carson et al. (2011)
finds in a cross sectional study that state legislators with increased overlap with Congressional
districts are more likely to run. Given the nature of strategic ambition, whether, when, and
where a legislator runs for higher office cannot be separated. To understand progressive
ambition requires not only an over time analysis as performed by Maestas et al. (2006) and
Hetherington, Bruce and Globetti (2003), or by location as completed by Carson et al. (2011,
2012), but the intersection of the two in relation to redistricting cycles. A dynamic model of
progressive ambition necessarily unites the time and space to understand whether, when, and
where a legislator runs, which in turn determines level of electoral success and competition.
Measuring the Tripartite Structure and the Hydraulic Framework
Chapter 2 builds upon the work of past research in order to provide three primary benefits
in studies of state party tripartite structures: (1) a means to analyze the strength of party
organizations over time; (2) a macro-level measure that captures the intersection of party
control of government and electoral competition; and (3) an analysis of the extent to which
the competitiveness of legislative control, materialistic appeal of control of state government,
and polarization strengthen or displace the capacity and sustainability of party organizations.
The chapter first takes advantage of the fact that there is unanimous agreement that
modern day state party organizations rely upon high levels of funding so as to maintain
their operations and engage in coordinated expenditures necessary to support candidates
necessary to capturing office, in addition to getting out the vote (Hernson, 2009; Gierzynski
and Jewell, 1992; Jewell and Morehouse, 2001; Rosenthal, 1995; La Raja, 2008; La Raja
and Schaffner, 2015; Masket, 2009; Bibby and Holbrook, 1996; Cotter et al., 1989; Kolodny
and Dulio, 2003). Therefore, although one might not know the exact strength of a party
organization, it is possible to determine the extent to which a party organization meets the
necessary conditions to be a viable and sustainable organization. I therefore analyze the state
11
party committees, the modern day and candidate serving organizations that maintain their
party’s outreach efforts, recruitment of new candidates, and spending in competitive elections
(Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). I acquire data on all donations to these state party committees
from the National Institute on Money in State Politics. I then create an aggregate measure of
party organizational capacity for a given party within a state for a two-year period via three
steps. I first aggregate all donations to a given party. I next weight the total donations based
on the breadth of the base for party committees, such that a wide donor base is weighted
closer to one, and a donor base more reliant upon a few individuals a weight of zero. Finally,
the weighted donations are divided by the state’s population. These three steps create a
measure of capacity and stability. Following the work by Banfield and Wilson (1963) into
the death of party machines, a party organization’s downfall is usually marked by if not an
outright loss of resources, then capture by a single interest or individual. Therefore, weighted
funds on hand allows one to both measure capacity of a party in addition to its sustainability
in the event of the loss of the largest donors.
I next capture the measure of competition through the creation of the marginal majority
measurement (MMM), which looks to the percentage of the electorate that would need to
switch their votes in the most marginal districts so as to flip majority control. The measure
builds upon the idea that party organizations would not seek to recruit and support a quality
candidate in every state legislative district, nor improve electoral performance uniformly
across all districts. Rather, a party organization, in addition to other political actors, would
seek to flip the districts necessary to change majority control (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and
Langer, 2002; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). For example, in 2010 the GOP targeted specific
neighborhoods within the most marginal legislative and Congressional districts necessary to
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flip control, and advertised their strategy as a means to attract new donors (Daley, 2017).5
I therefore create the MMM as the total number of the two party vote within the minimum
number of legislative districts that would need to be switched in order to change majority
control within a chamber, divided by the total number of voters within the election. The end
result is a 0 – 1 score of the difficulty in changing majority control, with states near zero
holding very fragile majorities, and states near one as effectively immutable. MMM improves
upon the micro level HVD index which does not give proper weight to how individual elections
affect majority control within the legislature. Additionally, the measure is an improvement
over the Ranney index by discerning how fragile legislative control is based upon micro and
macro level electoral information.6 Additionally, looking to legislative control specifically
frees the measure of the unstable effect of gubernatorial elections (Holbrook and Dunk, 1993;
Shufeldt and Flavin, 2012). Confirmatory factor analysis goes on to confirm the strong
expected effect of MMM against the HVD and Ranney indices insofar as one would seek to
collapse all three measures onto one dimension.
Finally, I build upon the micro level framework of La Raja and Schaffner (2015) and offer
a test of rational campaign finance “hydraulics,” positing that money will flow based upon
5Karl Rove widely advertised the GOP “RED MAP” strategy in his 2010 Wall Street Journal Editorial as a
means to attract new donors. He started out his editorial writing,
“Some of the most important contests this fall will be way down the ballot in communities like Portsmouth,
Ohio and West Lafayette, Ind., and neighborhoods like Brushy Creek in Round Rock, Texas, and Murrysville
Township in Westmoreland County, Pa. These are state legislative races that will determine who redraws
Congressional district lines after this year’s census, a process that could determine which party controls
upwards of 20 seats and whether many other seats will be competitive.”
Karl Rove, “The GOP Targets State Legislatures,” wall Street Journal, March 4, 2010, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575099670689398044 (accessed February 27, 2019)
6As Lublin (1997) and Grose (2011) write, pure margins of legislative or Congressional seats might be
deceiving. Whereas Democratic control might have looked mostly solid throughout the South prior to 1994,
the 1994 midterm elections wiped away Democratic Congressional majorities. The 2010 midterm elections
similarly spelled the end of most Democratic control of southern state legislatures (Daley, 2017).
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the perceived appeal and opportunity costs of political donations. I argue that the appeal
of donations to party committees is influenced largely by the perceived competitiveness of
the state legislature and power of the leadership positions acquired upon winning majority
control. However, I expect polarized legislatures to detract from party organizational strength
as it becomes increasingly appealing to donate instead to more ideological driven interests.
Employing a linear time series panel model from 2000 to 2010, the result support the rational
hydraulic framework of party organizational strength. Therefore, chapter 2 concludes with
two measures to capture the tripartite structure within states and empirical evidence as to
the basis for party organizational strength.
Obstacles and Outcomes of Legislative Redistricting
Chapter three seeks to answer why legislatures fail to enact redistricting in time, and thus
cede their power to non-legislative bodies. I posit that the failure of legislatures to pass maps
in time is a function of the collective action problem and technical barriers to redistricting
that state legislatures face. Even should a party be in control of unified government, the
inability to effectively impose order and socialize the costs of maximizing party control over
legislative and Congressional districts, the legislature is prone to overly long deliberation and
inaction.
Even with advanced computers, it might still take far too long to find an ideal map
that satisfies a sufficient number within the majority party given technical criteria, such as
preservation of local boundaries and population equality. Further, without the means to
centralize and enforce a hierarchy within the map development process, the excess of self
interested legislators all competing for safe seats can detract from completing a map in time,
which in turn results in non-legislative take over of the map making process. I argue that
it is through a strong party organization, which funds a centralized mapmaker and offers
support to legislators who need to accept more competitive districts for the good of the party,
that ensures legislative control of redistricting.
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Chapter three offers qualitative and quantitative in support of the argument that technical
criteria and collective action failure lead to an inability of the legislature to redistrict state
legislative and Congressional maps. The chapter first takes advantage of the wealth of insight
into the redistricting process through a combination of interview research, amicus briefs from
redistricting litigation, and the personal notes and presentations of the National Conference
on State Legislatures (NCSL) redistricting expert and GOP redistricting coordinator. These
data offer insight into the complexity of the redistricting process and common obstacles
that must be overcome, in addition to the necessary personnel and organizational structures
necessary to overcome legislative and legal obstacles to redistricting. Additionally, the chapter
employs three stage model, with a two stage survival model, followed by a linear model to
analyze the following within the 2000 and 2010 redistricting cycles: (1) the duration until
redistricting for a given legislative chamber or Congressional map followed by, (2) a competing
risks analysis of whether a non-legislative actor redistricts in place of the legislature, and
finally (3) the impact on a map’s competitiveness as measured with the MMM and HVD
Index. I posit that the main obstacles to redistricting in time takes the form of geographic
requirements to preserve local boundaries and soft deadlines for when maps should be passed,
as required by state law. I argue that given the role of party leaders to spread out the costs
and benefits of various district designs, that unified governments are best able to prevent
non-legislative redistricting when in control of a well funded party committees. Through these
analyses, there appears to be strong support that the timing of redistricting, and in turn
legislative failure to redistrict, can be understood as a technical and collective action problem
that can be overcome with strong institutional party hierarchy. However, the results of the
final stage suggests that the relationship between courts and commissions implementing more
competitive maps might be questionable. Therefore, these contradicting results suggest the
need to reanalyze the field and conduct more rigorous studies on counterfactual maps.
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Overlapping Ambition for Higher Office
In chapter four, I argue that when and where a legislator runs for higher office is largely
influenced by their relative strength as a candidate when compared to the incumbent of a
higher level district or the potential competition. A candidate performs their best in running
for higher office through a combination of choosing a race where their name recognition
and reputation within the higher level district is at its maximum, and when the potential
competition is at its weakest. A state legislator that successfully balances their candidate
strengths amongst their current constituency relative to the competition will be more likely
to run for higher office and win. Therefore, to understand the redistricting cycle and where
multiple levels of districts overlap is to understand whether, when, and where a legislator
runs for higher office.
I therefore build upon past work analyzing shared constituency between districts by
Carson et al. (2011) by expanding the range of potential competition to include every other
potential competitor for higher office within the state legislature. Further, I incorporate time
into considerations of the progressive ambition of decisions to run for higher office with a
survival model of whether and when a legislator runs for a particular office. As incorporated
into a two stage model, decision of where to run followed by election performance, the analysis
reveals the extent to which district design over time influences who runs for higher office,
which in turn influences the competitiveness of a given election.
Chapter four conceptualizes that constituencies matter to running for higher office only
insofar as they are not wasted against someone with a greater presence within the district.
Most obviously, the incumbent for a higher level district would hold the greatest name
recognition within their own district. An incumbent would be weaker purely on the dimension
of relative constituency advantage in the event of redistricting, or should their potential
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competition share the exact same constituency.7 In the event that no incumbent runs for
office, then some legislator from a lower level district would be in a position to potentially
enjoy the greatest constituency overlap with a higher level district.
Consider the following map of Michigan’s 11th Congressional district. The map displays
Michigan State Senate districts overlapping with the open 11th Congressional district during
the 2002 midterms. All of these districts contained constituents who voted for both the
Congressional and a state senate races. In regards to population overlap and shared con-
stituency, the boundaries of state senate district 9 from the state senate map in place in the
year 2000, had the greatest level of shared constituency. The state senator of senate district
9 from the electoral cycle before shared 37 percent of the Congressional district’s population.
The nearest competitor, the state senator from district 15, shared only 24 percent of the
Congressional district’s population. Ultimately the state senator of district 9 ran uncontested
in the Republican primary and won the general election with 59 percent of the vote in 2002.8
The case of Michigan’s 11th Congressional district exemplifies a process that is part of the
state legislator to Congress career pipeline. However, to fully capture the effects on decisions
to run for higher office therefore requires a better attempt to model and measure the elements
that comprise the decision of whether, where, and when to run.
Chapter four therefore makes use of self-created python toolbox that calculates the
population overlap between state house to state senate, state house to Congress, and state
senate to Congressional districts. The calculated overlap is then transformed for each legislator
7Situations where some other office holder has 100 percent overlap with a higher level district occasionally
happens with California’s state senate to Congressional districts, or single member of Congress states to the
U.S. Senate (Rohde, 1979).
8House General Elections, Michigan, 2002-2010 All Districts, Congressional Quarterly Press Voting and
Elections Collection (accessed July 12, 2016) http://library.cqpress.com/elections/search.php
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Figure 1.1: Michigan’s 11th congressional District Overlap with State Senate Districts
Map only includes state senate districts from the year 2000 that overlaped with Michigan’s 11th congressional district for the
2002 midterm elections, the first of the new Michigan map in place following the 2000 Census.
Map created using information from the U.S. Census and Lewis et al. (2013) Digital Boundary Definitions of United States
congressional Districts, 2003.
into a relative difference from the maximum overlap.The score is transformed into a 0 – 100
scale, where candidates who have a score of zero have the maximum shared constituency
with a district, relative to the incumbent, if present, and all other potential challengers
from legislators. Each one unit increase reflects a one percentage point difference in shared
constituency from the candidate with the most overlap within the district.
With the construction of the relative population overlap variable, chapter four’s competing
risks analysis over the period from 2000 to 2016 on legislator decisions to run for higher office
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reveals relative population overlap to be a strong predictor of decisions to run for higher
office. In combination with changes to an incumbent’s district, relative population overlap
as constructed explains most of the incumbency advantage as measured in prior studies.
However, the ensuing regression on general election outcomes reveals a lack of an effect for
relative population overlap. Therefore, the results suggest that relative population, in large
part decided by redistricting, can provide the ideal conditions to convince a legislator to run
for higher office. Further, by knowing relative population overlap it is possible to ascertain
where a legislator will run for higher office, which in turn leads to more competitive elections.
Contributions to the Field
These following chapters will present the reader greater insight into the dynamics of party
strength and competition over time. Each chapter is united in the mission to analyze and
answer what provides for the conditions necessary for representative democracy as mediated
through parties to function.
Chapter two provides the means to better measure the tripartite structure at the macro
scale. These measurements then offer the means to test the extent to which the legs of the
tripartite structure support each other in a way so as to maintain a balanced two party
system. The results highlight the importance of a competitive electoral environment and
the threat of polarization to strong party organizations. Threats to party organizations in
turn affect the ability for a party to maintain the overall party and support competitive
elections. Further, these results bolster previous work by La Raja and Schaffner (2015), who
find that weak party organizations contribute to greater polarization. These results suggest
that polarization in turn weakens party organizations. Therefore, these results substantively
demonstrate the feedback loop and the poor outlook for party organizational strength in the
future.
Chapter three immediately makes clear the applicability of the new measurements provided
in chapter two to answer who redistricts and the expected effects on the electoral environment.
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Given that late redistricting is the primary causal mechanism for non-legislative authored
maps, and that non-legislative authored maps provide the plurality of competitive districts
within Congress and state legislatures, it is crucial to understand what drives the process.
The three stage model demonstrates time to be the decisive factor in deciding who redistricts,
and that time to redistrict is based upon the capability of the majority party to centralize
and overcome the technical obstacles to redistricting. However, the lack of results for
court and commissions in changing the competitiveness of maps suggests that the field of
redistricting research and representation needs to carefully consider the means by which
courts or commissions redistrict.
Chapter four builds upon and unites previous work into progressive ambition and redis-
tricting. The results demonstrate the precise means by which redistricting affects who runs
for office by shaping overlapping constituencies between different levels of districts. Further,
the overtime nature of the model combined with a new measurement to better capture
the strategic considerations of potential candidates provide insight into the intersection of
individualistic decision making and political institutions. Given the importance of quality
challengers to competitive elections, these results uncover how micro scale competition can
aggregate up to macro level effects on competition.
Therefore, this dissertation in its three article both improves our measurements of
party strength and competition, in addition to the causal processes that go onto shape
the competitive electoral system overall.
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CHAPTER 2: FINANCING STATE PARTY CARTELS
Key (1958) is among the first to establish the importance of the three different legs
of a state party, the party in government, electorate, and organization. The party in the
electorate provides the voting coalition necessary to elect the party in government. The party
in government in turn enacts laws in line with party preferences (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995)
and/or secures the goods of government while maintaining the party’s reputation necessary
to hold onto power (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Heberlig and Larson, 2012). The party
organization in turn is responsible, to varying extents, to identify and acquire new voters,
recruit new candidates, and fundraise in order to maintain the organization itself in addition
to electioneering efforts. Each of these legs to party strength are interdependent on each
other. As Key (1949) notes in his studies of the least competitive states during his writing,
the American South, to establish a party organization requires some feasible claim to having
a competitive chance at securing political office. To secure political office requires some
type of party organization and voters in the electorate. Voters in the electorate in turn will
be less likely to turn out and vote in absence of quality candidates with name recognition
(Miller and Stokes, 1962; Jacobson, 1989; Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992; Roberts
and Carson, 2013) or voter outreach efforts (Green, 2004; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr., 2000;
Broockman, 2014). Therefore, no single part of the tripartite structure can successfully be
analyzed, especially over time, without some consideration to the other components of the
tripartite structure.
Measures of party organizations are unfortunately lacking due to the changing nature of
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party organizations from when Key (1958) first theorized the tripartite structure. Whereas
at their prime during the Gilded Age most party organizations decided the ideal candidates
to recruit without interference of primaries, ballot design, tracking of loyal versus disloyal
voters and more (Swenson, 1982; Summers, 2004), party organizations lost most of their
powers during the progressive era and the rise of electoral reforms (Roberts and Carson, 2013).
Although scholars such as Cotter et al. (1989) and La Raja (2008) have tracked the pivot
to candidate centered campaigns and a supporting role for party organizations, consistent
measurements of party organization capacity and sustainability are absent in the research.
La Raja and Schaffner (2015) and Masket (2009) offers in depth research into individual level
support of party organizations versus competing intra party actors, though these estimates
are not readily aggregated into macro level measures of party organizational strength.
Further, while much work within state politics successfully analyzes party control of
government (Ranney, 1971, 1976) and competition across legislative districts (Shufeldt and
Flavin, 2012; Holbrook and Dunk, 1993), they are not readily interconnected with the
tripartite structure and role of party organizations.
In regards to party organizations, though they lost much of their formal power, they still
play a crucial role in American politics, especially at the state level. In the face of changing
campaign finance laws and candidate centered campaigns, party organizations adapted to
support individual candidates with services in kind, consultants, and decisive ad buys for
marginal seats late during elections (Kolodny and Dwyre, 1998; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003;
Hernson, 2009). Additionally, it is through party organizations that the state and national
parties coordinate to hire redistricting consultants and develop redistricting strategies (Daley,
2017; Chin, 2017). Further, it is largely state party organizations that recruit and train
candidates to run for office (Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). Additionally, it is active recruitment
by party members that acts as one of the primary determinants as to whether one runs for
higher office (Fox and Lawless, 2011). However, given the modern day limitations on party
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organizations, they must be very strategic in where they spend, limiting their activities to
marginal seats that have a chance at affecting majority control of the legislature (Rosenthal,
1995; Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer, 2002). Therefore, I aver that the field of state
politics must rethink and measure how the tripartite collectively works together, with special
attention given to the measurement and sustainability of party organizations over time.
I therefore develop two new measures to gauge party organizational strength and its
connection with a competitive party electorate. To analyze party organizational strength, I
measure per capita state party campaign committee receipts from 1996 to 2016. To measure
the competitiveness of the state’s elections, I create the marginal majority measurement
(MMM), the percent of the vote that would need to change in order to switch majority control
of the state’s legislature. I argue that to measure the connection between party organizational
strength and the intersection of party in government and electorate via these two measures
offers the means to better unite the field of state politics conceptualization and measurement
of the tripartite structure. Looking to revenues received by state party campaign committees
acts as a valid method to measure party strength given that money is the primary means
by which party organizations can exert influence (Jewell and Morehouse, 2001). Further, a
measure that specifically measures the fragility of majority control offers the macro level
benefits of measures like the Ranney index, yet the precision of the HVD index.
With these new measures, I go onto test the rational hydraulic framework of campaign
finance, and thus party organizational strength. I build upon the framework posited by La Raja
and Schaffner (2015) and formulate that where money accumulates follows both campaign
finance laws and the institutional features that make competing political organizations more
appealing over others, given the motivations of the individual. Where competitiveness and the
benefits of controlling procedural power of leadership positions high, money will accumulate
to party organizations. In turn, where higher levels of polarization and partisan conflict mark
a state, money in the aggregate will tend to flow away from less ideologically driven interests
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like party organizations. Therefore, states where ideology displaces the pragmatism of party
organizations amidst polarization, donations to party organizations will dwindle.
In order to develop these new measures, I first draw upon donation data from the National
Institute on Money in State Politics to determine the funding for state party committees from
1996 to 2016. I then weight parties both upon total receipts and the broadness of their donor
base using a reverse Herfindahl index weight, divided by the state’s logged population. The
analysis reveals which state party committees are overly reliant on few donors, and therefore
more susceptible to greater fluctuation and control by relatively few political interests. I
next employ the Klarner (2018) Legislative Elections Returns data to determine the most
marginal legislative seats in a given election period, and votes necessary to change election
outcomes per marginal district. I next gauge the impact of the MMM compared to the
Ranney measure of party control of government (Ranney, 1976) and Holbrook-Van Dunken
index of party competition via confirmatory factor analysis. I finally gauge the determinants
of party organizational strength and electoral marginality via a time series panel linear model
from 2000 to 2010.
The results overall support a rational hydraulic framework to party organizational strength.
Party committees draw greater funds within competitive electoral environments. Additionally,
increased polarization within state legislatures detracts from revenue to party committees.
Further, confirmatory factor analysis supports MMM to be a unique and improved measure
of electoral competition relative to the Ranney and HVD index. These results offer several
specific insights into future research into state party tripartite structures. First, the new
weighted measurement of party committee strength can be employed in future time series
research where such a measure was previously missing. Additionally, the analysis reveals how
susceptible party organizations are to inescapable downward spirals of loss in influence due
to runaway polarization and bias in redistricting. Further, insofar as one seeks to measure a
macro level competition of a state in a manner that captures the intersection of the party
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electorate and government, the MMM offers a more accurate and simplified measurement of
how fragile party control is of legislative chambers. Finally, given that these results confirm a
negative spiral between polarization and party organizational strength, future research might
go onto specifically analyze the organizations directly displacing party organizations. Though
the tripartite structure will likely continue to be the best means to conceptualize parties,
party organizations might again undergo another evolution in their structure, purpose, and
connection to the rest of the party.
I Tripartite Structure and Interdependence
Parties highly depend upon each component part working together in order to viably
compete for power. Different political actors might be motivated by materialistic gain (Olson,
1965), or expression of identity and ideology (Hansen, 1985), though all parties ultimately
must acquire public office to maximize their end goals (Epstein, 1980; Wray, 1981). Whereas
those in public office might seek the position itself for influence in government (Mayhew,
1974; Fenno, 1978), or their party’s control and good policy as framed by their ideologies
(Mayhew, 1974; Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), it is a necessary
condition to win public office through elections. Given position taking by parties and the
need to organize different groups of voters unified by a collective brand, cohesive parties need
to be able to coordinate the electorate with party in government. Failure to do so might
result in situations where the party is not able to capitalize on favorable electoral conditions
(Roberts, Smith and Treul, 2016) or minimize losses during unfavorable years (Rosenthal,
1995).
Relatedly, without a competitive electoral environment it is difficult to build up a cohesive
party in government or organization. A competitive electoral environment acts to provide a
sense of collective threat to unify the party (Lee, 2009; Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Smith,
2014). Without some perceived collective threat, there is little in the way to pressure parties
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in government to adopt cohesive policy stances (Key, 1958, 1949; Strom, 1990; Riker, 1962),
or act on policy goals (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer, 2002). A party organization
without a claim to being necessary to ensure party majority control might likewise seem
as an unnecessary investment, as happened in the non-competitive Democratic Solid South
(Key, 1949; Bibby and Holbrook, 1996). In turn, a party in government without some type of
longterm voting coalition and shared identity will not be able to establish the party brand
and institutions necessary to keep the party viable (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Battista, 2002;
Lee, 2009; Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Smith, 2007).
The tripartite structure is therefore highly interdependent and endogenous. To understand
the strength of one component requires an understanding and analysis of the other two. Of
the three components of the tripartite structure, however, party organizations have undergone
some of the most debilitating changes and transformations from their inception and zenith. To
not understand and measure the party organization, therefore, is to leave out both knowledge
of organizations and how they relate to party in government and the electorate, all of which
go onto shape electoral competition and accountability.
II Financing Party Organizations in the Modern Era
Modern day American state party organizations lack the type of resources and stature
once enjoyed during their prime. State party organizations once mobilized and coordinated
all campaigns within the state, chose their party’s candidates, printed out ballots, controlled
access to government jobs, and enjoyed far more authority than the national level party
organization (Heard, 1960; Key, 1958). However, progressive era reforms in ballot access,
primaries, civil service, and campaign finance effectively ended the sources of power and
meaningful variation in state party organizational strength (Mayhew, 1986; La Raja, 2008;
Cotter et al., 1989). Therefore, it is not possible to judge and measure the strength of state
party organizations based upon their Gilded Age style predecessors.
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State party organizations in the modern era primarily exist to service the party in
government, and engage in candidate service and party building activities. State party
organizations within their far more limited role now have the duty to train and recruit new
talent into the party, register voters, conduct voter outreach in the form of door-to-door
canvassing and direct mail, and identify upcoming campaign issues with polls (Bibby and
Holbrook, 1996).
Cotter et al. (1989) performed the most in depth study of state party organizational
strength from their nadir to regrowth during the 1980s. In their interviews with state party
committee organizational leaders, his responses reveal three primary dimensions which party
organizational strength relies upon: quality of services offered to candidates, recruitment of
new candidates, and maintenance of its own bureaucracy. La Raja (2008) confirms these
features of party strength hold up in the 2000s, and finds that state party organizations focus
far more on these features of party maintenance than other activities, such as media ad buys
(190–1).1 For example, La Raja (2008) found Democratic party committees spent approxi-
mately 35 percent of all expenditures on grassroots mobilization in 2004, and Republicans
approximately 36 percent (184).
As La Raja (2008) notes, large campaign funds and plentiful donations are not a sufficient
condition for a strong party organization (188–9). However, a constant stream of revenue
to state party organizations do amount to a necessary condition for state party strength
given that there are no other avenues in the present day for parties to conduct party
maintenance activities. Jewell and Morehouse (2001) note that as of the late 1990s, the
1La Raja (2008) finds an upsurge of state party committee expenditures during the 2000 presidential election
due to a loophole that effectively allowed state party committees to receive laundered national funds and
purchase television and radio ads. This practice quickly ended following the passage of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, which ended the practice (184).
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single most important role of party organizations is to “[R]aise enough money to maintain
the headquarters and to pay for the functions that state parties should be carrying out” (50).
Therefore, state party organization committees strength can in large part be determined
based upon the breadth of their donor base and total receipts.
ii Party Organization Structure and Role in the Party Network
Perhaps most crucially, the actions state party organizations take to maintain the party
meaningfully differ from other political organizations within the party network. The presence
of party organizations within states take three forms: the central state party committee,
legislative party campaign committees (LPCCs), and affiliated temporary victory funds.2
The state party committees focus primarily on active administration and voter mobilization
efforts (La Raja, 2008; Cotter and Bibby, 1984; Cotter et al., 1989). Legislative Party
Campaign Committees focus more on the recruitment of new candidates and maintaining
legislative chamber majorities (Bibby and Holbrook, 1996; Rosenthal, 1995; Gierzynski
and Jewell, 1992). Affiliated party victory committees in turn arise as part of national
party pushes to aid in acquiring state legislative and Congressional majorities with late
campaign ad buys and another venue for donors who reached the contribution limit for other
candidates/organizations (Hernson, 2009; La Raja, 2008; Heberlig and Larson, 2012). Three
2The Federal Elections Committee (FEC) requires a state party committee meet three requirements:
(1) Run “at least one candidate for federal office whose name appears on the ballot as a candidate of
the committee; (2) must possess an official party structure; and the relationship between the politi-
cal party and the committee must be based on an agreement that requires the committee to perform
activities commensurate with the day-to-day operation of the party on a state level (such as raising con-
tributions; assisting candidates’ fundraising efforts; conducting voter registration drives; holding state
conventions; and nominating candidates for state and federal office).” See Federal Elections Commit-
tee: Types of political party committees. https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/
registering-political-party/types-political-party-committees/ (accessed April 15, 2019). As
cited from, Federal Election Commission, § 100.14 State Committee, subordinate committee, district, or
local committee (52 U.S.C. 30101(15))
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features unite these organizations from others within the party network: direct control by
party leaders, coordinated expenditures with higher expenditure limits, and efficiency of
campaign targeting.
All party-associated committees, whether it take the form of the central party committee,
an LPCC or temporary majority push, all are headed by the primary officeholders and their
appointees within the state. Cotter et al. (1989) and Bibby and Holbrook (1996) consistently
find that governors have direct input into the selection of party chairs, and other members
are appointed with the permission of state house speakers and senate presidents.3 Gierzynski
and Jewell (1992) and Rosenthal (1995) find that the legislative chamber leaders directly
head their LPCC, though tend to leave day-to-day activities to a trusted appointee, such as
their chief of staff. Affiliated victory funds vary more in staffing, though usually comprise
those with connections and the trust of both state and national party leaders. For example,
the Promote Oregon Leadership Republican committee formed in 2007 to bolster the Oregon
Republican Party.4 The organization is still maintained and is currently headed directly
by House Republican Leader Rep. Carl Wilson and Deputy House Republican Leader Rep.
Greg Barreto.5 All of these committees bear responsibility for implementing the statewide
strategy for party power within the state. Additionally, Federal Election law limits donations
to both state and local political party committees to $10,000 per donor.6 Therefore, it is
3Or the equivalent head of the state senate.
4Data on Promote Oregon Leadership acquired from Brandenburg (N.d.) and the organization’s website,




the responsibility of the state party committee to decide which localities are worth funding
and contesting, and which others should be abandoned. These strategic decisions necessitate
the involvement of party leaders, which is why they have been and continue to be actively
involved over the years.
Additionally, state party committees enjoy more expenditure options not available to other
political actors. Election law permits state party committees to contribute only $5,000 to a
single candidate.7 However, state parties can engage in coordinated expenditures to finance
crucial elections. State parties can spend money on behalf of a federal candidate conditional
upon receiving express permission from the candidate (Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). For
Congressional candidates, the limits are calculated based upon the number of representatives
that a state has multiplied by the cost of living adjustment from 1976 (La Raja, 2008, 259).8
As Kolodny and Dulio (2003) note, party committees use these funds in order to aid in the
payment for consultants and district level campaign efforts, canvassing and mail efforts, and
district specific polls (738–40). Additionally, with coordinated expenditures the state and
national parties can combine their funds to aid in the payment for staff related to redistricting
(Daley, 2017; Chin, 2017; Bibby and Holbrook, 1996). While coordinated expenditures apply
to federal candidates, it is possible to carry over some of the benefits to state specific offices,
such as identifying campaign issues for state legislative districts nested within a Congressional
district.
Further, state legislative elections party committees can act as means to distribute
7Ibid.
8See the Federal Elections Commission: Calculating the coordinated party expenditure
limits, for up to date limits. https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/
making-disbursements-political-party/coordinated-party-expenditures/
calculating-coordinated-party-expenditure-limits/ (accessed April 14, 2019)
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funds to marginal legislative elections. Although direct contribution limits to candidates
vary by state, in nearly every state the contribution limits for state party committees to
candidates far exceeds that of individuals to candidates.9 For example, in Arizona the limit
on individuals to legislative candidates is a mere $410, though the limit for parties was $8,352
as of 2010.10 Although the aforementioned amount for Arizona legislative races would not
be sufficient to win the campaign, even in 2016 it would make a difference given that the
average contributions received for the most competitive candidates amounted to $77,390.11
These increased contribution limits and ability to directly coordinate with candidates grant
state party committees a unique role in political expenditures that is not true for Political
Action Committees, even after the Supreme Court’s Citizen’s United ruling in 2010 (La Raja
and Schaffner, 2015).12
Finally, party committees overwhelmingly spend their funds efficiently in order to secure
legislative majorities. Other political actors, such as legislators and interest groups, also
have an interest in securing their favored party into power. However, legislators have their
9See, Jennie Drage Bowser, “State Limits on Contributions to Candidates”, National Conference of State
Legislatures, updated January 20, 2010. http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/limits_
candidates.pdf (accessed April 20, 2019)
10Ibid.
11J.T. Stepleton, “Monetary Competitiveness in State Legislative Races, 2015 and 2016,”
November 1, 2017, https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/
monetary-competitiveness-in-2015-and-2016-state-legislative-races (accessed April 13,
2019).
12Citizens United did not directly impact the financing of party organizations. However, the 2010 ruling
did increase the appeal and power of Super PACs by effectively eliminating expenditure limits leading up
to election day as a violation of free speech. Therefore, Citizens United would exert a potential negative
impact on party organizational revenue insofar as donors decide to switch their limited funds from party
organizations to Super PACs.
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own interests, such as reelection, influence within their chamber, and good policy (Mayhew,
1974; Fenno, 1973, 1978; Rohde, 1991) that might detract from always seeking to maximize
their party’s interests. Similarly, interest groups seek access and good policy, not necessarily
one party’s control. Further, in regards to influence it is always a dominant strategy for
access seeking interest groups to donate to a specific individual, especially one that shares
their ideology (Hernson, 2009; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Ideologically driven non-party
committees in turn focus a disproportionate amount of donations on incumbents who face little
electoral threat. For example, Hernson (2009) finds that whereas national party committees
spent 94 percent of their funds on competitive Congressional seats during the 2006 midterms,
allied PACs only spent 58 percent of their funds on competitive seats, and interest groups
spent only 54 percent (1220). Although most research on the effectiveness of party committees
is at the national level, Rosenthal (1995) and Gierzynski and Jewell (1992) find similar trends
with state LPCCs. Additionally, La Raja and Schaffner (2015) find that from 1996 to 2010,
party committees focused their expenditures on weaker incumbents and strong challengers,
whereas issue groups and unions donated primarily to safe incumbents. Hernson (2009) notes
that during the 2006 midterms 10 percent of interest group funds went to candidates facing
no opposition (1220).
In the modern day, Hernson (2009) notes that the role of party committees can be
conceptualized the center of a party viewed as a multilayered coalitions, modeled in the
form of concentric circles (1209–10), as replicated in Figure 2.1. Following the multilayered
network view of parties, the power of party organizations are dispersed across a multitude of
political actors and elites that comprises a constellation of individuals and groups who aim to
influence who makes it into government and adopted policies (Hernson, 2009; Skinner, 2007;
Skinner, Masket and Dulio, 2012; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015; Cohen et al., 2008). However,
as Hernson (2009) and La Raja and Schaffner (2015) effectively argue and demonstrate, there
is still a hierarchy of pragmatism and efficiency within the party network. In regards to
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theories of party roles and goals, party organizations fall the most under the idea of functional
parties, i.e. it is the goal of the party to win elections so as to acquire political office (Epstein,
1980). By organizing party affiliates into concentric circles, those nearer the core are more
invested in the strength and maintenance of the party, whereas the periphery is moved more
by non-party interests.13 Although party organizations are not necessarily antithetical to
ideological goals, it is not the responsibility of the party committee to prioritize these. Rather,
interest groups and non-party organizational committees might appreciate the function of
party organizations, though are more inclined to pursue ideology as a part of responsible
party governance (Wray, 1981; Ranney, 1975). Following Hernson’s typology, beyond the
core party committees are officeholders with their personal interest in greater influence and
reelection, party allies outside of office who work with those in office, and finally regular party
voters.
Following Figure 2.1, the innermost rings act more strategically in maintaining the party
and securing majority status. The core actors are those who might have ideologies, but
prioritize functionality over ideology in their attempt to aid candidates in tough elections. The
periphery in turn will see actions taken to secure chamber allies and ideological agendas, which
means increased expenditures on safe incumbents (Hernson, 2009; La Raja and Schaffner,
2015).
It is important to note that there might still be some interest groups and PACs who
might act more in line with the interests of the party core. For example, Skinner, Masket
and Dulio (2013) find a variety of 527 groups with strong personnel ties to party committee
13La Raja and Schaffner (2015) divides political elites within a party as pragmatists versus purists. Pragmatists
place the wellbeing of the party and its hold on majority status above ideological concerns, whereas the
reverse is true for party purists.
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Diluted party collective interest
Core groups focus more on party maintenance expenditures and party collecitve good, whereas periphery groups expend more
on personal/group interests independent of the party. The trend towards less party collective interests is represented with the
left arrow. Model derived from Hernson (2009) (1210).
personnel, which therefore suggests greater coordination. As a result, it might be possible to
model party strength based upon an advanced network model of shared personnel. However,
such an endeavor faces two problems. First, is that an attempt to network party relations
amongst all party affiliated personnel would be prohibitively expensive. Financial and data
collection efforts largely limited the most in depth party network research by Masket (2009) to
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California alone.14 Such a method would also be difficult to expand across time. Additionally,
the idea that peripheral interest groups might be better agents of the party given that they
share similar personnel implies that the party committee had the necessary funds in the
first place to hire personnel, who might later go onto more lucrative work with various
organized interests. Therefore, insofar as party organizational power is to be understood, it
revolves around their funds that it can use to maintain its administration and strategically
win marginal elections necessary for power in government.
III Determinants of Party Committee Investment
Party committees play a materialistic role in politics; it is their job to secure funds for
the party and acquire power. It is not the job of party committees to advance a particular
ideology within the party. Therefore, I argue any decision to invest in a party committee as
opposed to some other candidate or organization will in large part be determined based on
the relative return on investment. Following the hydraulic theory of campaign finances by
La Raja and Schaffner (2015), I expand the theory to macro level motivations in the form of
rational hydraulic framework. The campaign finance hydraulic framework posits the idea
that money is fluid and will find its way to political interests, though can be manipulated by
rules and regulations that affect the path of least resistance through the creation of obstacles.
I posit that beyond campaign finance regulations, statewide institutions and features can
shift the incline of pipes leading to different organizations so to speak given the collective
interests of the electorate and party elites. Where the utility of party organizations can
be primed and known amongst the collective donor class, more money in aggregate will
shift to party organizations. Where competing non-functional party interests are primed by
14Few other states besides California have such high quality open access records necessary for research in line
with Masket (2009).
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the political environment, funds will gravitate to non-organizational interests in aggregate.
Therefore, where party organizational committees can offer themselves as necessary tools to
secure majority control amidst a competitive electoral environment, then their revenue and
in turn durability will increase. I further argue that the necessity of a party organization is
largely judged based upon the fragility of legislative majority party control, which can be
treated as the intersection of the party in government and the electorate.15
Figure 2.2 models the possible alternative organizations and individuals that political
actors might fund within a state. Donors can fund a variety of officeholders for state or federal
office, with most funds given to individuals over organizations (La Raja, 2008; La Raja and
Schaffner, 2015). A donation to an individual officeholder by a donor establishes a personal
connection with potential access (Kalla and Broockman, 2016; Jewell and Morehouse, 2001),
a sense of ideological fulfillment (La Raja and Schaffner, 2015; Aldrich, 1983), and the
opportunity to make a difference in a specific election (Downs, 1957). Donating to a state
party committee in turn might be better targeted to competitive elections (Roberts, Smith and
Treul, 2016; Gierzynski and Jewell, 1992), but is far less likely to grant access to a particular
individual or fulfill some ideological need. Therefore, whether a party committee can survive
largely depends on its ability to secure funds from not only donors, but other officeholders as
well. In regards to motivations for officeholders, a party committee can make it more likely
that a party acquires majority control, fulfilling one of the base motives for officeholders (Cox
and McCubbins, 2005). However, there are still the concerns of reelection, influence within
the chamber and good policy that might be maximized by officeholders through donations to
other political actors or simply by holding onto the funds. Theoretically, candidates through
15This of course excludes Nebraska, with its non-partisan state legislative elections.
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their campaign committees can give unlimited amounts to a party committee, as permitted
through election law (Heberlig and Larson, 2012). State party committees additionally draw
a large proportion of their funds through current officeholders (Heberlig and Larson, 2012;
La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Therefore, I argue party organizational strength rests upon
their ability to make a legitimate case that they are a credible means to fulfill other political
goals.








Arrows reflect donations to different organizations within a state system. The national party organization is left out of the
figure. Width of lines reflects the relative size of the donations based upon previous research (Heberlig and Larson, 2012;
Hernson, 2009; Bibby and Holbrook, 1996; La Raja, 2008; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015; Masket, 2009). Note that state party
organizations depend the most upon all other political actors, and their smaller relative number of donations, to survive. A
party organization might be weak on funds due to (a) fewer political actors donating to them, (b) smaller donations from the
other political actors, or (c) some combination of the two. When a party organization collapses, that is when the national party
organization takes over whenever there is a national election, assuming that a state is worth contesting (Bibby and Holbrook,
1996)
iii State Competition for Majority Control
A party organization’s primary duty is to secure majority control for their party. Insofar
as they can make the case that they will make a difference in whether a member is part
of the majority or minority will go a long way to making a difference in attaining funds.
Whether a party organization can make the case that they can make a difference relies upon
evidence that the state is marginal enough where a slight change in voter behavior would be
enough to turn the majority. It is the lack of perceived potential competition in one-party
states that led Democrats to permit their organizations to decay in the South pre-1994 and
in Massachusetts in the 1990s (Bibby and Holbrook, 1996, 89–90). Additionally, state party
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committees should be able to identify key districts and the number of individuals that they
can realistically get out in order to acquire majority control. Especially when only several
hundred to a few thousand voters need to be reached in order to acquire majority status,
state party committees can argue that their large funds dedicated to effective door-to-door
canvassing is a worthy investment (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr., 2000; Gerber and Green,
1999).
As has been commonly debated in the field of party organizational strength and electoral
competitiveness, there is a chicken and egg argument as to what comes first (Jewell and
Morehouse, 2001). However, it is the case that the two are intertwined and that it would
be difficult for a party organization to get off the ground after years out of government,
such as in the American South (Jewell and Morehouse, 2001; Key, 1958, 1949). Given that
parties do not have the resources of the Gilded Age where they could compete in up to half
of all races (Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2006; Carson et al., 2007), party organizations
must be selective in where they invest, and in turn use their credible investment strategy
to attract donors (La Raja and Schaffner, 2015; Jewell and Morehouse, 2001). In the most
competitive state, it would be a single voter in a single district that decides majority control
of a legislative chamber. The most uncompetitive state would be one where a party would
have to turn half of the state’s voting population to take majority control, given that they
are starting with zero supporters.
Marginality of governmental control is a macro-level concept related to the party in
government and electorate. An individual race might be competitive yet not make a difference
in a state where there is no chance of changing majority control. Additionally, it might
be the case that most races are not competitive, yet the few races that are competitive
decide majority control. As conceptualized in previous research, there is a focus on the
proportion of Democratic control within the legislature and governorship, a pure macro level
party in government measure (Ranney, 1971, 1976). In regards to the electoral environment,
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some measures might analyze the statewide two-party vote (McGann et al., 2016), or
the average margins and competitive seats within the legislature (Holbrook and Dunk,
1993). While statewide two-party vote is crucial in understanding the foundation political
feeling and attitudes of states (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002), and knowing the
proportion of competed seats can aid in understanding legislator responsiveness (Harden, 2013;
Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina, 1992; Mayhew, 1974; Bowen and Clark, 2014). However,
ideally to capture the intersection of party in government and competition in the electorate
would be a measure of how the individual races directly relate to control of government, akin
to measures of seat responsiveness within the gerrymandering research and measures (Gelman
and King, 1994a; Cain and Campagna, 1987; McGann et al., 2016), except as framed to the
motivations of party organizations. Marginality would therefore be a measure of fragility
of party control in government given the electorate and district map design, and therefore
appeal to the practical sense of a party organization.
One can see the idea of marginality in playing a crucial role in party organizational
advertising strategies in the modern day. As recounted by Daley (2017), the Republican State
Leadership Committee in combination with state party committees secured a wide variety of
funders upon identifying the specific neighborhoods that they would need to turn in order to
secure legislative majorities. I expect these competitive margins to increase the appeal of
state party organizations and therefore increase their acquired funds. I therefore predict,
Hypothesis 1: The closer the electoral margins separating the majority party from the
minority, the greater the funds that state party committees shall receive.
iii Benefits of Access to Party Leadership
Party committees work to benefit the party and are therefore overseen by the party
leadership in government. Although leadership PACs act as one means to secure the attention
of party leadership, so too do the state party committees and LPCCs. Heberlig and Larson
(2012) find that donations to leadership affiliated committees are crucial for members of
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Congress to attain leadership positions themselves. Similarly, businesses interested in securing
their issues on the party agenda must donate to the party in power, especially following the
launch of Tom Delay’s K-Street strategy, which forced access oriented organized interests to
donate exclusively to the majority party (Heberlig and Larson, 2012, 50). While it might be
expected that state party committees with majority control would imitate DeLay’s strategy,
not all state officeholders have the power to do so. American states greatly vary in the power
vested to chamber leaders and governors. In states like West Virginia and Illinois, the state
speaker of the house wields more power in committee assignment and floor agenda than even
the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Mooney, 2013, 2012). However, in states
like North Dakota the speaker barely has the power to set the calendar. Similarly, some
governors can effectively replace the legislature in control of the budget, such as Wisconsin,
whereas others do not even wield veto power (Krupnikov and Shipan, 2012; Beyle, 2008). I
therefore expect the appeal of accessing party leaders to be conditional upon their power,
leading to
Hypothesis 2: State party committees with control of branches with higher levels of
institutional power will secure greater funding.
Insofar as a sufficient number of people and organized interests pursue material goals in
politics, money will accumulate in party organizations.
iii Ideology at the Expense of Pragmatism
The previous two hypotheses posit that given a sufficient number of potential donors
interested in attaining influence and party control, donations will accumulate into party
organizations. However, donors who place ideology above pragmatic material interests may
not find party committees appealing. As La Raja and Schaffner (2015) find, state party
committees spend most of their funds on competitive races where incumbents tend to be far
more moderate. It is for this reason that La Raja and Schaffner (2015) find that ideological
donors prefer giving directly to candidates proximate in ideology (Bonica, 2013, 2014). Even
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though an ideologically stringent donor likely will not make a difference in the candidate’s
election, they will fulfill a sense of ideological loyalty and possibly provide the funds necessary
for their preferred candidate to attain greater influence within the chamber. La Raja and
Schaffner (2015) finds general trends demonstrating closer ideological proximity between
legislators in states with laws greatly limiting party organizational funding. However, it
should also be the case that less polarized legislatures decrease the appeal for a donor to
donate based upon ideology. Rather, a politically active individual would either not donate
at all or give to the party organization. Similarly, legislators and other officeholders would
have less interest in expending resources to secure their ideological faction in the legislature,
but to the party organization in a less polarized setting. I therefore predict,
Hypothesis 3: Increased polarization within the state legislature will lead to decreased funds
for state party committees.
Should these hypotheses receive support, then it would suggest that the nature of the
political environment and how it appeals to different types of donors exerts an effect on the
strength of party organizations, which in turn feeds back into the political environment.
IV Data and Methods
I empirically test the wealth and durability of state party organizations with data on all
funds donated to state party committees from 1996 to 2016. I secured these data from the
National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) (Brandenburg, N.d.), which identified
FEC certified state party committee organizations, and cleaned the FEC data on donations
to state party committees. The contribution records includes 1,894,859 entries from 930,531
unique contributors to 312 unique party committees. Without the NIMSP efforts to catalog,
clean, and make these records available for academic purposes, this research would not be
possible.
There are three primary analytical goals. First, I seek to determine which states have
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more financially stable party committees.16 The second goal is to create a new measure
of fragility/marginality of party control of the legislature as determined by the electoral
environment within a state that more closely maps onto the strategic decision making of party
organizations. The third goal is to determine whether the pursuit of individual rationally
pursued interests given the campaign financial environment aggregated up to influence state
party committee strength.
iv Measuring State Party Organizational Committee Strength
I posit that there are three straightforward dimensions that must be analyzed in order
to measure state party committee strength. First would be the total receipts received. The
second would be the breadth of the donor base, and third, the population of a state. The
importance of party committee funding levels is self explanatory, though the breadth of
donors is crucial in determining the long term sustainability and independence of a party
organizations. A party organization overly reliant upon single donors is vulnerable to shocks,
such as a withdrawal of donations through dissatisfaction with the party organizational
performance, or death of donors. The importance of a sustainable donor base can be seen
through state party committee takeovers during the 1980s and 1990s. During these decades,
party committees reported spikes in donations, though these came from the national party,
which went on to completely seize control of poorly funded state party committees (Bibby
and Holbrook, 1996). Additionally, a state party committee completely backed by a few
individuals would be less of a mass party and more of an oligarchic front. Banfield and
16Given the looser structure of party committees in the modern day, I group party committees by affiliation
in a single party and state for a two-year period. For example, if Oregon has the Oregon State Republican
Committee, Senate Republican Campaign Committee, and Promote Oregon Leadership, their funds would
all be grouped together. While some nuance might be lost, these party committees all share the same
position within the party network model, share resources, leadership, and institutional power.
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Wilson (1963) note that the difference between a well oiled party machine and a puppet
party is the extent to which a party is financed not by one person, but rather through the
city at large.17 I therefore weight aggregated donations to a state’s party with the Herfindahl
index to capture the broadness of the donor base. I employ the Herfindahl index by summing
squared proportion of a donation to the state’s party committee for a given year. Values that
approach zero reflect great diversity in the number and size of donations, whereas scores of
one reflect complete homogeneity. For the purposes of weighting, I subtract the Herfindahl
index from one in order to create a reverse weight. I then multiply the logged donations to a
party’s committee within a state for a given year. Finally, the weighted logged donations
to party committees are aggregated to two year periods and divided by the logged state’s
population. I incorporate population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau.18 This results
in 1,084 observations for 49 states from 1996 to 2016.19 However, in order to match the party
committee donation estimates to the rest of the independent variables during the analysis,
the data are reduced to 522 observations from 2002 to 2010.
Upon establishing the funds per year for a given state party committee, I then employ an
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors by random effects on state-parties on
donations to state party committees from 2002 to 2010. I regress weighted logged donations
on independent variables related to the aforementioned hypotheses. The resulting analysis
17Banfield and Wilson (1963) wrote about city politics, though the same general rule applies to states. They
specifically wrote to clarify cities that appeared to have strong party machines, but were in actuality more
or less the personal property of single individuals, such as Chicago with the Daley family.
18State Population Estimates, 1990–1999; 2000–2010; 2011–2018. United States Census Bureau. https://www.
census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html (accessed January 15,
2018 )
19The NIMSP did not have any data on West Virginia, the sole missing state within the time frame.
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will reveal the change in weighted donations to parties, controlling for time.
I employ a new measure of party competition in order to test the competitiveness of state
legislative chambers. The new measure employed is called the marginal majority measurement
(MMM), which measures the percentage of the vote that would be necessary to change control
of the legislative majority by chamber by targeting the most marginal seats. I calculate these
data by first determining the number of seats that separate party control for the upper and
lower houses using the State Partisan Balance data established by Klarner (2013). I then
find the most marginal seats up to the difference in majority control and calculate the vote
difference between the winning and losing candidates using the state legislative elections
returns data by Klarner (2018). I then divide the marginal voters by the voting population
of a state, and then average the marginal percent across chambers. The end result is a score
reflecting the percentage of the state’s voting population that would need to change their
votes in order to change majority control.
The MMM improves upon and captures the intersection of two standard measures of
party control and competitiveness in state politics, the Ranney Index and Holbrook-Van
Dunk (HVD) index. The Ranney index is an average of the proportion of Democrats in the
state legislature, vote share for the Democratic governor, and percentage of the time that a
Democrat controls both the governor’s office and state legislature (Ranney, 1971, 1976). The
Ranney Index therefore is a macro level score of Democratic control of government, and can
be folded to create a measure of balance in state government. However, as Holbrook and
Dunk (1993) and King (1988) note, the measure swings to widely due to the gubernatorial
component.20 Additionally, for scholars interested in the party’s strength among the electorate,
20As Jewell and Morehouse (2001) note in their coverage of developing political parties, the personal component
of a gubernatorial candidate can often be enough to overcome party labels and cause voters to switch sides.
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gerrymandering through redistricting can bias results (Gelman and King, 1994b; Cox and Katz,
1999; McGann et al., 2016). The HVD index is a better measure of electoral competition, as
it averages the win percentage, winning margin, percent of uncontested seats, and percentage
of safe seats within a state’s legislative chambers (Holbrook and Dunk, 1993; Shufeldt and
Flavin, 2012). While HVD is a strong measure of aggregated micro level district competition,
it is not an ideal measure of macro chamber competition. While it is worth knowing the level
of electoral threat that the population of legislators face in aggregate, state parties do not
seek to win every seat. Rather, they seek to win majorities (Riker, 1962). A strategic state
party would seek to win the legislative districts with the least amount of opposition that
would acquire or maintain majority control.21 As has been noted by Barrilleaux, Holbrook
and Langer (2002), the best measure of legislative competition would both capture party
control of the legislature and marginality of district level elections (418). Such a measure
would capture the macro motivations of parties to acquire votes and governmental office
(Strom, 1990), creating what amounts to a single variable of the party in the electorate and
party in government. Following the idea that chamber majorities are the key point of interest,
that district level marginality affects legislative majorities, and that party organizations seek
to win/maintain legislative majorities in the least costly manner as possible, then the MMM
offers a macro level measure within the context of this study that appeals to the established
motives of party organizations. As a validation check, I employ exploratory and confirmatory
21Following a non-party and ideological model of legislative action, such as proposed by Krehbiel (1993),
then one might expect a party to win as many seats as possible in order to change the chamber median.
However, if parties at all matter and some of the base conditions of party cartel theory met (i.e. power
over procedural voting, chairmanships, etc.) (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), then the majority party median
would control policy output, making additional seats beyond what’s minimally necessary pointless. Strong
evidence by Anzia and Jackman (2012), Aldrich and Battista (2002) and Mooney (2012) strongly support
the importance of parties in procedural matters across the states.
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factor analysis to compare the three measures of MMM, the Ranney index, and HVD index
in the appendix, with the data acquired from the State Partisan Balance Dataset (Klarner,
2013). The initial results in Appendix Table ??cfa suggests that the MMM performs as
expected.
I measure the legislative control of the governor’s office and legislature with Klarner’s
State Partisan Balance data (Klarner, 2013). I code legislative control for a given party as
one if they control both chambers, and zero otherwise. I code gubernatorial control in the
same manner. I account for state legislative leader power using the state speaker formal
power index as established by Mooney (2013). The index accounts for whether the state
speaker can appoint committee chairs, legislators to committees, the percentage of other
leaders appointed, whether the speaker has bill referral power, and control of professional
staff for standing committees. A score of 0 reflects the weakest formal powers for a speaker,
whereas 5 represents the most formally powerful speakers. No similar index exists for state
senate presidential power. The state speaker power index effectively captures the ability for
state legislative leaders to reward loyal legislators who donate to their party. Gubernatorial
power is measured using the Gubernatorial Budgetary Power Index (BPI) for budgets as
established by Krupnikov and Shipan (2012). The index accounts for whether the governor
has the power to prepare the budget, spend federal grant money at their discretion, line item
veto budgets, reorganize budgeting departments without the approval of the state legislature,
and reduce the budget at their discretion in times of emergency. The BPI effectively captures
the ability for governor’s to control the budget in a way that would appeal for access oriented
interest groups. I interact both of these measures with whether a party committee controls
the branch of interest.
I finally measure polarization using the Shor and McCarty (2011) chamber ideological
distance scores. Polarization scores are averaged for each state for a given year. Higher
scores reflect greater polarization. The greater the score, the more meaningful the difference
46
between the parties, and the more polarized the state legislature.
iv Controls
I control for several potential confounding variables that relate to state party committee
funds. I first control for the proportion of state senate and state house seats up for election for
a given year, as drawn from the state partisan balance data. I next control for the legislative
professionalism of a state from the legislative professionalism dataset provided by Bowen and
Greene (2014), where higher scores reflect greater professionalism. Past studies suggest that
professionalism should be associated with greater funds for state party committees (La Raja
and Schaffner, 2015).
Further, it has been documented that Republicans tend to have a superior presence and
organizational set up in maintaining their party organizations (La Raja, 2008; Bibby and
Holbrook, 1996) Therefore, I add in a dummy variable for whether a party committee is
Republican or not. I further control for the logged GDP and GDP percent change. These
variables should have a positive relationship with donations to party committees. I acquire
state level GDP and percentage change from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.22
Given previous research by Jacobson (1989, 1986), it is also the case that there might be
nationalized effects on state party committees as related to the president. Party committees
as the same party of the president might enjoy higher revenues when the president is popular.
I therefore include the presidential job approval as measured by Gallup Polling from the first
November poll of a given year, as archived by the American Presidency Project by Woolley
and Peters (2019). I interact the presidential approval with whether the party committee
is of the same party as the president. I additionally interact percentage change in GDP
22Gross Domestic Product by State, Advance 2015 and Revised 1997-2014 (2015)
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with whether a party is of the same party as the president. These variables should capture
potential coattail effects in fundraising for party committees. I finally include controls related
to whether the time period is before or after the BCRA, or during a presidential election
year. These final controls should capture potential election type effects that might depress or
inflate party committee revenues for a given year.
V Results
The first question to answer is what is the variance in party organizational strength over
time, and which states tend to have the strongest parties? Relatedly, a question that should
be answered before looking at geographical trends is whether there is a meaningful difference
between donations to party committees versus unweighted donations. The motivation to
answer whether a difference arises is in order to determine if there is variance across breadth
of donor bases across the states, which should in turn influence the independence and
sustainability of party organizations. The results suggest that there are meaningful differences
between the weighted and unweighted measures.
Figure 2.3 displays the difference between the weighted and unweighted donations to party
committees. The Figure displays a histogram in the difference between unweighted logged
donations to party committees and weighted donations, without the normalization of state
population. We see that while in a little over 10 percent of the data there is no difference
between the weighted and unweighted donations, the two measures start to diverge. Given
that the results are in logged dollars, the resulting differences tend to be inconsequential,
though there are a number of state-years with substantive differences. Some of these states
include Wisconsin Democrats from 2000–2001, Arkansas Republicans from 2000–2001, and
Mississippi Republicans from 2006-2007, all of whom received most of their donations from
relatively few donors. These states with large differences between unweighted and weighted
donations are those where state party organizations have the capacity to spend on elections
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Differences in Donations to Party Committees
A histogram of the difference in unweighted and weighted donations to party committees within a state for a given year. The
weight is the reverse Herfindahl index, where a wider donor base are weighted closer to one, and party committees reliant upon
fewer donors closer to zero. The results are not normalized by state population, and therefore reflect the total logged revenues
to party committees.
and party building activities, though are highly dependent, and therefore fragile, to the whims
of these fewer donors. Although these results are not pursued further within this chapter,
these results suggest that tracking party committee spending decisions and goals within these
states dependent upon few donors might be of future research interest.
Figure 2.4 maps out the average difference in weighted logged donations between Demo-
cratic and Republican party committees from 2002 to 2010. States in blue have a greater
Democratic party committee fundraising advantage, and red states are those with a Republi-
can party committee advantage. We see that Democratic state party committees have the
greatest advantages over the 2000s in Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Arkansas, and Arizona. Republicans in turn have the
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greatest advantage in Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and South Dakota. Note that these data reflect
advantages in party committee strength, not necessarily strongest party structures overall.
Regardless, we do see some geographic trends. Democratic party committees tend to do
better on the East and West coasts, and Republicans in the South and Midwest.
However, some states warrant a closer analysis. North Carolina in particular is an
interesting state given that following the 2010 redistricting cycle, Republicans dominated
the state. Figure 2.5 plots the weighted versus unweighted party committee receipts per
capita during the 2000s, with two observations per year. It is apparent that more often
than not, Democratic party committee unweighted donations tracked closely to weighted
donations, with the exception of 2002 and 2007. However, the difference between weighted
and unweighted donations to Republican state party committees substantively diverge. With
the exception of 2005 to 2006 and 2010, Republicans tended to get most of their funds from
relatively few donors.23 Therefore, while the North Carolina Republican Party committees
generally had the same level of donations per capita as Democrats, they tended to be beholden
to a few select donors. These results suggest that one needs to consider what they seek to
measure when analyzing state party committees. A party committee might have the necessary
funds to compete for a variety of state offices, though lack a degree of independence necessary
to maintain stand up to particular donors.
v Marginal Majorities
Figure 3.2a demonstrates the distribution of the percentage of the vote necessary to
change majority control of both legislative chambers, the marginal majority measurement.
The distribution ranges from a minimum of 0.15 percent, in New York state in 2004, to a
23These donors include John Art Pope and the Republican National Committee. Specific individual donations
made possible by the well documented data provided by (Brandenburg, N.d.).
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Figure 2.4: Map of Difference in Weighted Donations by Party, 2002–2010
The average difference between weighted logged donations between Democratic and Republican party committees. Higher
values reflect a greater advantage to Democratic party committees, and negative values a Republican advantage. States in
white have missing data.
maximum of 53.9 percent in Hawaii during 2008. The results reveal varying degrees to which
state legislative chambers teetered between parties.
Figure 2.7 presents the average marginal majority scores by state average from 2002
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Figure 2.5: North Carolina State Party Committee Receipts per Capita, 2002–2010
The figure plots the donations to party committees per capita within North Carolina from 2002 to 2010, with points plotted
bienially. The top figure reflects Democratic committees, and the bottom Republican committees. Greater gaps between
weighted and unweighted donations reflect years in which donations to party committees arise from fewer individuals that
donate disproportionately more relative to the rest of the donors within a given year.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of the Marginal Majority Measurement (MMM), 2002–2010
to 2010. The map presents the MMM by quintiles. It is apparent that the legislative
chambers with the most solid legislative majorities during the 2000s were Idaho, Wyoming,
Utah, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, Kentucky, and Rhode Island. Among the most fragile
legislative majorities during the 2000s were Northeastern states, such as New York and
Connecticut, and Midwestern states such as Minnesota and Michigan. It appears that
regionally that the Northeast contains the most competitive legislative chambers, and the
south the and mountain West the least competitive. These results suggest that it would
be an uphill battle for a state party committee or any other organization to successfully
challenge and win control of the state legislature.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of the Marginal Majority Measurement (MMM), 2002–2010
State marginal majorities presented by quintiles. Lighter grays refelct closer marginal majorities and therefore more fragile
legislative majorities. States in white, Nebraska, Louisiana, and West Virginia, reflect missing data.
Appendix table A.1 in turn suggests that MMM when included as part of a confirmatory
factor analysis contributes a greater portion of the latent dimension of competitiveness within
the legislature as compared to either the HVD or Ranney indices. Therefore, it appears that
the MMM can be of use in analyzing the fragility of state legislative chamber control and
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overall party competition within state politics.24
v Analysis of Determinants of Donations to Party Committee
To analyze the determinants of party committee strength as measured by weighted
donations per capita, an OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors is employed.
Table A.2 reports the summary statistics for the covariates of interest, and overall reveals
sufficient variance in the independent variables. Table 2.1 reports results of the weighted
donations per capita to state party committees model. The adjusted R2 demonstrates that
the model explains approximately 18 percent of the variance.
24As Bowen and Greene (2014) write in their reconsideration of measures of legislative professionalism, the
best measure is one that more directly tracks onto the theoretical mechanism of interest. Similarly, if
one seeks to research micro-level competition of legislative districts, one might instead look to the HVD
index. Further, if one seeks a pure measure of Democratic control of party in state government, then the
Ranney index would be superior to the HVD index or MMM. For the purpose of this research, however,
the marginality of legislatures and impact on party organizations is of interest.
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Table 2.1: OLS Regression on Weighted Donations to Party Committees
Dependent variable: Weighted party committee revenue biennially
Marginal-Majority −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)






Governor Power (BPI) −0.018
(0.019)
Leg. Control X Speaker Power −0.024
(0.034)












GDP % Chg −0.000
(0.000)




POTUS Party X GDP chg. 0.001
(0.006)
POTUS Party X Approval −0.000
(0.001)









Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed
Coefficients on top, and standard errors in parentheses beneath. Errors estimated with panel corrected standard errors, with
random effects by state-party, and fixed effects for party.
In regards to the primary independent variables of interest, competition within the state
legislature as measured with the MMM reaches statistical significance (p<0.01). The results
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the necessary votes to turn majority control
of the state legislature is associated with a 0.007 decrease in dollars per capita to party
committees. In order to visualize the impact of marginal legislative majorities, Figure 2.8
demonstrates the estimated total per capita dollars to party committees, all else equal,
as MMM varies from its minimal to maximum values. We see that in the most marginal
legislative chambers, where relatively few votes might change majority control, the predicted
56
dollars to party committees per capita is at approximately 1.76. In the most stable legislative
chambers, the donations per capita drop by approximately 0.38 per capita dollars. Moving
from the 25th to 75th percentiles would be associated with a reduction in approximately 0.10
dollars per capita, or about one-third the size of the standard deviation in party committee
per capita funds. Therefore, it appears that while the total impact of MMM does not predict
most of the variation in party committee receipts, the estimated effect can make a difference.
Overall, there is support for hypothesis one.
Figure 2.8: Predicted Impact of Marginal Majorities on Party Donations per capita
95 percent confidence intervals between the dashed gray lines.
Hypothesis two is not supported by the results. The effects for leader power, as measured
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by formal state speaker and gubernatorial budget power, are indistinguishable from zero.
Additionally, the components of the interacted effects are inconsistent. Therefore, it appears
that a party committee who controls either the legislature or governorship and enjoys strong
formal powers do not see increased donations to party committees. These results suggest that
in aggregate, the appeal to donate and access powerful party leaders in government, all else
equal, do not lead to increased donations. These results might be due to one of two factors.
First, as Mooney (2013) notes, speaker power tends to be fairly stable across time, although
changes do occur. It might be that there is not sufficient variance within speaker power, and
the same for gubernatorial power. Additionally, it might be due to the fact that governors
and state speakers are more than just their formal powers. Informal power, in part arising
from the characteristics of the person who holds the position, affects the perceived power.
For the purpose of this study, these results, or lack thereof, shall be left to future research.
Finally, we see fairly strong support for hypothesis three, in that increased ideological
distance between legislative parties significantly (p<0.05) reduces donations to party com-
mittees. Figure 2.9 plots the predicted effect of ideological distance between parties on
donations to party committees. The results suggest that moving from minimal polarization
to maximum polarization would be associated with a reduction in 0.32 dollars per capita
to party committees. Moving across the inter-quartile range of ideological distance, one
would expect a reduction in approximately 0.06 dollars per capita to party committees, or
approximately 19 percent of the size of the standard deviation in party committee funds.
Therefore, these results suggest support for hypothesis three in that increased ideological
distance between parties is associated with decreased donations to party committees.
As for the controls, logged GDP and legislative professionalism are associated with
increased per capital dollars to party committees. Therefore, wealthier states are associated
with better funded party committees, along with states where the primary job of a legislator is
to be a legislator. Pre-BCRA years and presidential election years are in turn reach statistical
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Impact of Legislative Polarization on Party Donations
95 percent confidence intervals between the dashed gray lines.
significance in a negative effect on per capita dollars to party committees.
VI Discussion and Conclusions
These results in aggregate suggest several important conclusions going forward in analyses
of state party organizational committee strength. First, although party organizations no
longer have the means to offer offices and similar incentives to maintain party control,
donations to party committees provide variance across time and space in analyzing party
organizational strength. Further, one must be careful in considering who funds the party
organization. As occurred with party machines following the progressive era, a well funded
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party might look strong but in reality be beholden to relatively few donors and interests. The
field of state politics already documents several high profile cases where party committees
dependent upon the national committee lost most of their autonomy in running their own
operations (Bibby and Holbrook, 1996). We additionally know within American localities
that it is more than possible for local party organizations to be captured by a single wealthy
individual (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). Though left to future research, the differences in
behavior between party committees beholden to relatively few interests versus many might be
worth pursuing in future research. Both in regards to governance and selection of candidates
for elected office, we might see differences in behavior in a manner that can be quantified as
an explanatory variable. For example, the weighted donation measure penalized Minnesota
Republicans for overly relying on wealthy donor Robert Cummins, who provided over seven
percent of the Minnesota Republican campaign committee funds. His withdrawal of funds
over disagreements with the GOP leadership for not pursuing right-to-work laws substantially
decreased the strength of the Minnesota Republicans looking purely at logged dollars, though
not overly much with the weighted measure.25 Therefore, analyzing how dependent a party
is on a few individuals would grant future research a better grasp as to the sustainability
and independence of a party. A party with a broad donor base will be less susceptible to
a single individual dictating the operations of the party organizational operation. Future
research might further analyze how closely party organizations adhere to the ideologies and
preferences of donors that they are dependent upon.
25A special thanks to La Raja and Schaffner (2015) for this example. Though they did not identify
Robert Cummins in their work explicitly, it was fairly straightforward to identify the drop in donations
using the data from NIMSP. For more details, see, Catharine Richert and Tom Scheck, “Stealth donor
gives millions to GOP candidates, causes,” Minnesota Public Radio News, February 1, 2012, https:
//www.mprnews.org/story/2012/02/01/robert-cummins-profile (accessed May 6, 2019)
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Additionally, the results presented suggests the marginal majority measurement (MMM)
as a useful means to capture the intersection of party in government and macro level
competition in the electorate. The measure builds upon the idea that there is overlap in
concepts between the desire for a party to maximize votes and power in government, while
minimizing expenditures. Further, confirmatory factor analysis suggests that insofar as the
MMM, Ranney index, and HVD index measure the same latent dimension, MMM explains
the most. Though the MMM does not capture every micro component that leads to a
competitive political environment, it is a useful for two reasons. First, it simplifies the
connection between party in the electorate and party in government. Though it does not
capture every governmental office like the Ranney index, it does focus in on the data with
the least noise. That said, it would not be difficult to implement MMM into the Ranney
index, switching in the MMM in place of the proportion of seats held by Democrats in the
state legislature. Second, MMM is a measure that more or less is directly used by those
operating within the applied political world. As Daley (2017) recounts, the GOP literally
advertised marginal majorities as a means to acquire more donations in order to fuel their
plans to acquire state legislative and Congressional majorities. Therefore, MMM can be a
useful tool within the study of state politics. The initial results already suggest an effect on
party organizational capacity, and it seems likely the results are not limited to only the sphere
of party organizations. For example, MMM might be used within redistricting research as a
means to measure electoral responsiveness more directly. Whereas responsiveness measures
the confidence interval of changes in control of the legislature given swings in the statewide
vote as applied randomly to districts (Gelman and King, 1990), MMM takes into account
that given the partisan makeup of districts and past party performance, rationally strategic
political actors will seek to minimize the costs necessary to attain majority party control and
target the most marginal districts. The application of MMM remains to be completed for
future research.
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Further, the analysis of the rational campaign hydraulic framework, as first developed
by La Raja and Schaffner (2015), suggests that the aggregation of individual level choices
as framed by the political environment affects the strength of party organizations. The
results suggest that marginal control of state legislatures potentially drive up donations
to party committees. Party committees in turn invest their funds into the candidates and
infrastructure necessary to maintain the party over time. These results suggest that party
committees would also receive fewer donations the better they perform in winning legislative
majorities. All else equal, a dynamic equilibrium should eventually be reached. However, the
results also suggest that increased polarization reduces financial support for party committees.
La Raja and Schaffner (2015) finds evidence to support that weaker party committees lead to
more polarization. Given that more polarization leads to less support for party committees,
it appears that there is the strong potential for a cyclical effect that continually eats away
at party organizational strength. Once party committees reach a sufficiently low level of
support, they will not be able to recruit quality candidates that can appeal to the general
election median voter, and instead succumb to outside interest groups and activists, which
leads to more polarization (Masket, 2009).
One might also keep in mind when analyzing party organizational strength and competitive
environments that electoral competition as measured with the MMM is very susceptible to
gerrymandering. If districts can be drawn in such away that overwhelmingly wastes the
other party’s votes and lead to relatively safe wins a little above 10 percentage points for
the majority party in control of redistricting, then there will be no longer be the need for
state party organizations to win elections. Such extreme gerrymandering became especially
severe following the 2010 cycle (McGann et al., 2016; Daley, 2017). Given that less party
organizational power would necessarily lead to empowered party activists, gerrymandering
might therefore indirectly lead to increased polarization of state legislatures. Therefore, one
might expect for gerrymandering to potentially both encourage the polarization of candidates
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in combination with primaries (Krasa and Polborn, 2018), and deteriorate the primary source
of pragmatism within the tripartite structure that sponsors the party members most likely
to adhere to moderation as a means to maintain control of state legislatures (La Raja and
Schaffner, 2015). Therefore, the potential is strong for changes in party behavior within
office.
Another concern and avenue for potential research to keep in mind is that the analytical
results are sandwiched by two major shifts in campaign finance. The BCRA of 2002 and
the Citizens United ruling bookend the data. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) finds little in
the way of changes to state campaign finance law as well over the period. Therefore, these
results come after keeping the campaign finance hydraulic framework constant. The nature
of the Citizens United ruling makes it such that non-party organizations can engage in more
unfettered campaign activities, in recognition that over-regulating campaign activities is an
infringement on free speech. McCutcheon v. FEC 26 following Citizens United also lifted
most limits on wealthy donors on the amounts that they could donate to. Further, these
U.S. Supreme Court rulings produced a backlash by some state courts and activists, who in
turn implemented their own state level campaign finance regulations (Kulesza, Miller and
Witko, 2017). Therefore, these disruptions to the campaign environment combined with the
institutional features that prime and motivate political donations offer a series of exogenous
shocks that might be pursued in future research to better ascertain the components of the
campaign hydraulic finance framework.
Overall, these results need to be further explored in order to ascertain the direct and
indirect effects state party organizational strength has on governance, and governance’s effect
26572 U.S. 134 (2010)
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on state party organizational strength. The newfound ease in which we can measure the
funding and sustainability of a state party organization via their fundraising opens the path
to many future research projects. These results therefore offer a better understanding of the
tripartite structure and the sources of strength that maintain it over time.
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CHAPTER 3: HAZARDS AND OBSTACLES OF REDISTRICTING
The opportunity for state legislators to draw legislative districts permits one of the
most contentious and predictable political battles in American politics. At least once a
decade, state legislators have the opportunity to draw their district lines and structure
elections for the next decade so that incumbents and/or political parties enjoy a long term
electoral advantage. For the professionals and legislators who partake in redistricting, a
common theme in why redistricting is so appealing is that, “Redistricting is like an election
in reverse ... In redistricting, the politicians get to pick the voters!”1 Although decennial
redistricting is required to ensure even population across legislative districts within a state,
the opportunity to potentially bias maps leads to great consternation about the impact on
electoral accountability (Gelman and King, 1994a). Given that the structure of redistricting
is such that those who benefit the most are those with the responsibility of drawing their
own districts, many aver redistricting to be a nigh unsolvable obstacle to ensuring electoral
responsiveness (McGann et al., 2016; Daley, 2017).
Although redistricting might be difficult to solve at the ballot box, it is a highly fragile
process prone to failure. Disregarding states where non-partisan independent commissions
1Thomas Hofeller, “National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Review,” C-SPAN, August
13, 2001, https://www.c-span.org/video/?165594-3/2000-redistricting-review (accessed June 6,
2019). As cited in, Miles Parks, “Redistricting Guru’s Hard Drives Could Mean Legal, Political
Woes For GOP,” National Public Radio, June 6, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/730260511/
redistricting-gurus-hard-drives-could-mean-legal-political-woes-for-gop (accessed June 6,
2019)
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redistrict, state legislatures fail to redistrict 20 percent of the time, which in turn necessitates
court intervention. Research to date suggests court intervention in turn leads to a significant
reduction in partisan bias and leads to more competitive districts (Crespin, 2005; Levitt and
McDonald, 2007; McGann et al., 2016; Carson, Crespin and Williamson, 2014). The question
arises then, why do legislatures permit courts and other outside actors to redistrict in their
place? Given that who redistricts influences who represents us, we have both positive and
normative reasons to seek to answer this puzzle.
I argue that redistricting is plagued by a collective action dilemma where individual
legislators face a zero sum game for the most secure districts. The collective good of the
party, securing a party majority, can easily fall to the wayside in the face of too many self
interested legislators who seek to maximize their security amidst a limited number of potential
supporters. Further, the technical difficulties that impair quick redistricting can prevent
the legislature from redistricting. Given that states need both legislative and Congressional
districts in time for elections, failure to redistrict a map that satisfies basic redistricting
criteria leads courts and other non-legislative bodies to redistrict in place of the legislature.
I argue that it is through the strong party funds coupled with unified party government
that centralizes, expedites and secures legislative control of redistricting capable of overcoming
technical obstacles. A lack of the necessary funds to hire expert redistricting consultants
agents only to the party leadership and the expenditure on other items as the need arises
risks the intervention of courts and other non-legislative actors to redistrict in place of the
state legislature in both state legislative and Congressional maps. It is then the presence
and perceived probability that a court might redistrict that leads to more competitive state
legislative and Congressional maps.
I apply party cartel theory to frame the role of centralized party leadership funds to ensure
that their party secures governing majorities (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Without the
centralization offered by party leadership and their funds to hire a single party redistricting
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consultant, reelection seeking legislators left to their own devices deliberate too long due to
their conflicting preferences. Further, divided governments lead to gridlock between parties,
leaving unified governments with the capability to secure the buy-in of its legislators the
primary means by which to secure legislative control of redistricting. It is when party leaders
lack the resources to centralize redistricting and offer incentives to legislators to side with
the party position that the time it takes to redistrict and overcome the technical barriers
increases, until courts finally intervene. When courts intervene, their disconnect from the
concerns of legislators leads to more competitive maps. Thus, well resourced parties prevent
courts from implementing more competitive and less biased districts through centralization
of redistricting, no matter the obstacles.
I employ a two stage survival analysis, followed by an ordinary least squares regression
(OLS), in order to test the claim that redistricting is a collective action problem that might be
solved through strong state parties in control of unified state government facing fewer technical
obstacles. I expect unified party governments in combination with greater party committee
funds, and fewer technical obstacles to explain when and who redistricts state legislative and
Congressional maps. For the 2001 and 2011 redistricting cycles, I determine redistricting
passage dates and who redistricted for all states that redistrict three maps per cycle, and
where the legislature or a politician commission initially retains redistricting authority. I
first run a multilevel survival model to determine the likelihood that a map is passed over
time. I then estimate a competing risks survival model to determine the probability that
courts redistrict in place of the legislature, dependent in part on the residuals from the first
stage model. I find evidence that better financed party committees in combination with
unified party government reduces the time necessary to redistrict, which in turn prevents
court intervention. Further, state policies mandating adherence to local boundaries appear
to greatly inhibit the ability for legislatures to redistrict. Relatedly, states where legislative
and Congressional delegation majorities are secure from losing power tend to be associated
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with a lower risk of court intervention.
Finally, the third stage model analyzes the change in security of the legislative and
Congressional majority parties within a state following redistricting, along with the competi-
tiveness of state legislative districts. The results ultimately suggest that the predicted effect
of a court redistricting does not exert a significant reach significance. Additionally, there is
some evidence that court and commission drawn maps might decrease levels of competition
within legislative districts. These results support that who redistricts is a function of a
collective action problem faced by the legislature, though calls into question the benefits of
redistricting by non-legislative bodies.
I Legislative Time Limits and Ticking Clocks
Baker v. Carr 2 (1962) launched court intervention into redistricting and forever made
time a critical factor in redistricting. States prior to the 1960s could delay redistricting
legislation so long as their state did not lose seats during the decennial apportionment process
following the U.S. Census (Engstrom, 2013; Cox and Katz, 2002). However, Baker v. Carr
ruled redistricting to be a justiciable issue before federal courts, soon applied in Wesberry
v. Sanders3 (1964) and Reynolds v. Sims4 (1964). These decisions mandated that in order
to preserve the one person, one vote principle, state legislatures must redistrict following
the U.S. Census (Cox and Katz, 2002). Whenever states failed to redistrict in time for
candidates to file for elections, courts at the state and national level redistrict in place of the





the Voting Rights Act established pre-clearance of states with a history of discriminatory
practices. As a result, these states up until 2013 needed to submit maps for pre-clearance by
the department of justice, which required extra time (Levitt and McDonald, 2007).
Traditionally, state legislatures retained the sole right to redistrict due to tradition and U.S.
Constitution Article I, section 4, which states that “the times, places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof.” Entry of the courts in redistricting and concern over gerrymandering by the people
have led to the increased presence of non-legislative redistricting. Several states adopted non-
partisan/independent commissions to redistrict in place of the state legislature.5 As of 2019,
eight states adopted some form of non-partisan/independent commission: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington. These non-partisan/independent
commissions are non-legislative bodies with at least some commitment to non-partisanship.
This includes non-partisan advisory boards, such as Iowa’s, and independent commissions
without any legislative input, like California. While these commission rules vary by state,
they all infringe on the legislature’s redistricting power. The legislature in advisory body
states can vote maps up or down and possibly offer amendments only after rejecting earlier
proposals (Levitt, 2010b). However, even if the legislature seeks to offer amendments, the
advisory board still retains enough power to dictate the terms of legislative and Congressional
maps, and greatly curb legislative discretion (Squire, 2005, 267–68). In all but Iowa, popular
referendums led to redistricting commissions (Bates, 2005). The state legislature in Iowa
5A plurality of states use legislatures as the primary body to redistrict. Other options include politician com-
missions, where members appointed by state legislative and executive leadership redistrict. Independent/non-
partisan commissions are those where non-politician members meet to pass a map based on non-partisan
criteria. Some states have laws where non-partisan/independent commissions, act as back-up commissions
should the state legislature not pass redistricting legislation in time. Should these commissions also fail,
then the court redistricts.
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only voted to cede power to their non-partisan Legislative Research Bureau following court
redistricting of legislative districts in the 1980s and 1990s (Squire, 2005).
State legislatures responded to the possible intervention of courts or non-legislative
commissions by authorizing legislative and politician commissions in several states, which
includes Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (Levitt, 2010a).
A politician commission sees a subset of legislature and other political leaders draw the
district boundaries. These leaders always include the leaders of the state legislature (i.e.
state speaker), along with some leaders from the executive, such as lieutenant governor
and secretary of state (Levitt, 2010a). These commissions limit the whole legislature from
having a formal say in redistricting, though it keeps legislative and party influence within the
redistricting process. Given that members of the legislative majority party would prefer maps
where their party wins a majority and ensures incumbent reelections, a politician commission
is usually preferable to courts or non-legislative commissions. Courts and commissions tend
to, by design or accident, produce maps less in favor of incumbents and less biased in favor
of the majority party (McGann et al., 2016; Carson, Crespin and Williamson, 2014).
State legislatures also grant themselves soft deadlines to redistrict in time. These soft
deadlines consist either of specific dates set in state law, the primary filing deadline, or
the last day of a legislative session before the primary filing deadline. Most states have
their primaries several months prior to the November general election. In turn, most states
require that the legislature redistrict a certain number of days prior to the primary filing
deadline as required by state law (Storey, 1999; Pound, 2009). Although these primary filing
deadlines can be postponed and the primary itself shifted to later in the year, the attempt
at procrastination delays the rest of the state legislative agenda and increases the risk of
court involvement (McKee and Shaw, 2005; Pauerstein, 2013). Therefore, the primary filing
deadline, or similar deadline as established by state law, is known as the soft redistricting
deadline. To move the soft deadline requires time and resources, and other agenda items be
70
delayed. Even then, contentious redistricting continues. However, the hard deadline is July
1st of a year ending in 2, in which it is not possible to delay the primary due to the general
election.6
A state legislature that does not redistrict in time is one that gives up its ability to protect
party majorities and/or incumbents. Even should the legislature delay the primary,7 the
general election cannot be moved, and eventually either a court will redistrict in place of
the legislature. Further, legislators also lose out, as courts ignore incumbency protection
(Carson, Crespin and Williamson, 2014). Therefore, time is the enemy of the majority party
and incumbents, and a loss of redistricting power for a cycle is a non-ideal outcome.8
Parties similarly appear to lose their chance to create a map biased in their favor.
McGann et al. (2016) in Appendix 3A compute the level of bias present in Congressional
maps following the Gelman and King (1994b) method. They find 35 maps significantly biased
towards one party (89–92). I incorporate data on whether legislative versus non-legislative
body redistricts. Although the size of the data is too limiting for a more in depth analysis,9
the results demonstrate a significant difference between legislative versus non legislative
6This is the case for all states except for Maine. No state legislature has ever redistricted following July first
of a year ending in two for the mandatory post-Census redistricting.
7A practice in states where redistricting litigation is common, such as Texas and North Carolina.
8Although the legislative majority party tends to lose out with non-legislative redistricting, the minority
party might lose out as well. If divided government exists, bipartisan incumbent protecting gerrymanders
tend to be the norm (Cox and Katz, 2002). However a court might ignore incumbents’ homes and previous
election results, threatening incumbent security.
9Alex Keena, Michael Latner, Anthony J. McGann, and Charles Anthony Smith recently runz a similar
analysis with all state legislative maps and confirmed the same trend. See, Alex Keena, Michael Latner,
Anthony J. McGann, and Charles Anthony Smith. 2018. “Partisan Bias in State Legislative Districting
Plans.” American Political Science Association Conference, Boston, Massachusetts.
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Table 3.1: Bias in Congressional Maps by Redistricting Body
Leg. Drawn Non Leg. Drawn
Unbiased 41.5% (22) 81.0% (17)
Biased 58.5% (31) 19.0% (4)
X-squared = 7.8715, df = 1, p-value = 0.005022
Data for Congressional maps with 4 or more districts, for the 2001 and 2011 redistricting cycles. Data on biased maps from
Appendix 3A of Gerrymandering in America by McGann et al. (2016).
drawn maps.10
II The New Balance of Redistricting Power
I assert that redistricting is best framed as a collective action problem for the legislative
majority, for both state legislative and Congressional maps. The majority party desires to
retain redistricting authority to advance the party’s interests, and individual legislators seek
to secure easy reelection. Given the desire to retain redistricting authority, three conditions
exist to ensure smooth legislative redistricting. First, an early concerted effort to redistrict.
Second, a relatively few, if any, strict technical mapping criteria to overcome. Third, a
concerted effort by strong state party leaders to centralize redistricting in control of unified
party government. Without these conditions, gridlock or overly long deliberation risks court
intervention. It is then court intervention that produces more competitive maps.
Therefore, redistricting can be viewed as a complex game where players are self interested
amidst a zero-sum environment. Support for these premises received confirmation from the
coordinator for the Republican redistricting effort nationwide during the 2011 redistricting cy-
cle, Thomas Hofeller. During his presentation to state legislators and redistricting consultants,
Hofeller establishes three primary criteria that determine whether a state legislature can
redistrict successfully: (1) late maps, (2) getting caught in “criteria hell,” and (3) irrational
10The non-legislative biased maps are Mississippi (2011), Oregon (2001), Oklahoma (2001), and South
Carolina (2001).
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and selfish legislators/Congresspeople.11 Hofeller presented his findings and advice as a result
of the redistricting jobs he and his professional acquaintances experienced from the prior
30 years of redistricting.12 Therefore, it is possible to combine his insight and the nature of
redistricting to deduce obstacles to state legislatures successfully redistricting state legislative
and Congressional maps.
Criteria Hell and Timing
Obstacles to redistricting are largely comprised of the state laws that constrain how, where,
and when to redistrict. All states require at least equal population and contiguity across
districts. However, most states have additional requirements for how to redistrict both state
legislative and Congressional districts. These constraints, known as traditional districting
principles (TDPs), include respect for county and township boundaries, compactness, com-
munities of interest, and favoritism toward incumbents or parties (Levitt, 2010a). However,
Engstrom (2002) finds that most applications of TDPs arbitrary, with the exception of the
preservation of local boundaries. Whereas there is no accepted definition as to the best means
to measure compactness (Polsby and Popper, 1991; Levitt, 2010a), two or more districts
dividing a county/town is easy to determine.13 County requirements in North Carolina, Texas,
11Hofeller, Thomas, “What I’ve Learned About Redistricting: The Hard Way!”, National Conference of State
Legislatures Redistricting Seminar, at National Harbor, MD January 24, 2011. https://www.ncsl.org/
documents/legismgt/The_Hard_Way.pdf (accessed February 19, 2019)
12Hofeller started redistricting during the 1970 redistricting for California. He acted as one of the primary teach-
ers for the National Conference of State Legislatures and was respected across parties. See Wendy Underhill,
“In Memoriam: Redistricting Pioneer Tom Hofeller, National Conference of State Legislature Blog, August 21,
2018 http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/08/21/in-memoriam-redistricting-pioneer-tom-hofeller.
aspx, (accessed February 20, 2019)
13As an example, when redistricting expert David Niven testified to the lack of TDP criteria that guided
Republican efforts, the federal judges unanimously demonstrated a better reception to county and census
tract splits as opposed to odd shapes. See, Ohio A Philip Randolph Institute et al. V. Larry Householder
et al., United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Case: 1:18-cv-00357, 76–88
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and Maryland prolonged redistricting enough that courts intervened. Republican redistricting
coordinator Hofeller noted, legislators must first develop a base “good government plan” that
adheres to the constitutional requirements and then deviate from there in order to maximize
political or partisan gain.14
In regards to local boundaries, some localities are too large to preserve wholly, but some
localities can be more split than others. It is better to have a county divided between two
districts as opposed to seven. Worse yet for those redistricting, it is nearly certain that
a lawsuit on the grounds of splitting counties/towns will arise. If this occurs and a court
concludes that there are grounds for the lawsuit and that there is not enough time for the
legislature to redistrict again, then the court redistricts. In the presence of constraints to
respect local boundaries, the legislature must ensure localities are preserved as well as possible,
lest lawsuits drag out the process and courts intervene. Therefore I predict,
Hypothesis 1: The presence of state requirements to preserve local boundaries increases
the probability that a court redistricts in place of the legislature.
To confound the problem of how and where to redistrict is the timing. States must have
districts in place for elections and primaries. Most states employ some sort of soft deadline
relative to primary filing dates or set dates as established in state law (Levitt, 2010a). It
is theoretically possible for states legislatures to change the law to grant themselves more
time to redistrict, which seems like an easy way out, on the surface, to escape the need for
non-legislative intervention. However, the map making process itself is a complex problem.
For one, a map might just fail to converge within a reasonable time given the outcomes of
interest. Chen and Rodden (2013) note that while redistricting, it might be the case that most
14Hofeller, Thomas, “What I’ve Learned About Redistricting: The Hard Way!”, National Conference of State
Legislatures Redistricting Seminar, at National Harbor, MD January 24, 2011., slides 21–5
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of the simulations fail to meet basic criteria such as population equality (251–2). Hofeller
notes that technical problems can confound errors inherent to the redistricting process, such
as failing to establish check points for basemaps, backup data, and firing consultants too
early before realizing a technical error within a map.15 An earlier soft deadline therefore
leaves less room for error, and poses a serious pitfall for legislatures to redistrict independent
of court intervention. I therefore predict,
Hypothesis 2: Failing to meet the soft deadline for redistricting significantly increases the
probability that a court redistricts in place of the state legislature.
Unified Party Government
Redistricting is an inherently partisan process. Insofar as parties are important either
in terms of policy outcomes or as cohesive teams (Aldrich, 2011; Lee, 2009), who makes it
into government is a contentious issue. Redistricting is a prime opportunity to determine
the partisan makeup of state legislatures and Congress. It has been well documented that
drawing boundary lines can waste voters by party. Parties can “pack” the opposing party’s
voters into a few districts and spread their remaining voters across the other districts via
“cracking” so as to ensure party majorities (Gelman and King, 1994b; McGhee, 2008; McGann
et al., 2016). The presence of partisan conflict over state legislative and Congressional maps
has been enough of a conflict so as to delay redistricting to the point of court intervention
(McDonald, 2004). Insofar as parties seek to secure reelection of their members, control of the
state legislative and Congressional delegation is crucial. Unless the state legislative chambers
and executive branch quickly agree to an incumbent protection plan, divided government
often explains why the legislature fails to redistrict in time (McDonald, 2004; Cox and Katz,
15Hofeller, Thomas, “What I’ve Learned About Redistricting: The Hard Way!”
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1999).
However, several states still failed to redistrict in time even with unified party government.16
Therefore, while unified party government might be a necessary condition in order to prevent
courts from redistricting, it is not sufficient. Instead, the effect of unified party government is
conditional upon threat to the majority party and the power of the central state party to
control redistricting.
Competition and Conflict within Parties
Although partisanship creates conflict between parties, conflict also arises within parties.
Redistricting is a zero-sum process over supporters between legislators. When a legislator
acquires a partisan supporter, it prevents any other fellow partisans within their chamber
from acquiring the same supporter.17 GOP redistricting coordinator Hofeller notes from his
decades of experience that when it comes to redistricting, there are “no permanent allies”
only “permanent interests,” and that “self interest binds, not honor.”18 Hofeller similarly
notes that a major source of late maps and therefore court intervention are very nervous (i.e.
risk averse) legislators and Congresspeople, in addition to every individual believing that
16These states include Kansas, Mississippi, Maryland, North Carolina, and Texas
17The zero-sum nature of redistricting is best exemplified in regards to urban areas. Cities are typically
much more Democratic leaning than suburbs and rural areas (Bishop, 2008; Chen and Rodden, 2013). The
Republican Party leadership could “pack” Democrats into a single district comprising most of the city
and win the surrounding areas, or “crack” the urban area into several Republican leaning districts. The
GOP will not win every district in the state under a packing scenario, though they will win most districts
by very safe margins. In the latter cracking scenario, the GOP might win all of the districts via close
margins. Individual Republican legislators have a strong incentive to defect from a party backed district
cracking plan and advocate for their own safe district, leading to an entrenched Democratic district. In this
example, a Republican legislator neighboring an urban area under a packing plan will not need to worry
about urban voters and likely secure an easy reelection. However, a Republican legislator in a district with
only a marginal electoral majority faces competitive and costly elections.
18Hofeller, Thomas, “What I’ve Learned About Redistricting: The Hard Way!,” slide 3.
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redistricting “should originate from their own district.”19 In a situation where each legislator,
or numerous groups of them, all insist that maps respect their boundaries over all others, the
computational complexity all but ensures that the search for an ideal map that satisfies all
will be impossible.
Factionalized redistricting amidst unified party government afflicted the Republican
Kansas legislature in 2011, and North Carolina Democrats in 2001. In 2011, Republicans
in the Kansas state legislature were set to solidify their hold on the state legislature and
Congressional delegation heading into the 2011 redistricting cycle. The Kansas Republican
party controlled the state legislature and executive branch, with more than enough members
to force through Republican gerrymanders. However, Republican legislators could not come
to an agreement as to how to shift the burden of the clustered Democrats around Kansas
City and Lawrence.20 Legislative and executive leaders had taken a hands-off approach, and
only realized in late April that the Republican legislature would not be able to pass a map
in time for the primary filing deadline in order to hold elections.21 The delay ultimately
led the Kansas Supreme Court to intervene and redistrict in place of the legislature. The
court drawn map overwhelmingly harmed incumbent Republicans, creating 23 districts with
more than one incumbent, 25 with no resident incumbent, and eight similarly affected state
19Ibid., 27
20John Hanna, “Northeast Kansas will likely be redistricting debate’s core.” Wichita Eagle, December
28, 2010 https://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/election/article1051104.html
(accessed August 28, 2018)
Brad Cooper, “Kobach asks federal court to settle Kansas redistricting issue.” Kansas





senate districts.22 The Congressional map in turn was one of the only Republican unified
government state maps not significantly biased against Democrats (McGann et al., 2016,
88–9).
North Carolina legislative leaders were similarly unable to prioritize the “good govern-
ment” map over the legislator oriented one, which led state courts to routinely reject the
Democratic proposed map for violating counties until the state court redistricted in place
of the legislature.23 A unified party government can still fall victim to the individualistic
mindset of risk averse and self interested legislators.
Threat to Majority Control as a Technical Problem
Legislators and other elected officials tend to be motivated as Mayhew (1974) and Fenno
(1973) note as reelection, influence within the chamber, and good policy. However, as Aldrich
(2011); Rohde (1991); Cox and McCubbins (2005) note, the latter two motivations necessarily
rest upon a legislator’s party holding a majority within their chamber, confirmed to hold
true across state legislatures (Anzia and Jackman, 2012; Aldrich and Battista, 2002). To an
individual legislator, then, the trade off to secure a larger than majority within the chamber
at the cost of their own reelection would not be worth it. As Engstrom (2013) notes of
post-Gilded Age Congressmen, the negative experiences suffering a loss of both their own
seats and majority control in the attempt to secure overly large Congressional majorities led
to a reaction by incumbents to favor more incumbency advantage.
22Dion Lefler, “Court releases redistricting plans; two Wichita-area Senate showdowns avoided,” Kansas
City Star, June 8, 2012, https://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article1093446.html
(accessed August 29, 2018).
23North Carolina State Senator Phil Berger, “Sen. Berger’s Prepared Remarks on the 2017 Senate Redistrict-
ing Plan,” Phil Berger Campaign Committee, https://www.philberger.org/redistricting_remarks
(accessed August 29, 2018).
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However, one does not simply will their party map’s into being. Various states have
different levels of difficulty. Some states like Utah and Hawaii cannot draw the state in a
manner that would benefit the minority party even if they sought to. These states enjoy party
majorities that are fairly secure, no matter the electioneering activities of the opposition.
Further, if the map going into the redistricting cycle contributed to party strength and
withstood state population and electoral shifts, then it is a fairly easy to update the map.
In a state where the combination of party in the electorate and districts in place favor the
majority party, then those in charge of redistricting might simply need to change a few lines
for population changes in order to redistrict in time and prevent outside intervention.
It is when the majority party going into a redistricting cycle needs to contend with a
set of districts from the old map and a competitive electorate that creates a difficult search
for a district. For example, Chin, Herschlag and Mattingly (2018) find North Carolina’s
Republican map adopted following the 2010 census could almost never be generated by
random mapping and demonstrated extreme fragility to relatively marginal changes in district
design. Although the Republican legislature managed to overcome the difficulties of finding
an ideal map after starting from a weaker starting position, it proved quite difficult. Whereas
some states could automate the process after accounting for where incumbents lived, more
marginal states require heavy investments to overcome. I therefore predict,
Hypothesis 3: The more marginal majority control of the legislative delegations are, the
higher the probability that a court will redistrict in place of the legislature.
Party Committee Strength as a Signal and Solution
I argue that one key feature to explain the failure versus success of a party in control of a
legislative chamber to keep redistricting in their hands arises from the funds of their party
committee funds. There are two central reasons for this. First, party committees are primary
mechanisms by which the best redistricting experts are hired to solve the complex problem of
redistricting. Second, party committees flush with cash signal that a party is strong through
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a combination of either a party cartel able to extract resources from members and/or strong
party solidarity able to maximize party interests.
As noted before, a crucial component in determining whether a map can pass in time is
whether there are competing maps. Competing maps will almost assuredly be present amidst
divide government, though also possible in unified government. Hofeller himself made clear
that one potential obstacle is that a legislator or Congressperson believes that the act of
drawing a statewide legislative map should begin with one’s own district. If many legislators
left to their own devices with the capability to proffer their own maps arises, the ensuing
chaos will almost assuredly doom any attempt to redistrict prior to deadlines.
In order to solve the multi-map conflict that might derail redistricting by the state
legislature, it is through party committees, headed by party leaders and/or their trusted aids
(Bibby and Holbrook, 1996; Rosenthal, 1995) that parties hire a single redistricting expert.
As Daley (2017) finds in his in depth investigation of Republican redistricting during the 2011
cycle, the national and state party committees were the agents who hired and coordinated
the redistricting efforts. Further, it was through the coordinated expenditures between the
state and national parties that paid the funds to the individuals who created the maps and
aggregated the preferences of legislators and the party leaders. Insofar as party leaders can
centralize the redistricting process, it is through their funds to pay the best redistricting
efforts. An important feature to the Republican failure in Kansas in 2011 was the presence of
competing maps authored by factions within the party. Maps where Republicans dominated
legislative and Congressional maps, such as North Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
all employed single party redistricting consultants to redistrict their states. Relatedly, North
Carolina Democrats in 2001 had about average resources for a state party committee to
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pay for redistricting consulting amidst members who sought to abandon their own party.24
Insofar as the legislative majority can hire a redistricting expert to create a map that satisfies
all if the complex technical criteria that also satisfies party and legislator interests, while also
retaining them long enough to deal with potential court challenges on technical criteria, rests
upon state party committee funds.
Additionally, post-redistricting it is through party committees that those most suffer-
ing from more competitive districts might receive aid. As Hernson (2009) finds at the
Congressional level, and La Raja and Schaffner (2015) at the state legislative level, state
party committee expenditures are the primary means by which weak incumbents and strong
challengers receive most of their financial support. Whereas interest groups and incumbents
in Congress and state legislatures tend to provide funds to other safe incumbents, state party
committees, such as legislative party campaign committees (LPCCs) tend to overwhelmingly
give and coordinate donations and late election ads to bolster their more marginal members
(Rosenthal, 1995; Gierzynski and Jewell, 1992; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Therefore,
whether state parties can offer the incentives and insurance following redistricting and districts
that are not perfectly secure arises from party committees. Although there are options that
a party leader, such as a state speaker of the house, might take to coerce their members
into agreement, such a situation is not ideal. There are only so many positions that a state
leader might use to incentivize party loyalty. One former state speaker of the house revealed
during an interview that in an attempt to secure the support of a member he said, “You
might have your seat more easily than before, but you will never be the chairman of anything
24In measuring the donations to party committees from the Brandenburg (N.d.), North Carolina Democrats
had about 0.69 logged dollars for every person in the state, only a little above the 2001 average of 0.65
logged dollars.
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ever again.”25 Offering positions such as a committee chairmanship might definitely aid at
the margins in acquiring party support, though there are only so many positions to offer
before incentives start to dry up. Insofar as reelection concerns still motivate members of the
party, it is through party committees that individual legislators can be moved to support
the central party position. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) and Hernson (2009) find that state
party committees at the state and national level overwhelmingly donate to strong challengers
and weak incumbents in marginal elections. Kolodny and Dulio (2003) also notes that it
is through coordinated expenditures that party committees can supplement the funds of
legislators, conduct difficult to run district constrained polls, conduct last minute ads and
mailers, and similar activities to aid endangered candidates. Therefore, well funded party
committees both can be used to hire a single redistricting consultant to centralize the process
and aid candidates after the process as well.
Given that party unified government and a well funded party committee would be in the
best position to centralize and expedite the redistricting process, I expect,
Hypothesis 4: High levels of party committee funds relative to the state’s population and
unified state government will decrease the probability of court intervention in redistricting.
Finally, I predict that when a court redistricts given the multiple stages, they will
redistrict in a more competitive manner. As Crespin (2005) find for Congressional districts,
non-legislative drawn maps is associated with the probability of increased competition within
a district by as much as the effect of a quality challenger (462). Although courts and
commissions are undoubtedly not free of politics, they do demonstrate a level of concern to
facts of a case more so than legislators (Caldarone, Canes-Wrones and Clark, 2009), and less
25Former state speaker interviewed with IRB approval, anonymity guaranteed.
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connected with the intricacies of the party’s preferences, especially in regards to redistricting
(Daley, 2017; Washington, 2013), with the same true for independent commissions. I therefore
finally expect,
Hypothesis 5: As the probability that a court redistricts increases, the more competitive
that an adopted map will be.
Should these hypotheses receive support, it would suggest that redistricting is a fragile
process where agreement can fall to the wayside in the face of technical requirements and
limited time. Overly long deliberation or maps that fail to meet the technical requirements
without time for a revision will result in court or non-legislative intervention. Support for
the later hypotheses would reveal that the potential threat of loss of majority control of their
chamber and centralization of the redistricting process through well funded party committees
are instrumental in ensuring that the legislature maintains their hold over redistricting. By
knowing who redistricts, it is then possible to know the degree of partisan bias and quality of
representation in state legislatures and Congress.
III Data and Methods
I run a three stage model to analyze what determines who redistricts Congressional and
state legislative maps, along with the ensuing competitiveness of the passed maps. The first
stage measures the hazard that redistricting occurs at a given time, and the second whether
a court redistricts. Both of these stages take the form of a survival analysis. The first stage is
a parametric survival analysis of the likelihood that redistricting occurs over time, following
a Weibull distribution. The second analysis is a competing risks model, where the event is
redistricting by a non-legislative body, the competing outcome a legislative authored map,
and the unit of time as the number of days. The analysis is run for the 2001 and 2011
redistricting cycles, with the starting date of April 1st for the respective cycle, the date when
Public Law 94171 requires the national government to provide all of the necessary census
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information.26 The end date is when redistricting finally takes place, either by the state
legislature or non-legislative body, eliminating right censoring.
An observation for the first stage survival model exists for each state’s map per day. This
comprises three maps per state: the state’s house, senate, and Congressional maps, for a
given day. All states where a non-legislative commission is the default redistricting body are
excluded, as there is no opportunity for the legislature to redistrict. All states with only
one member elected to the U.S. House are excluded, given that these states have less of a
redistricting burden. This leaves 37 states27 with 3 maps each for two cycles,28 for a total of
213 state maps.29 For the second stage, there are then 213 observations total as the residuals
from the first stage are calculated and carried over only for the observation when redistricting
occurs.
The third stage takes the form of an OLS regression with two separate models to
incorporate macro and micro levels of competition. For macro level competition, the change
in the marginal majority measure (MMM) average is employed. The MMM is the percentage
26Some states appear to get U.S. Census information prior to April 1st, though the reporting of which by
states and the U.S. Census is inconsistent. Using April 1st as the start date date would be a problem if
states redistricted successfully prior to April 1st. However, no state has ever redistricted prior to April 1st
of a redistricting cycle (Levitt and McDonald, 2007). Possible state differences are then accounted for by
state random effects.
27Beyond the states with only a single member of Congress excluded are Louisiana, West Virginia, and
Nebraska. Louisiana does not have historical records for legislative elections necessary for the MMM score.
West Virginia is the single state without financial data available for state party committees on the National
Institute of Money in State Politics. Nebraska in turn is unicameral and technically non-partisan.
28California and Arizona drop out due to the shift to independent commissions for the 2011 cycle.
29Most of the cases where a state legislature failed to redistrict were either all three maps (23), or only a
Congressional map (25). Eight times a state legislature passed a Congressional map but neither of the
state legislature maps, and four times a state legislature passed only one of the state legislative maps.
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of votes that would need to change within a state chamber’s elections in order to flip majority
control. The MMM ranges on a scale of 0 – 100. For micro level competition, I employ the
Holbrook Van Dunken (HVD) Index, which measures the average winning vote percentage,
election margins, number of uncontested seats and safe seats within a given state chamber
(Holbrook and Dunk, 1993; Shufeldt and Flavin, 2012). The HVD Index is on a 0-1 scale and
amounts to the aggregated level of individual competition for a given map.
Redistricting Event Times Every extra day spent debating district design risks a loss
in state legislative redistricting power. Court or commission intervention is required should
the state legislature not be able to pass a map in time for the general and primary elections.
Districts need to be drawn in time for potential candidates to know where to run for office,
and the violation of a primary filing deadline triggers court or commission redistricting
(Storey, 1999; Pound, 2009).
The first stage survival model measures the likelihood that a map passes given the
estimated hazard function over time and the covariates. Time is measured in days. I
assume a monotonically increasing hazard function in the form of a Weibull distribution,
where every day that passes increases the probability that redistricting occurs. I employ a
parametric model as opposed to a Cox-Proportional Hazards model as I expect time to be
informative. For example, each day that passes increases the risk of defection and an inability
to unite a legislative majority. If one could measure perfectly all of the potential covariates,
a Cox-Proportional Hazards model would be sufficient. Given that we cannot measure these
variables, and that the the hazard of redistricting should increase with time, a Weibull
model results in greater efficiency and ultimately collapses down to a Cox-Proportional
hazards model should there not be a monotonically increasing hazard (Box-Steffensmeier
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et al., 2003).30
I employ a competing risks survival model as the second stage to measure the probability
that a non-legislative body redistricts given time and the covariates of interest. The competing
risk is if the legislature redistricts. The competing risk model, as developed by Fine and Gray
(1999), accounts for the dependency between outcomes. A competing risk model accounts for
a competing event that might prevent the event of interest from occurring. As for redistricting,
a court cannot redistrict if a legislature redistricts first, and without technical mistakes. A
standard survival model with right censoring would lead to invalid and biased estimates as to
the time until the event (Fine and Gray, 1999; Klein et al., 2001). Therefore, I am interested
in the probability of failure at time t, where the failures can take the form of J = [0, 1, 2].
This is expressed as F (t) = Pr(T > t) and J = j. The data is formatted such that there
is an observation for every combination of state, map type and year for a given day until
the event occurs. Where no event occurs, j = 0. When the state legislature redistricts a
given map, j = 1. When a court or non-politician commission redistricts in place of the state
legislature, j = 2. I determine which body passed a map and the date in which it was passed
from the text of Justin Levitt’s (2015) “All About Redistricting” website. Standard errors
are implemented by state grouping, which results in 37 groups.
Table 3.2: Legislative Redistricting
Level No Yes
Congressional 27.27% (21) 72.72% (56)
State Legislature 19.48% (34) 80.52% (124)
These results exclude all states which use independent/non-partisan commissions as the default redistricting body (i.e. Arizona).
Percents reported as row columns.
30The Weibull model fits better should the shape parameter reach significance, suggesting acceleration of
the hazards over time. However, when there is no acceleration, the Weibull distribution simplifies to the
Cox model when the natural log of the shape parameter is equal to zero Royston (2001). The results are
reported in the appendix, and shape parameter is significantly greater than zero.
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Table 3.2 reports the frequency in which a map was passed by the state legislature. The
failure rate is greater for Congressional maps by approximately 7.8 percentage points. However,
the difference is not so large as to suggest that there might be a different causal process for
Congressional maps as opposed to a different intercept. Figure 1 displays the distribution
of days spent redistricting. The median is 321 days, with only ten percent exceeding 430
days. These results suggest that the coverage of the time at risk for redistricting should be
sufficient for survival modeling (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2003).
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Days Redistricting
N=50,583
Ensuing Electoral Competition The third stage analyzes state competition at the
macro and micro level via the MMM and HVD indices. Through the MMM, the macro level
competition of a given state legislative or Congressional delegation is captured by determining
the necessary change in votes for the most marginal seats to change majority control. The
process therefore weights competition within legislatures most likely to be targeted and
contested.
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The measure is calculated by finding first how many seats in a legislative chamber or
Congressional delegation would need to flip in order to change party control. I then find the
n most marginal seats for the majority party within a given chamber and sum the number of
difference in votes between the winning and losing candidates. I then divide the resulting
number of marginal voters by the total number of voters who participated in an election in
order to create a percentage of voters who would need to be accounted for in order to change
control of a chamber/delegation.31 The data on seats needed to change partisan control of
the legislature is acquired from Klarner’s State Partisan Balance data. Election returns data
is taken from the Klarner (2018) State Legislative Election Returns dataset, and the U.S.
House MIT MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017) Elections Return dataset. The MMM
is structured so that lower values reflect fewer number of voters are necessary to change the
chamber/delegation majority, and higher values more voters. The difference in MMM is taken
for the average chamber-MMM for the last two elections of a redistricting cycle and first two
elections of a redistricting cycle.32 Positive values therefore reflect greater majority control
of a legislative chamber, and negative values more fragile majority control of a legislative
chamber.
I employ the HVD index as a measure of micro-level competition in order to more closely
parallel results from the analysis with those by Crespin (2005). To calculate the index, I reran
the methods employed by Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) with the Klarner (2018) legislative
elections returns data. However, the results are split by chamber for the purpose of increasing
31In the event of staggered elections for a state house or senate chamber such that it might not be possible to
take the majority even by winning every single seat up for grabs, the MMM is calculated as where the
party must win every single seat belonging to the majority party.
32States that redistricted their maps before two elections could take place instead only make use of one
election.
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the variance within the dependent variable. The change in HVD is then calculated as the
difference between the first two elections of a redistricting cycle, and the last two from the
previous cycle. The values are positive for when the aggregated individual competition
decreases, and negative values for when there is a change towards increased competition. For
the HVD analysis, only data for the state legislative maps are employed.33
Operationalization of Independent Variables The independent variables of interest
are local boundary preservation requirements, whether an observation is before or after the
soft deadline, the percentage of voters in the state election that would need to change their
vote to change majority control in a delegation, and party committee funds relative to the
population. Further, given the multistage nature of the data, the predicted residuals are
included from each stage to include in the next stage.34
I create a dummy variable for whether a state has a formal requirement to preserve local
political boundaries from Levitt (2010a). When a state requires local boundaries be respected,
it is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Across all states, 42 require localities be respected for state
legislative districts,35 and 18 states require the same for Congressional districts.36
I code whether an observation takes place before or after the redistricting soft deadline
33Initial results in applying the HVD index to Congress resulted in extreme values, especially for smaller
states, and added no useful information to the analysis once a Congressional dummy variable was added.
34The residuals for the first stage take the form of Cox-Snell residuals for the data in which the event occurs.
The second stage residuals are the predicted probabilities that a court redistricts in place of the legislature.
35The eight states that do not have a requirement to respect local boundaries are Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia (Levitt, 2010a).
36These states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washing-
ton Levitt (2010a).
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in order to test the second hypotheses. Most of the states use the primary filing deadline
as the soft redistricting deadline. To code the deadline dates, I first found primary dates
from the Book of the States (1981–2011) (BOTS). When the BOTS did not have the primary
filing deadlines, I referenced Ballotopedia37 and state secretary of state websites to determine
how many days before the primary are permitted for a candidate to file. From this, I coded
the primary filing date as a number and subtracted it from the date of passage. When an
observation is before the deadline, it is coded as 1, and 0 after the deadline.
For deadlines relative to the legislative session calendar, I found the last legislative session
day relative to the primary filing period from the NCSL Legislative Sessions Calendar (2001–
2012). I referenced state secretary of state websites to determine when the U.S. Census
sent the information necessary for redistricting, where I also found the laws referencing the
creation dates for redistricting commissions.
I measure state party committee strength as the average weighted sum of their total
receipts for the three years preceding a redistricting cycle for the party in control of a
chamber. I acquire the total donations to all state party committees within a state from the
National Institute of Money in State Politics data on contributions to state party committees
(Brandenburg, N.d.). I then take the natural log of the donations and weight the donations to
reflect the breadth of the donor base using a reverse Herfindahl index. The weight is calculated
as the sum of squared donation proportions such that one reflects complete homogeneity
and values approaching zero reflect complete heterogeneity. The weight applied to the log
donations is then the Herfindahl index subtracted from one. The process ensures that no
37“Signature Requirements and Deadlines for 2002 and 2012 U.S. Congressional Elections” Ballotope-
dia, https://ballotpedia.org/Signature_requirements_and_deadlines_for_2012_U.S._Congress_
elections (accessed September 1, 2016).
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single donors unduly influence the perceived financial capability and stability of a party
committee. Additionally, I then divide the logged funds of a party committee by the logged
population of a state, with population data acquired from the U.S. Census.38 The final
measure therefore takes into account the total funds of a party, the breadth of the donor
base, and the potential impact of the funds relative to the population of the state.
In order to identify the party in control of a given legislative chamber and overall
government, I employ the dataset on partisan balance provided by Klarner (2013).39 From
the partisan balance dataset I code dummy variables for partisan control of government.
Unified government is coded 1 for single party control of the legislature and governor, and 0
otherwise.40 The party in control of a legislative chamber party committee’s funds are then
coded as the funding strength for a given state-map-year dyad. For divided governments, the
absolute value of the difference between the Democratic and Republican party committee
funding strength is used. Finally, the party committee funding strength is interacted with
the unified party government dummy variable.
I capture the difficulty of creating a map in regards to election outcomes with the MMM.
For the first and second model stages, the MMM as calculated from the prior two elections
is employed. The MMM, as explained above, effectively acts as a measure of how fragile
legislative and Congressional control of a delegation is. Values that approach 100 reflect
38State Intercensal Tables 2000–2010. United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/time-series/demo/popest/intercensal-2000-2010-state.html (accessed April 12, 2017)
39Even if a state’s governor does not have veto power, the governor’s party is still considered in determining
party control of government.
40Jonathan Winburn (personal communication) notes that there might be more deference to legislative
chambers in quasi-divided government than divided (Winburn, 2008; McDonald, 2004). However, inclusion
of quasi-divided government leads the model to fail to converge. A simplified model also reveal a lack of
significant differences between divided and quasi-divided government.
91
greater durability, and values approaching 0 reflect increased fragility.
The competing risks analysis is interpreted via cumulative incidence plots, where the
point in time is the x-axis, and the probability that a court or commission redistricts on the
y-axis. Results are then plotted for high and low values for the variables of interest, which
reveals the probability of an event over time given a standard deviation difference from the
mean. The CIF is calculated as,
CIF1(t) = 1− exp(−exp(Xβ)H̄1,0(t)) (3.1)
whereXβ is the linear predictor, and H̄1,0(t) the baseline hazard at time t for the competing
risk of interest (Coviello and Boggess, 2004). The results shall therefore demonstrate the
aggregate direct and indirect effects of the covariates of interest. The predicted CIFs are also
employed as the residuals for the model on changes in electoral competitiveness.
Several controls need to be added in order to account for confounding variables and bias.
I control for legislative expenditures from the legislative professionalism dataset provided
by Bowen and Greene (2014). Legislative expenditures consists of what a state spends per
legislator for non-salary related expenses. This variable captures state sponsored total funds
available to legislators for staff and research.41 It is expected that as legislative expenditures
increase, legislators will be less reliant upon their chamber leader (Mooney, 2012).
I add in a dummy variable for whether or not the map is a Congressional one. State
legislators have more of a personal stake in seeing their own district maps passed. While
41I decided to forgo legislative professionalism scores since these are mainly driven by salary (Bowen and
Greene, 2014). Further, since legislative professionalism scores use factor analysis to combine factors
including length of session, salary and expenditures, it is superior to use the individual components when
theoretically justified (Woods and Baranowski, 2006; Bowen and Greene, 2014).
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Congressional maps are still a high priority for legislators (Chin, 2017), it is fair to assume
that legislators will give priority to their own districts. This control is coded 1 if it is a
Congressional map and 0 otherwise. It is expected that a Congressional map will see an
increased number of days to pass and higher probability of non-legislature intervention.
Polarization of state legislative chambers are controlled for as well. I use Shor and McCarty
(2011) chamber ideological distance scores. Polarization scores are matched by chamber,
while the Congressional map receives the average of the chamber distances. Higher scores
reflect greater polarization.
I further control for the impact of gubernatorial power. Governors in most states can
veto maps, and might employ budgetary powers where permitted to indirectly influence the
redistricting process. Gubernatorial power is measured using the Gubernatorial Budgetary
Power Index (BPI) as established by Krupnikov and Shipan (2012). Most governors do
not have formal powers besides the veto in regards to redistricting legislation. The index
accounts for whether the governor has the power to prepare the budget, spend federal grant
money at their discretion, line item veto budgets, reorganize budgeting departments without
the approval of the state legislature, and reduce the budget at their discretion in times of
emergency. Further, it is through the power over the budget that a governor might offer
payments to loyal legislators in the future (Krupnikov and Shipan, 2012; Levitt, 2015). While
not perfect, the BPI is of theoretic interest and captures potential power that a governor
might have over redistricting. I adjust the veto power component to reflect when a governor
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cannot veto a state map, which leads to an adjustment for only Hawaii and New Jersey.42
I additionally control for the population mandated for each district. It should be the
case that larger districts, which in turn permit a greater number of people to deviate across
districts, should be easier to redistrict. I therefore measure the district population as the
logged population divided by the number of districts per map.
Another concern addressed is whether a state is under pre-clearance jurisdiction for
the Voting Rights Act. States under the act dealt with direct federal intervention in the
construction of their maps. Pre-clearance states will likely take longer to pass their maps and
might be expected to succumb to non-legislature redistricting. I code two dummy variables,
one for partial coverage and another for complete coverage, with no pre-clearance as the
reference group. Controlling for pre-clearance also accounts for whether a state might be
susceptible to an alliance between minority legislators and the Republican Party in creating
a racially-GOP gerrymandered map (McDonald, 2004; Barabas and Jerit, 2004).
IV Results
Table A.3 presents the summary statistics for the independent variables of interest. We
see that there appears to be sufficient variance in the data at first glance, with not clear
clustering of data that might unduly prohibit the analysis.43
Looking to the distributions of the macro and micro level competition, there is evidence
42I do not employ the Beyle FPI, as the index covers a wide array of power attributes, including other
statewide elected office holders and years left in office, which are of less theoretical interest. Further, some of
the changes in the Beyle formal power index are due to the change in measurement across time. Therefore,
another index of formal gubernatorial power is necessary to capture the governor’s ability to lead, inform
and pressure the state legislature to pass redistricting legislation. In terms of procedure, the governor’s
formal budgetary powers as measured by Krupnikov and Shipan (2012) relates to direct formal influence
that the governor can employ during redistricting.
43The exception would be the clustering of the second stage residuals near one, which shall be discussed later.
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in line with Crespin (2005) and Carson, Crespin and Williamson (2014) that non-legislative
bodies are associated with more competitive maps. Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of
macro and micro level competition that arises from non-legislative versus legislative authored
maps. Figure 3.2a demonstrates that nearly all maps drawn by courts and independent
commissions result in marginal majorities where it would take less than 20 percent of voters
to switch majority control, with all values constrained lower than 40. However, legislative
drawn maps display a long right tail, with all of the most extremely secure majorities created
by legislatures. Some of these maps include states alleged to be gerrymanders, such as the
Congressional and legislative maps for Florida and Michigan.
Figure 3.2: Non-Legislative Created Maps and Levels of Competition
(a) Court/Commission v. Legislative Redis-
tricting on Macro-level competition
(b) Court/Commission v. Legislative Redis-
tricting on Micro-level competition
Observed levels of the distribution of average competition on the macro and micro scale for maps by redistricting body. Gray bars
reflect frequencies by non-legislative bodies, such as courts and commissions, whereas hallow bars reflect legislative competition.
The MMM in the right panel represents the percent of the vote necessary to slip majority control of a given delegation. The
HVD index represents the average of winning percent, winning margins, uncontested seats, and safe seats, where higher values
reflect less competition.
The evidence is mixed for micro level competition, as seen in Figure 3.2b. Though
a greater proportion of legislative maps earn an HVD score of above 0.6 as compared to
non-legislative authored maps, some of the least competitive maps appear to be drawn by
courts. At the same time, courts and commissions similarly draw a higher proportion of the
most competitive maps as well, as seen by the distribution of around 0.2.
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Table 3.3 presents the results of the duration model of time until redistricting, the
competing risk model of whether a court redistricts in place of the legislature, and the final
stages of electoral competition. Given the multi-stage model, coefficients significant in the
first stage but not the second stage would reflect an indirect, but not direct, effect in the
probability that a court redistricts; by affecting time until redistricting, the time permitted to
build up cumulative risk is affected. A variable significant in the second stage, the competing
risk model, exerts a direct effect, i.e. quality of the map in satisfying technical criteria given
the time taken to redistrict. The first feature to note is that the first stage residual exerts a
significant and positive effect (p<0.01) that a court or similar non-legislative body redistricts.
The residual ranges from approximately zero to 13, suggesting the potential for a substantive
indirect effect.
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Table 3.3: Multistage Models of Redistricting Risk
Duration Model Competing Risk Model Macro Level Competition Micro Level Competition
Pre-Soft Deadline -0.918*** -0.316 -3.032 0.018
(0.204) (0.602) (2.209) (0.018)
Local Boundary Req. -1.030** 20.632*** 2.448 -0.057**
(0.519) (0.487) (6.775) (0.023)
Party Com. Funds -0.628 0.746 2.516 0.006
(0.466) (0.839) (3.165) (0.073)
Unified Govt. -0.348 5.852*** -4.877 0.019
(0.936) (1.932) (4.890) (0.080)
Party Com. Funds X Unif. Govt. 1.959* -11.789*** 4.064 -0.014
(1.128) (3.263) (6.503) (0.099)
Marginal-Majority -0.012 -0.076** -0.000
(0.008) (0.035) (0.000)
District Size 0.028 0.237 -0.541 -0.004
(0.060) (0.167) (1.100) (0.005)
Governor Power -0.092 -0.052 0.884 -0.012
(0.159) (0.301) (1.041) (0.009)
Leg. Expenditures -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Polarization -0.213 2.548*** 12.319** 0.016
(0.483) (0.794) (5.556) (0.028)
Congressional Map -0.989 22.319*** 6.702
(0.657) (1.574) (12.726)
Cycle: 2011=2011 -0.011 -0.736 -2.110* -0.036
(0.180) (0.672) (1.132) (0.023)
Partial VRA Coverage 0.180 0.049 5.541 0.011
(0.579) (0.540) (3.784) (0.013)
Complete VRA Coverage 0.128 1.422** 0.036 -0.038*
(0.451) (0.686) (1.927) (0.021)
First stage residual 0.726*** -0.687* 0.003
(0.135) (0.397) (0.003)
Second stage residual 8.024 0.091**
(5.317) (0.037)








Log Likelihood -153.359 -155.399 -775.974 155.359
AIC 340.717 336.798 1583.949 -278.717
R2 0.31 0.19
N 50866 207 207 118
*p< 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01, two-tailed
Coefficients on top and standard errors are in parentheses. The duration model (first column) is of the logged hazard of time
until redistricting occurs. Positive values represent an increased likelihood that redistricting occurs given time, and negative
values a lower likelihood. The competing risk model is for the probability that a court redistricts in place of the legislature,
where the competing risk is where the legislature redistricts. The coefficients reflect the logged odd coefficients as opposed
to subhazard ratios, where positive values reflect a greater probability that a court redistricts, and negative values a lower
probability. The Macro and Micro level competition (columns 3 and 4) present the OLS results with robust clustered standard
errors of expected change in the MMM and HVD Index respectively. A one unit increase of the MMM within the Macro Level
Competition model reflects a one percentage point increase in the percentage of voters necessary to flip majority control. A one
unit increase of the HVD Index in the Micro Level Competition model represents an increased average of the winning percent
of the vote, winning margin, number of safe seats, and number of uncontested seats, within a state chamber.
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In analyzing the first stage of the model we see that the pre-soft deadline reaches statistical
significance (p<0.01), suggesting that the hazard that redistricting occurs increases following
the soft deadline. Further, states with a requirement to preserve local boundaries reaches
statistical significance in the first stage (p<0.05). Further, increased party funds during unified
government increases the likelihood that redistricting occurs, which approaches statistical
significance (p= 0.06). Of the explanatory variables of interest, only Marginal-Majority does
not reach statistical significance.
Moving onto the second stage, there appears to be strong support for hypotheses one,
three and four. The results suggest that the passing a map prior to the soft deadline is
not associated with a significant effect, leading to a failure to reject the null hypothesis for
hypothesis 2. However, there is support for the expectations laid out in hypothesis 1. The
presence of a local boundary requirement is associated with a significant (p< 0.01) increase
in the likelihood that a court redistricts. The effect of local boundary requirements is such
that the probability that a court redistricts is all but certain, all else equal. In analyzing
the data, it appears that every time a court redistricted a state legislative map was due to a
local boundary requirement. Of the 31 state legislative maps courts redistricted within the
data, all of them were in states with some type of local boundary requirement. Therefore,
while the effect of local boundary requirements is probably not as deterministic as the data
suggests, it might amount to a near necessary condition for court intervention, at least for
state legislative maps.
The results also suggest that more durable majority control of the delegation is associated
with a decreased likelihood that a non-legislative body redistricts in place of the legislature.
The effect for marginal majority scores reaches statistical significance (p<0.05) and exerts a
negative effect. Given the nature of a competing risks model, the estimated effects of changes
in the MMM from the first to third quartiles are presented in Figure 3.3, which plots the
probability that a court or similar non-legislative body redistricts given time.
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Figure 3.3: Probability that a Court Redistricts By Majority Stability
A cumulative incidence plot that a court or other non-legislative body redistricts over time given. Low MMM is held at the
first quartile, and high MMM at the first quartile. Given that nature of a competing risks model, the space left after day 450
reflects that the rest of the legislative and Congressional maps are redistricted by state legislatures.
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Figure 3.4: Probability that Non-Legislative Bodies Redistrict
(a) High Party Committee Funding (b) Low Party Committee Funding
Days passed are on the x-axis, and probability that a court or commission redistricts on the y-axis. The values for high and
low levels of funding are the third and first quartiles, respectively.
Figure 3.3 suggests that a shift from the first to third quartiles of the MMM reduces the
probability that a non-legislative body redistricts by as much as 10 percentage points after
day 200. The 200 day mark bears especial importance given that most state deadlines start
to occur following this period. Therefore, more fragile majorities seem to be associated with
a substantive and significant reduction that a non-legislative body redistricts. These results
are associated with expectations set in hypothesis 3.
The results of the second stage model also suggests that increased funds for party com-
mittees amidst unified party government reaches statistical significance (p< 0.01). However,
the resulting estimated effect is interacted with unified government, which exerts a significant
(p<0.01) effect, though the net gain of party committee funds is positive. Overall, these
results are in line with the expectations set in hypothesis 4. In order to interpret the effect,
the predicted changes in the probability that a non-legislative body redistricts over time is
presented in Figure 3.4.
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The results present part committee funds given the change from the third to first quartiles,
interacted with unified party government. The results of Figure 3.4b and 3.4a suggest that
unified party governments are unlikely to cede redistricting control to non-legislative bodies,
all else equal. However, it is apparent that the chamber majority party in control amidst
divided government and high party committee funds is associated with a five to ten percentage
point increase in probability that a court redistricts following day 80. Therefore, these results
suggest that problems might arise from gridlock between parties where the state party
organization is well funded and prepared to fight for party interests. These results suggest
that party committees might be a double edged sword, insofar as legislatures seek to retain
redistricting authority. These results are supported by the control for polarization within
the legislature, where increased polarization increases the likelihood that a non-legislative
body redistricts (p<0.01). It is also the case that Congressional maps are associated with
a statistically significant increase (p<0.01) that a court redistricts, along with full Voting
Rights Act coverage within a state (p<0.05).
Moving to the final stage of the model, the ensuing competitiveness of the maps from a
macro and micro level fails to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 5. The Macro level
model suggests that an increase in the probability that a court redistricts is associated with
no significant decrease in stability of the majority party. Further, the estimated coefficient
moves in the wrong direction. There is evidence to suggest that an increase in the residuals
of the first stage is associated with decreased majority party stability, though the effect
only approaches traditional levels of statistical significance (p<0.10). However, among the
estimated coefficients, increased polarization is associated with increased majority party
stability (p<0.01).
Figure 3.5 plots ideological distance of state legislative chambers, as calculated by Shor
and McCarty (2011), by estimated change in the marginal majority measurement. The results
suggest that a nearly 30 percentage point difference is associated between the most and
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Figure 3.5: Change in Marginal Majority Strength Given Polarization
Estimated effect of Shor and McCarty (2011) ideological distance within legislative chambers
on the average marginal majority measurement between redistricting cycles.
least polarized legislative chambers. A change in one standard deviation from the mean is
associated with a three percentage point increase in the MMM, which equates to three percent
more of the state’s voters who participated in an election in order ro flip majority control
in the most marginal districts. Overall, these results are substantive. Beyond ideological
distance, there is a general decline in MMM associated with maps passed during the 2011
cycle (p<0.1), all else equal. All other variables do not reach traditionally accepted levels of
statistical significance.
Moving to micro level competition, as measured with the HVD measure, there is a complete
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Figure 3.6: Estimated Change in the HVD by Probability that a Court Redistricts
Second stage residuals, the predicted probability that a court redistricts from the first model, are on the x-axis. Higher values
equate to a higher predicted probability that a court or commission redistricts in place of the legislature. The Estimated change
in the Holbrook Van Dunken (HVD) Index is the y-axis. An increase in the HVD Index represents a decrease in aggregated
average competition within state legislative districts.
lack of support for hypothesis 5. The second stage residuals, the predicted probability that a
court will redistrict in place of the legislature, is associated with a positive and significant
(p<0.05) effect. The effect of 0.09 given the zero to one scale of the HVD suggests that moving
from a near zero probability that a non-legislative body redistricts to a near one hundred
percent probability that a court redistricts is associated with an increase of incumbent safety
by nine percentage points. Figure 3.6 plots out the results of the estimated effect. The results
demonstrate general uncertainty near low probabilities, given a lack of predicted residuals
near zero. However, there is a general increase in the probability that a non-legislative body
redistricts as the residuals approach one.
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A potential critique of the results would be that the residuals are not capturing what they
should, and are forcing a multistage model where none exists. Therefore, as a robustness
check I reran the models on macro and micro level competition without the multi-stage
residuals, and replace the second stage residuals with a dummy variable as to whether a
non-legislative body redistricted. Therefore, the non-multistage models are presented in Table
A.4. In both models, the variance explained are lower than the multistage models. More
importantly, however, is that the results do not substantively change. Within the Macro
level model for the MMM, non-legislative drawn maps do not significantly differ from zero in
affecting the majority party’s stability. Further, the effect is positive, in conflict with the
expectations set in hypothesis 5. Additionally, polarization remains a significant (p<0.05)
of increased majority party stability, and the size of the effects do not significantly differ
between the two models.
The micro level competition model of the HVD Index sees a substantive reduction in the
variance explained by the model. The R-square drops to 0.13 whereas it was 0.19 in the
multistage model. The coefficient for non-legislative drawn maps is not associated with a
significant effect, though is still positive. Of all the variables, only district size approaches
statistical significance (p<0.1). Overall, there is not evidence that the multistage models
biased the results.
V Discussion
These models provide mixed results, insofar as the evidence appears to support the
general mechanisms, though the end product of these mechanisms is not as expected. There
is evidence presented to suggest that the ability of the legislature to redistrict without court
or commission intervention is highly dependent on the time it takes for legislatures to solve
the technical obstacles related to redistricting. When state legislatures are faced with the
complexities of satisfying incumbent, partisan, and geographic criteria with a hard deadline
104
as set by elections, the possibility of court intervention is high. However, state parties flush
with funds and in control of unified government are in a strong position to both reduce
the time necessary to redistrict and in producing a map more resistant to challenge from
the courts on non-partisan grounds. Similarly, a majority party that already has a map in
place that ensures stable control of the legislature will lessen the difficulty to produce a map
without outside intervention.
However, the end result of avoiding court or commission intervention does not appear
to significantly increase the competition within passed state legislative and Congressional
maps. At the macro level, as measured by stability of majority control, there is no effect
for the probability that a court or commission intervenes. For micro level competition, as
measured with the average of winning margins, safe seats, and uncontested elections, there is
evidence to suggest that non-legislative bodies decrease competition. These results appear to
contradict the hopes of reformers that litigation of maps will lead to superior competition,
and the evidence by Crespin (2005) that court and commission drawn maps are associated
with improved district competition.
However, it is important to note that there is a high degree of endogeneity and lack
of external shocks that might lead to precise estimates of the true effects. For example,
although it appears that state requirements to preserve local boundaries is associated with
a higher likelihood of non-legislative intervention, it is not possible to randomly assign
local boundary requirements. Although there is variance within state as to whether local
boundary requirements apply to state legislative or Congressional maps, it might be the case
that states already more likely prone to courts redistricting adopt requirements to preserve
local boundaries, or there might be some other confounding variable. Although potential
confounders are controlled for wherever possible, endogeneity remains a limitation. It is
likely that the effect for these geographic requirements are not as deterministic as estimated.
However, given what we know from the redistricting consultants responsible for solving the
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technical problems associated with attaining several competing criteria, it is not a simple
problem to solve. Preserving county and township lines can be of such great difficulty that as
Chen and Rodden (2013) note, most attempts at redistricting while preserving several criteria
will end in failure. Combine the technical difficulty of drawing a single map with competing
interests by legislators or Congresspeople who all believe that the state map should preserve
their districts, as Tom Hofeller noted, and redistricting will be more difficult.
In regards to the marginality of legislative chambers and Congressional delegations, it
appears that greater marginality leads to a greater likelihood that courts redistrict in place
of state legislatures. These results are in line with treating the difficulty to create maps that
secure majority party control as a technical problem. States legislatures that do not need
to carefully sort voters into precisely laid districts have less discretion in how they draw a
map given time constraints. Further, as Chin, Herschlag and Mattingly (2018) and Chen and
Rodden (2015) find, it can take immense computational power and resources to find the few
maps that might meet partisan and incumbent needs.
It is also important to note the paradox in the effect of state party committees. It appears
that better funded state party committees are associated with a decreased likelihood that
courts redistrict. If stronger party committees can centralize the redistricting process and
keep the state legislature in control of redistricting, adopted maps would be more biased
in the event of unified party government (Cox and Katz, 2002). However, it is also the
case that stronger party committees and their focus on winning state legislative chambers
and Congressional delegations lead to more competitive races (Hernson, 2009; La Raja,
2008; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015). Therefore, weaker party committees would lead to
less competition in legislative and Congressional races following redistricting. As La Raja
and Schaffner (2015) find, it is also the case that weaker party committees lead to greater
polarization. Therefore, insofar as one might want to indirectly create more fair maps in
regards to political outcomes, it would not be sufficient to weaken party organizations. It
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would be a better idea in the grand scheme of electoral competitiveness and the long term
viability of two party competition to increase the difficulty of the technical requirements to
redistrict or grant power to redistrict to independent commissions.
Ultimately, these results lose some of their luster given the final stage of the model as to
estimated changes in macro and micro level competition. As the probability that a court
redistricts increases, there is no discernible effect on the stability of majority party control.
Further, there appears to be evidence that courts for state legislative maps actively decrease
the levels of competition within districts. These results are more directly comparable to
Crespin (2005), though the unit of analysis is the statewide population average as opposed
to individual districts, and for state legislators as opposed to Congressional races. It is too
soon to declare that courts or commissions when they redistrict in place of the legislature. It
would be worth exploring the benefit of implementing informative priors through Bayesian
analysis into the models employed within this chapter. Given the research by Crespin (2005)
incorporates information from the 1990s, it might be possible to include information from
before the time period of the multistage models. It might also be the case that there is a limit
to what can be learned from studies that attempt to infer the effect of counterfactuals through
research that relies overly much on between effects. Although expensive in regards to time and
resources, one might seek out the maps proposed within litigation between opposing parties
in regards to redistricting. The effort would require archived maps and proposed legislation,
which would undoubtedly require travel to various state archives and legislative libraries.
However, it would then be possible to compare what a court or commission implemented,
the proposed Republican map, proposed Democratic map, and how these compare to the
distribution of a series of randomly generated maps. Through such evidence, the debate
could be more or less settled on the effect of non-legislative bodies on redistricting through
direct evidence of counterfactuals.
In summary, whether a court or non-politician commission redistricts can be answered
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by knowing how long will it take a state to redistrict, and the stringency of the technical
criteria to redistrict. Whether the state legislature can overcome these obstacles to redistrict
depends upon the strength of the party committee to centralize the redistricting process.
Through knowing the time necessary to redistrict, it is then possible to know who redistricts.
Who redistricts appears to be a contentious issue, given the litigation that arises across the
states every redistricting cycle. However, on the dimension of competition at least, courts
and independent commissions might not differ to much from the behavior of state legislatures.
Given that delaying redistricting is one of the few venues left to those out of power to prevent
the majority party from redistricting following Common Cause v Rucho (2019), these results
are timely. Even if it is probably not the best idea to decrease funds to party committees,
it is possible to implement laws to respect local political boundaries should one wish to
make redistricting more difficult. However, the lack of results for non-legislative bodies on
increasing competition suggests that one might err on the side of caution before committing
too much in the way of resources and institutional changes in the legal fights over redistricting.
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CHAPTER 4: OVERLAPPING LEGISLATIVE AMBITION
Representative democracy is not possible without meaningful choices for representatives
(Pitkin, 1967). Elections where only one candidate or party can viably compete amounts
to single party rule, which results in a series of harms to policy responsiveness (Key, 1949;
Downs, 1957). Whether an election is competitive in large part arises from whether a quality
candidate with the name recognition, campaign resources and experience necessary to contest
an election (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). However, the environment from which quality
challengers arise can be structured in such a manner so as to stifle potential competition and
ensuing meaningful choice in elections.
Redistricting and the extent to which incumbents represent the same constituents strongly
affects who maintains their seat in state legislatures and the U.S. House (Ansolabehere,
Snyder Jr. and Stewart III, 2000). An incumbent who can maintain the status quo can
most likely ensure a dearth of potential challengers (Cox and Katz, 2002) and easy reelection
(Jacobson, 1989).
However, redistricting offers more than just the opportunity to maintain the status quo.
States redistrict lower and upper legislative chambers in combination with U.S. Congressional
districts. The multilevel nature of redistricting is a prime opportunity to climb the political
ladder if office holders take advantage of the disruption in the personal vote and relative
strengths between candidates. I argue that insofar as state legislators share a greater degree of
shared constituency with a higher level district relative to the incumbent or other competing
state legislators, that state legislators to carry over their incumbency advantage at the
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opportune time to seek higher political office.
Legislators as progressively ambitious individuals who seek to advance their political career
are central to understanding who makes it to political office. Former state legislators typically
make anywhere between one-third to one-half of the membership of Congress (Berkman,
1994; Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999). Therefore, to understand how legislators create and
take advantage of political opportunities to seek higher office is to understand in large part
what determines the makeup of most of the U.S. House of Representatives and upper state
legislative chamber membership. While few legislators seek to risk their political career with
an all but certain loss (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2011; Schlesinger, 1966), many are willing to
run if the probability of winning is all but certain. It is through patience and reducing the
risks involved in running for higher office that ambitious office holders gain the confidence to
launch a run for higher office.
I argue that whether, where, and how successfully a state legislator runs for political
office is largely determined by the extent to which a legislators shared constituency with a
higher district is greater relative to the potential competition. The ability for a legislator
to carry over their incumbency advantage depends upon running within a district where
they are already known due to overlapping constituencies that they represented within their
legislative chamber. By taking advantage of their overlapping constituencies, a legislator can
successfully run for high office as effectively an incumbent, a situation usually not the case
for most other contenders for political office.
I test the ability for state legislators to make use of their overlapping constituencies
over time through district design via a multistage model of progressive ambition. I analyze
state house and senate member decisions of whether and where to run for state senate or
Congressional office, and if so, the extent to which they are successful in the general election.
The analysis covers state legislator decisions to run for higher office from the 2000 to 2016
for U.S. Congressional and state senate elections. The first stage comprises a competing risks
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survival model, followed by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of total vote share
within the general election. The results reveal that the extent to which a state legislator has
an overlapping constituency all but determines where they decide to run for office. However,
the impact of relative population overlap does not appear to exert either a direct or indirect
effect on general election performance. These results suggest that redistricting not only affects
who holds onto office, but who can climb the political ladder over the course of time as well.
I State Legislative Ambitions for the U.S. House
Progressive ambition, the strategic pursuit by office holders to await for opportune
conditions to run for higher political office (Schlesinger, 1966; Rohde, 1979), has been central
to understanding the presence and promotion of former state legislators in Congress.
If we accept the premise that state legislators are strategically rational with a goal for
higher office, then we can expect them to only run when the benefits and probability of victory
outweigh the costs (Rohde, 1979). A state legislator can therefore best attain higher office
after considering their own strengths and weaknesses as a candidate, and the opportunities
and threats present in running, also known as a SWOT.
Strengths and weaknesses relate to internal characteristics of the candidate of interest,
such as their general quality and level of ambition. Stone, Maisel and Maestas (2004) find
in their candidate emergence study that strong candidates, as identified by district level
informants, perform significantly better upon running for higher office. A strong candidate is
one with experience and appeal to voters, with a strong reputation that appeals to voters
within a district of interest (Maestas et al., 2006; Stone and Maisel, 2003; Robeck, 1982).
As Jacobson and Kernell (1983) note, a candidate with previous elected office experience
tends to be stronger when running for higher office (Jacobson, 1989). However, not all state
legislators seek higher office due to a lack of progressive ambition Fox and Lawless (2005),
though it is possible for encouragement by party officials to lead someone to run for higher
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office (Fox and Lawless, 2011). Additionally, while legislators from professional legislators
tend to be in a strong position to run for higher office, they tend to be more risk averse
towards running given the increased costs of potentially losing (Maestas et al., 2006; Lazarus,
2006; Fox and Lawless, 2005).
Opportunities and threats explain when legislators decide to run. A legislator that seeks
higher office will wait for the ideal time so as to minimize the costs and probability of defeat
(Maestas et al., 2006). Typically state legislators wait for an open seat viable for their party
(Black, 1972). Candidates might also take advantage of times in which the Congressional
incumbent is weak, following redistricting (Hetherington, Bruce and Globetti, 2003; Cox
and Katz, 2002) or when the incumbent no longer represents the preferences of the median
voter (Boatright, 2004; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002). State legislators likewise are
more likely to run when the utility of their current seat declines, such as the loss in security
incurred following legislative redistricting (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr. and Stewart III, 2000)
or term limits force them out of office (Lazarus, 2006).
Previous research on progressive ambition tends to fall within either the candidate or
political environment categories in attempts to measure strengths and weaknesses of the
candidate or political opportunities or threats. However, there is conceptual overlap between
political opportunities and candidate strengths in regards to redistricting. All state legislators
necessarily share some of the constituents as higher level districts, such as between state
house and state senate, and state senate with U.S. Congressional districts. Where legislators
share constituents with a higher level district then provides them the potential opportunity
to carry over their strengths as an incumbent. Carson et al. (2011) finds in a cross sectional
study that state legislators with increased overlap with Congressional districts are more likely
to run. Given the nature of strategic ambition, whether, when, and where a legislator runs for
higher office cannot be separated. To understand progressive ambition requires not only an
analysis of time as performed by Maestas et al. (2006) and Hetherington, Bruce and Globetti
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(2003), or where by Carson et al. (2011, 2012), but the intersection of the two in relation to
redistricting cycles. A dynamic model of progressive ambition necessarily unites the time and
space to understand whether, when, and where a legislator runs, which in turn determines
level of electoral success.
II District Overlap and Progressive Ambition
I argue that when and where a legislator runs for higher office is largely influenced by
his/her relative strength as a candidate when compared to the incumbent of a higher level
district or the potential competition. A candidate performs their best in running for higher
office through a combination of choosing a race where their name recognition and reputation
within the higher level district is at its maximum, and when the potential competition is at
its weakest. A state legislator that successfully balances their candidate strengths amongst
their current constituency relative to the competition will be more likely to run for higher
office and win. Therefore, to understand the redistricting cycle and where multiple levels of
districts overlap is to understand whether, when, and where a legislator runs for higher office.
An incumbent state legislator with their reputation already known throughout a higher
level district attains a distinct advantage that other quality candidates do not posses. Whereas
other previous office holders might know how to run a campaign, state legislators that currently
represent constituents within a higher level district built up their name recognition through
repeated campaigns, service, earmarks and policy. State legislators with more constituency
overlap with a higher district will, as a result, have the increased name recognition to challenge
a sitting incumbent or defeat other potential challengers.
Where the two biggest obstacles to a successful run for higher office are presence of an
incumbent and partisanship of a district (Black, 1972), name recognition is a close third. A
lack of name recognition in a race is a near guarantee that members of the opposite party
will not crossover to vote for a candidate, and that even members of one’s own party may
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not support their candidacy (Miller and Stokes, 1963). Incumbents similarly rely upon their
name recognition as a substantial portion of their incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere,
Snyder Jr. and Stewart III, 2000). Any office seeking individual needs to build up name
recognition as a necessary condition to win an election.
For members of the state house, they have the potential to run for any state senate or U.S.
Congressional district, just as a state senator might potentially run for any U.S. Congressional
district. However, if we accept that state legislators seek to run when the probability of
victory is relatively high and the costs to run low, then we can expect state legislators to
choose to run in higher level districts where they can carry over their incumbency strengths,
i.e. districts for which they share constituents. A state legislator that does not need to run as
many introductory advertisements to build awareness with the electorate may save hundreds
of thousands of dollars. A state legislator can then use their advantage in shared constituency
to reduce the competition gap between themselves and the incumbent, should one exist,
or build up their own entrenched advantage against other would be challengers. A current
legislator also can carry over their internal geodatabase list of supporters, their personal and
primary constituencies, which is not true necessarily for the competition.1 Further, a state
could leverage their constituency overlap with a higher level district as a means to scare off
potential competitors.
All state house districts overlap with at least one state senate and Congressional district,
and all state senate districts overlap with at least one Congressional district. A state
legislator’s strength in the district can then be thought of as their number of constituents
1Internal U.S. House of Representatives Franking Commission documents reveal that over 25 percent of a
representative’s internally owned geodatabases of supporters can go out of date within a year. See,
Chris Naughton, “The 7 ‘C’s of Address Hygiene”, U.S. House Mail Services Monthly News Letter, May
2019.
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within a higher level district, divided by the total number of voters within the higher district.
A state legislator that wishes to take advantage of their overlapping constituency needs to
consider that other legislators will likely do the same.
As an example, consider the open seat for Michigan’s eleventh Congressional district, as
displayed in Figure 1. A total of 27 state house and senate districts overlapped with the
Congressional district. However, some had more overlap than others. Figure 1 shows the state
senate districts, which are larger than state house districts. Districts 15 and 9 are completely
nested within the 11th Congressional district while three others partially overlap. The state
legislative districts from before the redistricting, in 2000, were the potential districts from
which a likely quality challenger from the state legislature would emerge. State senate district
9 shared approximately 37 percent of the same population with MI-11, while state senate
district 15 shared approximately 24 percent. The design of MI-11 thus granted state legislator
Thaddeus McCotter of district 9 a 13 percentage point advantage from the closest contender.
McCotter ran without serious competition in the primary and won the general election with
59 percent of the vote in 2002.2 News coverage at the time notes that McCotter’s overlapping
state senate district made him the heir apparent for the unoccupied Congressional district.3
While Michigan’s 11th Congressional District is only a single example, it illustrates the
theoretical impact of relative district overlap in decreasing the campaign costs and in altering
the perceived probabilities of winning office. The other legislators with constituencies within
MI-11 may have decided against running for a number of reasons, though their smaller shares
2House General Elections, Michigan, 2002-2010 All Districts, Congressional Quarterly Press Voting and
Elections Collection (accessed July 12, 2016) http://library.cqpress.com/elections/search.php
3Stevens, Allison, “State Legislators Serve Dual Roles, Carving Out Congressional Districts for Themselves,
The Hill, January 16, 2002, (accessed August 1, 2016) http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/
reports/remanual/usnews8.htm
115
of overlapping constituencies would not have encouraged them.
Note that in the case of Michigan State Senator McCotter, he had the greatest lead
in regards to shared constituency of all of those running. The U.S. House Representative
retired, and the other state legislators faced an uphill battle given their lesser levels of shared
constituencies. Where Carson et al. (2011) perceive constituency overlap as independent of
the competition, I argue that it is better conceptualized in relation to all other potential
candidates at all district levels. Had the Congressional district been occupied, his relative
overlap would have been greater than other state legislators, but far behind the Congressional
incumbent. If one were to calculate the relative population overlap difference between
McCotter’s district and an occupied MI-11 as one minus 0.37, for a total of 0.63. The
larger the difference between a potential candidate and the incumbent or strongest potential
legislative challenger, the more costly a run for higher office and lower probability of victory.4
I therefore hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1: A state legislator will be more likely to run for a higher level district seat as
the relative constituency overlap between their district and the higher level district increases.
I similarly expect for relative district overlap to exert a substantial effect on election
results for a state legislator that decides to run for a higher level district.
Hypothesis 2: A state legislator will win a higher percentage of the vote share for the
higher level district as the relative overlap between their district and the higher level district
increases.
Note that relative district overlap between a state legislative district and a higher level
district necessarily influences not only whether a legislator runs for higher office, but also
4Calculated from a ArcGIS python toolbox. See Data and Methods section for more detail.
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where. A legislator with lesser district overlap between their district and a other higher
level district is unlikely to run given their poor chances of victory and/or higher costs of
running. Additionally, in the event that every higher level district overlapping their own is
occupied by an incumbent, the costs might ultimately become negligible to run in a higher
level district where they have no district overlap, and therefore no shared constituency. Such
is the case with State Senator Kenneth Chlouber of Colorado, who had no open seat to run
for with shared constituency upon being term limited out of office, and therefore ran for a
Congressional district that shared no overlap with his own.5
However, in considering the decision and performance to run, it is necessary to consider
when a state legislator runs. As posited by structural progressive ambition theory (Schlesinger,
1966; Rohde, 1979; Maestas, 2003), a potential candidate waits for the ideal time to run in
order to maximize their probability of winning. Therefore, a decision to not run in a given
election does not mean that a state legislator is not progressively ambitious. Rather, it might
be a covariate that makes an event of interest more likely over time (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones, 1997). Therefore, I incorporate time into the decision of where to run via a treating
the decision to run for higher office as a function of cumulative risk via a survival model. As
Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2003) note, “The premise of a event history analysis is to model
both the duration of time spent in the initial state and the transition to the subsequent state,
that is the event.”
By considering the time in congruence with constituency overlap, we account for the
desire of legislators to minimize the level of risk in running for higher office by ensuring that
5“Chlouber joins Arkin Law Firm,” Herald Democrat, August 15, 2012 http://www.leadvilleherald.com/
free_content/article_887f40b2-e703-11e1-911d-001a4bcf6878.html (accessed March 1, 2016); “U.S.
House, Colorado District 1 General Election, 2002,” Ballotopedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado\
%27s_1st_Congressional_District (accessed March 1, 2016)
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they are at their strongest (Maestas et al., 2006; Hetherington, Bruce and Globetti, 2003).
If these hypotheses receive support, it will suggest that how redistricting affects level of
constituency overlap between multiple level of districts over time is central to understanding
who makes it to higher political office.
III Data and Methods
I conduct a multistage model on whether and where a state legislator runs for higher
office, followed by their success in the general election for elections from 2000 to 2016 at three
levels: (1) state house to state senate, (2) state house to the U.S. House of Representatives,
and (3) state senate to U.S. House of Representatives. I create these dyadic data from the
Klarner (2018) for Legislative elections and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (N.d.) U.S.
House Elections returns. These election returns data include the names of all candidates,
their districts, and vote shares. The combination of these two data sets permit the matching
of state legislators to Congressional districts, and state house members to the state senate.
I employ a competing risks survival model as the first stage to determine whether, when
and where a candidate runs for higher office. A competing risks model offers the ability to
predict the probability of an event of interest occurs given time and the potential for mutually
exclusive competing outcomes (Fine and Gray, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
The the competing risks model is optimal given that it accounts for dependency within the
dependent variable; when a state legislator runs for one office, they cannot run for any other.
Therefore, a non-competing risks survival analysis would lead to biased estimates and fail to
estimate the stochastic process correctly (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). The data for the
competing risks analysis is arranged such that every time a legislator appears in the data
set and does not run for higher office is coded as 0, and upon running are coded as 1, which
results in every other potential higher district not run for coded as 2. Should the a legislator
exit the data set due to any other reason, they are also coded as 2, given that a competing
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risks model simply requires that the event of interest be coded differently than the competing
events (Fine and Gray, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
The second stage follows an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model of a state
legislator’s total vote share of the two-party vote upon running for higher office, with the
first stage predicted residuals carried over into the model. I acquire election outcome data
from the Klarner (2018) Legislative Elections data and MIT Election Data and Science Lab
(N.d.) U.S. House Elections data.
Given the interest to avoid substantial left truncation, I excluded states that redistricted
mid-decade where no GIS information was available on state legislative district design. The
U.S. Census cataloged state legislative shapefiles for the years 2000, 2006, 2010, and every
year after 2012. Therefore, states that redistricted twice or more between 2000 and 2006
failed to have geospatial information necessary for the analysis. Though it is possible to start
the analysis with the map cataloged in 2006, the data might be unduly influenced with an
excess of legislators who are predisposed against running for higher office given their choice
not to take advantage of redistricting to run for higher office.6 Following the exclusions, there
are 772,728 observations for state legislator and higher office dyads.
Given the repeated observations for candidate-target seat dyads over time, robust clustered
errors adapted to Fine and Gray (1999) competing risks repeated observations model. For
the second stage, robust clustered standard errors are employed by state-year.
The two-stage nature of the model will therefore capture over time the role that shared
constituency between multilevel districts plays in the decision of where, whether and when to
run, and the potential impact on election results. Therefore, the modeling strategy separates
6The excluded states are as follows: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
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the biased selection process that leads candidates to run for higher office from election results,
and better captures the full picture of the strategic progressive ambition model posited in
previous research.
iii Measuring Relative Constituency Overlap
I measure relative constituency overlap via multiple iterations and levels of computed
population overlap between different sets of districts at different times employing a co-
developed python toolbox.7 The python toolbox finds the three way intersection between
U.S. Census block group (CBG) population shapefiles and two other levels of geographies
of interest in order to determine the shared population. Both the legislative districts and
census block groups are acquired from the TIGERLINES shapefiles.8 I use the UCLA Digital
Boundary Congressional district database by Lewis et al. (2013) for U.S. House districts.
The python toolbox computes first the three way intersection between a CBG, geography
level one, and geography level 2. Next, identifiers are created based upon the dyadic name
between the first and second levels of geography. When a CBG is completely nested between
the first and second geographic units, its population is weighted by its geographic overlap
with a score of one. When a CBG is split between different dyads, the population is weighted
by the respective geographic overlap. The script then marginalizes the weighted population
data by dyad and divides the dyadic population by the population of the higher level of
geography. The end result is a population overlap score between zero and one, with one being
complete shared constituency and zero being no shared constituency.
7See, (Curiel and Steelman, 2018) and
Steelman, Tyler S. and John A. Curiel. “Measuring and Solving Modifiable Areal Unit Problems with
Overlapping Populations.” Paper presented at the Political Methodology Conference, Provo, UT July 2018.
8Maps and Data: TIGER/Line Shapefiles. 2013. United States Census Bureau. Retrieved from https:
//www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html (accessed July 31, 2016)
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An example of population overlap calculation. Grid squares reflect census block groups (CBGs), with a varying populations
across grids. CD-1 and CD-2 reflect higher level geographies with greater population than the lower level geography, Leg-A.
When census block groups are split, population is allocated based upon geographic overlap.
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In order to calculate the relative population overlap, it is necessary to know how a
legislator’s constituency overlap with a higher level district compares to the incumbent and
all of the other competitors. Even if a state legislator’s district is entirely nested within a
higher level district, their relative overlap would still likely be far less than the incumbent
should she decide to run.
Therefore, in order to calculate the relative overlap, I first run the population overlap script
for the state house to state senate, state house to Congress, and state senate to Congress. I
find measure the population overlap at time t−1 for the lower level map’s boundaries with the
higher level district at time t. The lags are run given that measuring the overlap at the same
points in time would not reflect the carried over incumbency advantage on the part of state
legislators. I follow up with measuring the population overlap within levels of geography
from the earlier point in time.
Upon computing the different levels of population overlap, I then determine whether
the incumbent of the target district ran, with data from MIT Election Data and Science
Lab (N.d.) and Klarner (2018). If an incumbent ran, the incumbent’s population overlap is
coded as their population overlap from time t−1 and time t. Further, amongst the potential
challengers from the state house and/or state senate, the group maximum overlap is computed
for the target district of interest. If the incumbent’s population overlap is the greatest, their
population overlap is coded as the maximum. Should one of the potential challenger’s have
greater overlap, then their overlap is coded as the maximum. After computing the maximum
overlap, the candidate’s actual overlap is subtracted from the maximum in order to compute
the overlap difference score. A candidate with the most overlap between their district and
a higher level is coded as zero. All other candidates have scores greater than zero and a
maximum of one. Potential candidates with no overlap between their district and a higher
level receive a score of one. Therefore, the closer a candidate is to zero, the closer they are to
approximating the constituency of the higher level incumbent.
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As an example for how one of these calculations might play out, consider a situation where
the highest level district, a Congressional district, has 100 constituents. State senate districts
have a populations of 25 constituents, and state house members 10 constituents. Should
the Congressional incumbent run, and all lower level districts be nested fully within the
Congressional district, the overlap difference would be calculated as one minus the population
overlap that a legislator shares with the district. Therefore, all state senators nested within
the Congressional district would receive a population overlap difference score of .75 (i.e.
1.0 - 0.25), and all state house members 0.90 (1.0 - 0.10). All legislators outside of the
Congressional district would receive a score of 1.0. However, if Congressional incumbent did
not run, all of the state senators with equal population would then be coded as having the
maximum overlap with the Congressional district, receiving scores of 0. In turn, all other
state legislators within would now only have an overlap difference score of 0.25, and state
house members nested within the district a score of 0.15. Therefore, the overlap difference
score captures the effect that incumbents, other potential challengers and one’s own personal
strength as a candidate on the decision to run for higher office.
In order to ascertain the effect over time of the overlap difference variable, I include
its interaction with the number of years since a legislator entered the dataset. The time
interaction permits analysis of whether the proportional hazards assumed in a competing
risks model is violated for the primary explanatory variable of interest and that the results
are not biased (Fine and Gray, 1999). Given the time interaction, the number of years in
which the base legislator of interest has been in office is also included.
I additionally control for confounding variables that relate to the structural opportunity
structure affecting progressive ambition. First and foremost, I include a dummy variable
for whether the target district of interest is open, coded one if yes, and zero otherwise. As
mentioned previously, these data are acquired from the MIT House Elections Returns (2017)
and Klarner Legislative Elections Returns (2018) data sets. From these data sets, I also
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calculate the lagged same party vote share percentage for the dyadic data. The variable takes
the form of the percentage vote share that their party’s nominee received in the previous
election for the targeted district, or the opposite party vote percentage subtracted from 100
in the event that a legislator’s party did not have a candidate in the prior race. Additionally,
I interact whether the seat is open with the same party vote share percentage. Although
candidates are far more likely to run if the district of interest is more favorable to their party
(Carson et al., 2011, 2012; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Boatright, 2004), they would be expected
to not run if their party’s incumbent chose to run again (Carson et al., 2011; Boatright, 2013).
I further control for the professionalism of the state’s legislature. Past research finds
conflicting results, with some studies (Maestas, 2003) finding that ambitious state legislators
more likely to run,9 with other studies (Carson et al., 2011) finding professionalism reducing
the likelihood that one chooses to run for higher office. I expect that increased legislative
professionalism will be associated with a higher likelihood of running within the context of a
survival model. I therefore employ the Bowen and Greene (2014) MDS2 measure of legislative
professionalism as a control.
I next control for the extent to which a state legislator is term limited. Lazarus (2006)
finds term limits to increase the rate at which legislators run for higher office. Using the
Klarner Legislator Elections returns data, I include a factor variable for the duration until a
state legislator is term limited. The data records whether term limits mark a legislator in
their last term in office, second to last term where each term is two years, or the second to
last term where each term is four years. The comparison group in turn are legislators who
are not affected in the near future by term limits.
9It should be noted that Maestas (2003) are able to first identify whether a legislator is progressively ambitious,
which is often not possible using non-survey data.
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I follow up with controls for the political environment related to when and how long a
term is. These include a dummy variable for whether a term is longer than two years, one if
yes and zero otherwise. A similar dummy variable is included for whether the base legislator
of interest is elected in an odd-year election. These controls account for the ability of a state
legislator to potentially run for higher office and not risk losing their current office, thus
decreasing the costs. For the second stage, I also include a dummy variable for whether a
candidate is a write-in. It is difficult to determine whether a candidate launched a serious
bid to run for higher office. At the same time, it would be unfortunate to exclude all write-in
candidates. I therefore include a dummy variable as to whether a candidate is a write-in, one
if yes and zero otherwise.
Should the overlap difference explanatory variable receive support, we should expect to
see a negative effect for the variable. As a potential candidate’s overlap between their own
and a higher level district increases, running for higher office successfully should be more
costly and less likely.
One potential shortcoming of the design is that success in the primary stage is not
accounted for due to a lack of legislative elections returns. Therefore, while it is possible to
better affirm whether a state legislator believes it to be less costly to run and more likely
to succeed given the relative differences of population overlap, the second stage of general
elections returns is biased towards a type 1 error. It might be the case that a state legislator’s
population overlap exerts a significant effect in the primary stage, though fails to carry over
into the general election, therefore exerting an indirect effect. While this is problematic, the
research design as proposed so far will better ascertain the impact on state legislator decision
making for higher office, and correct for limitations in past research unable to better account
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Table 4.1: Decision to Run for Higher Office Outcomes
Decision to Run Percent (Freq.)
Did not run (right censored) 80.48% (630,068)
Ran for district 0.03% (240)
Decided against running in district 0.62% (4,885)
Exited data set 18.87% (147,703)
Percents in the right column, with total number of observations in parentheses. Ran for district reflects the legsilators who chose
to run for higher office in a given district. Decided against running in district reflects the number of districts that legislators
actively chose against running in given the district that the chose to run in. Exited data set relfects legsilators who upon their
last year in the data never ran for higher office.
for time, space, and competing events.10.
IV Results
The initial data reveal that employing the competing risks model does grant additional
information that might have otherwise been missed following a typical survival model. Table
4.1 reports the outcomes for the first stage model, the competing risks analysis. Within the
data, 240 legislators ran for higher office, approximately 0.03 percent of the data given the
772,728 dyadic observations. However, in making the decision to run for higher legislative
office, the legislators within the data decided against running for 4,885 other districts within
their state. Finally, approximately 19 percent of the observations ended with legislators
exiting the data set without ever appearing in the general election.11
10It should be noted that up until the mid 2000s, competing risk models were effectively impossible to run
given computational limitations and the novelty of competing risk models at the time. Additionally, GIS
software improvements within the last decade permitted the creation of the python toolbox that allows
for measures of population overlap. Finally, it cannot be stressed enough that the work conducted by
MIT’s Elections Data and Science Lab and the many scholars on the Legislative Elections Returns team
(Klarner, 2018) made this research possible. Carson et al. (2011) in turn broke new ground in accounting
for population overlap in general between state legislative and Congressional districts, though were limited
by the lack of data in the Geographic Correspondence Engine at the time of their research, which has since
been updated to include most U.S. Census geographies (Rice, 2018)
11As mentioned previously, it is possible that some legislators tried to run in their party’s primary, though
ultimately lost and never made it to the general election.
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Table 4.2 reveals the results for the multi-stage model of decision to run for higher office
and general election performance. Positive coefficients reflect a greater likelihood of running
for a given district as opposed to some other potential district. The results reveal that the
primary explanatory variable of interest, difference in overlap from the maximum, reaches
statistical significance (p < 0.01), with the sign for the coefficient negative as expected.
The greater the difference in population overlap between a legislator and the incumbent or
strongest potential challenger, the less likely a candidate is to run for that district, all else
equal. However, the time interaction with population overlap reveals that the effect decays
with time. The results additionally reveal that whether the seat is open, along with its
interaction with same party vote share, do not reach significance. Additionally, the variable
for same party vote share reaches statistical significance, though moves in an unexpected
direction. Additionally, the initial results suggest that legislative professionalism does increase
the probability overall that a legislator runs for higher office, in line with the work by Maestas
(2003). Further, a legislator about to be term limited out of office, those with four year terms,
and off year elections, are all more likely to run for office.
It should be noted that in interpreting the application of coefficients, it is necessary to
present quantities of interest, since the coefficients must be considered in relation to time.
Therefore, the effects of relative population overlap and the effect of time are plotted in
Figure 4.2. We see in Figure 4.2a that a candidate in the fourth year in office with the most
relative overlap for a higher level district appears near certain to run. In turn, moving to
no overlap at a difference of one leads to an estimated 60 percentage point reduction in
running for higher office, all else equal. Note that the overlap difference variable incorporates
the constituency, redistricting, and incumbency variable into its score, as mentioned above.
Therefore, the effect of overlap difference on decision of whether and where to run for higher
office makes sense theoretically and substantively. For a reference point, were a U.S. House
incumbent to run again in the state of Michigan, and a state senate district entirely nested
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Table 4.2: Multistage Models of Progressive Ambition for Higher Office
Decision to Run Election Results
Stage 1 Residuals 2.008
(16.493)
Diff. from Max Overlap -1.896*** 11.665
(0.354) (10.110)
Diff. from Max Overlap x Time 0.069*
(0.040)
Open Seat 0.204 -4.810
(0.259) (8.912)
Open Seat x Same Party Vote -0.001 0.011
(0.005) (0.159)
Same Party Vote -0.009*** 0.212***
(0.003) (0.081)
Leg. Professionalism 0.151** 3.940*
(0.067) (2.174)
Last term 0.579*** -3.291
(0.205) (5.183)
Second to last term, 2-year -0.102 -13.244**
(0.312) (6.642)
Second to last term, 4-year -14.514***
(0.217)
4-year Term 0.464** 1.955
(0.200) (4.674)
Years in Office 0.037** -0.141
(0.018) (0.633)






Log Likelihood -2847.357 -1075.242
AIC 5718.713 2176.483
N 772,728 240
*p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Coefficients reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Model 1 is the competing risk model, where the dependent variable of interest is whether a legislator runs for a higher office
of interest, with competing events the mutually exclusive competing options, or exiting the data without running. Positive
coefficients reflect a greater likelihood of running for a district. Model 2 is the regression model for general election vote
percentage amongst the legislators who chose to run for higher office.
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within the Congressional district, the overlap difference score would be around 0.63. The
increased difference in overlap would in turn decrease the expected probability of running by
nearly 50 percentage points. These results suggest that the impact of population overlap on
decisions of whether and where to run for higher office are substantively significant.
Figure 4.2: Effect of Population Overlap on Decision to Run for Higher Office
(a) Population overlap diff. effect
Note: X-axis is the difference in population overlap from
the candidate with the maximum overlap.
(b) Time effect
Note: X-axis is the number of years within the state legis-
lature, with population overlap held constant at its mean.
The predicted effect of running for higher office, with the medium gray line reflecting the 95 percent confidence interval. Figure
4.2a varies the level of population overlap that a legislator has relative to the candidate with the most overlap. Figure 4.2b in
turn varies the data based upon time within the legislature. All other values held constant at their mean values. Estimates
calculated from the competing risks model with robust clustered standard errors by state legislator-district dyad.
However, should also be noted that the time interaction with geographic overlap and
positive effect of time suggests that the impact of geographic overlap decreases over time.
Therefore, Figure 4.2b plots the probability of running for a higher district given a member’s
years in the state legislature with geographic overlap held constant at 0.63. We see that as
time goes on, the probability increases substantially up until about year 15 in office. Note that
as Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) note, the effect of time, especially in competing risks
models, captures the informative effect of time that is not captured by the other independent
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variables present within the model.12 Therefore, one should not interpret these results that
running for higher office is inevitable, but rather that population overlap and other influences
on decision to run for higher office become less deterministic with time.
We see in the election results analysis in Table 4.2 that the first stage residuals and
relative overlap variables fail to exert a significant effect, though both variables move in the
expected direction. Although the results might be due to the fewer observations, the variance
inflation factor (VIF) for the explanatory variables of interest are below 8. Although the VIF
is high, it is not model breaking either. Further, even a model with only the relative overlap
and first stage residuals fail to reach significance as well. Therefore, it does not appear that
relative overlap is a significant predictor of vote share in the general election.
For the controls, both same party vote share significantly (p<0.01) increases expected
vote share, and legislative professionalism approaches a positive significant (p=0.08) effect.
Legislators who run during their second to last term under two year terms also are associated
with a significant and negative effect on vote share (p<0.05). Unsurprisingly, legislators as
write-in candidates see a significant negative reduction (p<0.01) in their vote share as well.
Overall, these results suggest strong support for hypothesis one, in that relative population
overlap with a higher level district increases the probability that a legislator runs for office.
However, the results fail to support the second hypothesis, in that there is no direct or
indirect effect on general election outcomes.
V Discussion and Conclusion
Quality challengers are among the primary determinants of whether an election is com-
petitive, and the results from these analyses suggest that district design strongly mediates
12Within the context of model 1, the presence of the time covariate leads to the suppression of the constant.
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decisions to run for higher office. Beyond the standard effects district design exert on legislator
reelection rates and party control of legislative chambers and delegations, these findings reveal
that the relative differences in population overlap between districts exerts a strong effect
on who decides to run for office, when and where. Legislators do not run for higher office
without regard to their existing constituencies, and nor do they appear to run as soon as
they achieve the maximum possible shared constituents with a higher level district. Rather,
when and where a legislator decides to climb the political ladder is heavily dependent upon
not only whether they can carry over their incumbency advantage via population overlap,
but also the strength of the competition.
These results offer substantial insight into the intersection of structured progressive
ambition, redistricting, and sources of candidate strength. From a modeling perspective,
the first stage competing risks model appears to better capture both the geographic and
time components that influence the cost to run for higher office and perceived probability
of winning. Unlike cross sectional studies, these results track legislator decisions to run for
higher office over a 16 year period. Therefore, although it is not possible to randomly assign
legislators to run for higher office for the time being, it is possible to more accurately discern
the true causal effect on decision making calculus on the part of state legislators.
Further, the ability to separate out the constituency base of support that incumbents
have from their ability as campaigners grants greater insight into the nature of incumbency
advantage. As Cox and Katz (2002) and Jacobson (1989) note, perceived incumbency
advantage works to scare off quality challengers, which in turn leads to incumbent strength
to remain untested most of the time. However, calculating the population overlap between
incumbents and potential challengers from the state legislature over time reveal that the
incumbent is perceived weakened compared to previous years as the population overlap
difference shrinks. Unlike the work by Rohde (1979) on progressive ambition between the
U.S. House and U.S. Senate, however, district design of state legislative and Congressional
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districts are subject to change at least once every ten years. Therefore, to understand how
state legislators make use of redistricting and their relative strengths as quality candidates is
to understand the career pipeline that makes up the plurality of eventual members of the
U.S. House and upper legislative chambers.
Although these results confirm and extend the previous research on progressive ambition
and redistricting, one great limitation is the lack of data on primaries. This shortcoming must
be kept in mind given the lack of statistical significance for either the direct or indirect effect of
relative population overlap on election results. Although Carson et al. (2012) find null effects
on population overlap on primary vote share, it might be the case that employing a competing
risks survival model coupled with an improved measure of population overlap would reveal a
significant effect. The significance of multilevel district design and overlapping constituencies
is important insofar as the field of progressive ambition researchers can discern whether the
decision to run for higher office is subjective confidence or more objective forecasting. As Fox
and Lawless (2011) demonstrate quite robustly, interest in running for higher office can be
very capricious. If relative population overlap truly fails to exert any significant effect on
increasing the probability of victory for a state legislator, then it would largely appear that
the largest population of quality candidates who might run and provide competitive elections
largely do so out of an incorrect belief as to the benefits of shared constituencies. Future
studies therefore should work to analyze how relative population overlap might impact the
prerequisites of a successful general election campaign. Such future work might incorporate
information on where legislators are able to raise money upon running for higher office,
variance in name recognition across different district sections, and more. These analyses
would reveal even if multilevel district design fails to affect probability of victory when a
legislator runs for higher office, relative population overlap might still reduce costs of a
campaign for higher office.
Another area of concern is how pre-determined is multilevel district design by geography?
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Given the highly contentious process of redistricting in the attempts by legislators to secure
safe seats or partisan advantage, it might be the case that redistricting offers the means for
legislators to secure their way to higher office. As Heberlig and Larson (2012) find, much
of the control over internal ambition within a chamber is decided by loyalty to one’s party
and majority control of the chamber. It might be the case that a similar process applies to
external ambition for higher office.
Therefore, it appears that more work needs to be conducted not only on progressive
ambition in general, but also the multilevel nature of redistricting itself. To date, most
research focuses on redistricting on a single map on the dimensions of partisanship, race, and
the personal vote (Gelman and King, 1994b; Cox and Katz, 2002; Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr.
and Stewart III, 2000; Lublin, 1997). However, if overlapping constituencies offers the means
to influence access to higher office, even if the true effect on election outcomes is negligible,
then it would suggest that the nature of redistricting is even more highly dimensional than
past research suggests. Regardless, the results from this research reveals strong evidence that
the aforementioned fields should work to incorporate relative population overlap into future
work. Insofar as districts at different levels necessarily overlap, where and when one runs for
higher office will be greatly constrained.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the 2020 approaches, state political parties enjoy a new found importance. The Supreme
Court in Common Cause v. Rucho ruled that despite their concerns over gerrymandering,
it is up to state courts and direct democracy to solve the process. Democratic state party
committees must now contend with the lack of funds by Democratic candidates following hard
fought competitive primaries in 2018,1 yet are also drained of funds following the strategy
by the Clinton campaign to overly extend the resources of state party committees through
coordinated expenditures.2 At the same time, Republican Congressional representatives are
continuing to retire in numbers that leave the way open for Congressional challengers at both
the primary and general election level to make their case to voters amidst the lack of a clear
incumbent advantage.3 All of these events will merge into each other so as to affect electoral
outcomes and ensuing representation.
Therefore, these results offered by this dissertation pave the way to better understand
1Bill Allison and John McCormick, “Primary Fights Are Draining the Democrats’ Cof-
fers,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2018 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-20/
democratic-primary-fights-drain-coffers-as-republicans-bank-cash (accessed August 3, 2019)
2Kenneth P. Vogel and Isaac Arnsdore, “Clinton fundraising leaves little for
state parties,” Politico, May 2, 2016 https://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/
clinton-fundraising-leaves-little-for-state-parties-222670 (accessed August 4, 2019).
3Ashley Killough and Clare Foran, “Here are the lawmakers who are not seeking reelection to Congress in 2020,”
CNN, August 5, 2019 https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/01/politics/congress-retirements-2020/
index.html, (accessed August 7, 2019).
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why, how, and who will acquire power in the coming years. Since the end of the Gilded
Age, the nature of party power has been in flux. Various individuals and organizations
concentrated power among themselves even as the Tripartite Structure remained a useful frame
to understand the components and rationale for party organizations. Even as polarization
increases across state legislatures and in turn displaces party organizations, it appears that
there might be a level of feedback that might turnover the current holders of party power
across the states. Structures remain in place to give some an edge over others within political
advancement, and insofar as office holding remains an appealing good, the struggle for the
means to control where one represents will continue.
These conclusions can be reached in considering these chapters together and how they
interact dynamically. These bring us to the questions asked at the beginning: (1) how can we
better measure sources of party organizational strength over time; (2) how do the three legs
of the tripartite structure reinforce each other (3) why do some state legislatures lose their
power to redistrict; and (4) how can districts be drawn to influence who runs successfully for
higher office.
What Have We Learned?
In considering question one, how can we better measure party power organizationally and
competitiveness over time, the results of chapter one are fairly clear. Money long played,
and likely will continue, to play a central role in the maintenance of party goals. Parties as
an organization bear a primary responsibility to serve party interests through the capturing
of political office as a means to control government. Money does not directly translate to
the votes necessary to secure legislative majorities, though it is a necessary condition to
begin the process. Further, party organizations can bear independence insofar as they are
not reliant on a single source of revenue: a party organization beholden to a single interest or
organization is susceptible to capture by outside organizations or the loss of funding in the
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next election cycle. Insofar as parties can approximate their old power seen in the Gilded
Age, they need a lot of money and the ability to sustain themselves over time.
In regards to competition, previous measures might capture which party controls govern-
ment or micro level competition, but does not exactly capture the vulnerability of majority
party control of state legislatures. A state government is competitive not just based on how
many seats are contested, but on how viable it is for a the party out of power to engage
in a party coordinated strategy to capture the necessary marginal districts so as to attain
majority control. How fragile a legislative majority is necessarily relates to how many seats
separate the majority from the minority and individual seats where it is not a lost cause to
contest. However, the marginal majority measure (MMM) captures both of these features in
a manner that directly captures how realistic it is for the party out of power to contest for
majority control.
In answer question two an building off of the results in answering question one, we see a
balance arise between the legs of the tripartite structure, party in government, the electorate,
and organization. MMM as the intersection of party in the electorate and government seems
to be associated with increased power for party organizations. These results make sense
given that a party organization’s primary purpose is to aid in the capture of party majorities.
Therefore, a competitive state legislature seems to attract more money to these organizations,
following the rational structured hydraulic theory of campaign funding. Additionally, it is
also the case that as polarization increases, there is a substantive association where party
organizations decrease in strength. Though these results are far from a natural experiment,
these results are in line with polarized environments priming more ideological concerns.
Donors more ideological donors would in turn donate to a range of other organizations that
are far more driven to advance an ideological agenda. These results support and extend the
findings of La Raja and Schaffner (2015). Presumably decreased funds for party organizations
will decrease the funds necessary to provide competitive elections. However, should the
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majority party be able to shut out the minority via changing rules and institutions, it would
suggest that both less competition and less party organizational strength would arise. As
La Raja and Schaffner (2015) finds, the crippled party organization would in turn permit
unchecked polarization.
Therefore, we learn from chapter two that institutional conditions equal, a sort of dynamic
equilibrium or the tripartite legs might arise. However, there is the potential for the process
to become unbalanced and result in unchecked polarization across state legislatures amidst
the death of the pragmatic center of state parties.
In chapter 3, it is evident that the process by which state legislatures lose their power
to redistrict and control the means by which to solidify their strength is far from random.
Timing is crucial in determining who redistricts, as there are clear deadlines by which a state
legislature needs to redistrict. However, given the appeal for individual legislators to secure
their means of easy reelections by defecting from party interests, the process is susceptible to
collective action failure from the perspective of the party. Further, given the complexities that
arise during redistricting in the form of respecting local boundaries, the process of producing
a technically valid and timely map can be difficult. Therefore, conditions associated with
decreased difficulty of searching for a satisfactory map and more centralized party control
tends to result in a decreased likelihood over time that non-legislative actors intervene to
redistrict in place of the legislature. Notably, a substantive predictor of more legislative
control of the process are increased party organizational funds. Therefore, party organizations
appear to be in the best position to centralize redistricting so as to give themselves an edge,
and potentially in the process displace their role in the state governmental power structure.
However, it does not appear to be the case that non-legislative actors redistricting in place
of the legislature results in fairer maps, as suggested by Carson, Crespin and Williamson (2014).
Rather, there appears to be little evidence that courts or commissions redistricting results in
more competitive maps at either the micro or macro level. Although when redistricting occurs
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affects who redistricts, who redistricts, as framed between the legislature and non-legislative
actors, does not seem to affect the competitiveness of the representational process.
Finally, chapter 4 reveals that who runs for office can be shaped by redistricting in a
multilevel process. Insofar as legislative districts must be nested to some extent in higher
level districts, where greatest nesting occurs influences the decision by state legislators to run
for higher office. Further, it is not just one’s own level of shared constituency that shapes
whether one runs for higher office, but also whether one’s shared constituency is greater than
the competition. The competition in turn includes both the potential current incumbent, in
addition to the field of other state legislators. These results are demonstrated via survival
modeling, with natural shocks in the form of retirements and redistricting. Therefore, these
results build on the findings of Carson et al. (2011) by providing an improved model and
in expanding the field of concerns that a potentially ambitious legislator needs to consider.
Therefore, level of relative shared constituency affects whether and where a legislator runs for
office, which in turn affects how competitive a seat is. However, it is not apparent from these
results that there is a direct effect on district overlap to votes earned in the general election.
Together, these results suggest in regards to the competition necessary for representative-
democracies, there are a range of micro and macro level effects that must be considered in
combination. As scholars from Key (1958) to La Raja and Schaffner (2015) and Hernson
(2009) discern, party organizations offer the means to provide two party competition, which in
turn results in responsive politics (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer, 2002). Whether a state
party organization is funded depends in turn on how competitive the state legislature appears,
which can be made less competitive via redistricting (Gelman and King, 1994b; McDonald
and Best, 2015; McGann et al., 2016). Whether the majority political party is in a position
to redistrict and decrease competition depends upon their party organizational strength that
in turn centralizes the redistricting process for the party. From the redistricting process,
individual legislators can be motivated to run for higher office and provide competition at
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the district level insofar as they believe their shared constituency with a higher district can
provide an advantage over their competitors.
Limits of the Current Research and Avenues for Future Research
Despite these results, problems do afflict each of the chapters to varying extents. In
chapter one, the time series model does much to demonstrate the robustness of the results,
even if it is not in the form of a natural experiment. However, there are still problems of
endogeneity, given the lack of exogenous shocks in the data. Additionally, the evidence in
support of using the MMM over the HVD or Ranney indices requires final evidence that
the measure better predicts outcomes that competitiveness should influence, such as policy
responsiveness. Each of these can be accounted for by expanding the data beyond the years
between 2002 and 2010, which would lead to shocks in the form of the BCRA of 2002 and the
Citizens United ruling in 2010. For the MMM, a test on how well MMM predicts governmental
policy tracks with public opinion would provide the final evidence to use the MMM in place
of HVD or Ranney indices when macro level competition is of interest.
For Chapter 3, much of the problem arises from an oversight of using such a rough measure
of respect for local boundaries in the form of a dummy variable. However, it should be
the case that some states encounter more difficulty redistricting based upon the population
distribution across localities and uneven population growth. These can be accounted for using
the population Gini index, and from there rerunning the results. From there, potentially
expanding the data set to prior years and the predicting how well the model applies to the
2021 redistricting cycle would go a long way to validating the results.
Chapter 4 in turn suffers one glaring weakness in the form of not accounting for the
primary stage in elections. The viability of collecting data on primaries varies by state.
However, it should be possible to limit these results to at least the state legislative to
Congressional level. A few states might also be selected where primary data does exist in
order to test every dyadic combination. Further, these results might be applied to years before
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the implementation of equal population, where the population of districts varied greatly.
These results might offer more evidence of the impact on shared constituencies. Finally, it can
also be tested whether state legislators are able to attain greater vote shares in places where
they represented as state legislators, enjoy greater name recognition, and raise greater funds.
These tests can be implemented with a combination of election precinct data, Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) data, and FEC data. These analyses in combination
could be implemented in the form of a regression discontinuity design (RDD), which would
offer a greater precision in testing treatment effects. The results, positive or negative, would
indicate as to whether the observed effects arose from increase confidence on the part of state
legislators, or some type of actual advantage from representing a subset of constituents.
Final Normative Comments and Applications
There will be some who benefit from strong party organizations, and competitive elections.
However, the basis of a functional representative-democracy rests upon meaningful choice,
contestation, and the marketplace of ideas. Therefore, while those benefiting from the status
quo might not enjoy increased competition, their concerns seemingly run counter to a healthy
government of responsible representation.
Although state party organizations might be frowned upon as pragmatic and materialistic,
they bear an important role in providing state level competition. Polarization has its benefits,
namely in providing substantive difference and choice between parties (Shor and McCarty,
2011; Aldrich, 2011; Rohde, 1991), though if they start to shut out the minority party from
ever having a chance at competing for office, then a republic cannot stand. Therefore, party
organizations provide a useful check. Whether a party organization can secure funds and
viability depends on competitive state legislatures. However, party organizations when strong
can be useful in securing legislative control of redistricting, which can lead to decreased
competition. Therefore, it might be the case that for the good of party organizations,
policy responsiveness and representation, that power to redistrict be taken away from state
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legislatures. As it stands, redistricting takes away the attention of state legislatures from
other pressing concerns and provides the means to reduce the quality of representation across
time. Whether one party holds power is not the concern of this dissertation. However,
inconstant rules and institutional decay offer only a death spiral for democratic accountability.
Where parties hurt themselves and the state in the long term due to how lines are drawn
offers, the best path forward appears to be to structure institutions such that there is a
degree of dynamic equilibrium.
Additionally, it appears that where district lines are drawn can encourage competition for
individual Congressional and legislative seats, an effect of which is on par with responsive
maps in increasing competition (Carson, Crespin and Williamson, 2014). Therefore, an effort
might be made to encourage greater nesting between different levels of districts. Additionally,
insofar as one seeks to encourage state legislators to run for higher office and bring forth
the benefits they bring to the lawmaking process (Volden and Wiseman, 2014), states might
consider reducing the number of legislative seats. Some states, such as New Hampshire and
their hundreds of state house seats, make it nigh impossible for a state house member to carry
over their constituency to compete for higher office. At a certain point, the low level of relative
overlap leaves some state legislators no better off than a random voter. Therefore, if one
wants to encourage more state legislators to run for higher office, fewer districts and greater
nesting would both lead to more legislators running for higher office. Although some might
fear the decreased size of state legislative chambers, Mooney (2012) finds that overly large
legislative chambers leads to a cession of power to state chamber leaders. Therefore, there is
no real loss in representation, as overly large chambers simply lead to the concentration of
power in a single person anyway.
All of that said, it is not my position to implement any of these changes, and all institutional
changes/reforms must be done with caution. One cannot simply undue a law and expect
everything to go back to the way that it was. Additionally, each state needs to consider what
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is best for them. California is not New Hampshire, and what might work in one state can
easily fail in the other. However, insofar as fair representational-democracies are a concern,





The results of Table A.1 present the factor loadings of the measures of party competition
in the electorate and in government on a latent dimension that amounts to the intersection
of party in government and the electorate. As can be seen within these estimates, each
component part reaches statistical significance. The MMM is constructed such that an
increase of one point reflects a one percentage point increase of the voting electorate necessary
to flip majority control. Therefore, an increase in MMM reflects a decrease in competition.
The HVD index similarly reflects a decrease in electoral competition for every one unit
increase. The folded Ranney index in turn reflects more solidified partisan control of the
legislature in number of seats, the governor’s winning vote percent, and years of unified
government. Therefore, it is expected that MMM and HVD will be positively correlated with
each other, whereas the two measures should be negatively correlated with the Ranney index.








Estimates of confirmatory factor analysis loadings on the intersection of electoral and governmental control competition. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Loadings reflect how much power a change of one unit of the component would affect the change in
the measure of the latent dimension of interest. Estimated using the “Lavaan” package in R.
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The results of Table A.1 suggest that MMM explains most of the latent dimension deduced
from the CFA. Note that the power of MMM is approximately 3.5 times that of the HVD,
and over five times more influential than the Ranney index. As Shufeldt and Flavin (2012)
note, the HVD and Ranney index tend to be limited in variance. Therefore, these results
suggest that insofar as the three measures load onto the same dimension, the MMM is the
most influential and analytically crucial component. However, should one seek to analyze
purely party in government or party competition across state legislative races, then the HVD
and Ranney indices should perform better.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics of Variables, 2002–2010
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Logged Donations 534 24.481 5.378 4.520 34.173
Weighted Donations 534 26.810 4.691 9.729 34.704
Weighted Donations per cap 534 1.610 0.308 0.343 2.045
Logged Donations per cap 534 1.767 0.266 0.653 2.113
Marginal-Majority 534 14.436 11.576 0.159 53.939
Leg. Control 534 0.375 0.484 0 1
Speaker Power 530 2.674 0.754 0.000 4.280
Governor Power (BPI) 534 3.521 0.894 1 6
Polarization 526 0.730 0.326 0.019 1.675
Leg. Seats Up 534 0.039 0.187 0 1
Leg. Prof. 534 0.121 0.764 −3.040 3.119
Log GDP per cap. 534 0.046 0.009 0.029 0.071
GDP pct. chg. 534 2.460 2.705 −5.435 11.860
Log Population 534 15.131 1.036 13.110 17.435
POTUS Approval 534 49.172 13.905 29 68
Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables from the years 2002 to 2010. These results reflect the variance of
the data employed in the analysis of the determinants of party organizational strength. Note that party ideological distance
provided by Shor and McCarty (2011) proves the most limiting variable, given the resources and effort required to compute




Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean SD Min. Max.
Pre-Soft Deadline 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Local Boundary Req. 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
Party Com. Funds 0.73 0.25 0.01 1.00
Unified Govt. 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marginal-Majority 11.62 12.85 0.01 64.16
District Size 8.39 4.20 0.33 13.67
Governor Power 3.24 0.82 1.50 6.00
Leg. Expenditures 767.13 710.88 58.58 4610.93
Polarization 0.85 0.28 0.27 2.00
First Stage Residual 2.16 2.63 0.00 13.20
Second Stage Residual 0.93 0.23 0 1
Marginal Majority 4 -6.26 13.21 -60.34 26.08
HVD Index 4 -0.01 0.07 -0.29 0.24
Observations 213
Note: Following the first stage, the number of observations is to 213. The number of observations for the first stage model is
50,866. None of the descriptive statistics change following the change in observations to the second and third stages.
III Chapter 4
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Table A.4: Non-Multistage Linear Models of Level Legislative Competition
Macro Level Competition Micro Level Competition
Non-Legislative Drawn 1.256 0.008
(1.427) (0.022)
Pre-Soft Deadline -1.494 0.014
(2.265) (0.019)
Local Boundary Req. 7.713 -0.002
(4.996) (0.026)
Party Com. Funds 2.493 -0.020
(3.268) (0.072)
Party Com. Funds X Unif. Govt. 4.123 -0.004
(7.502) (0.101)
Unified Govt. -5.765 0.024
(5.465) (0.082)
District Size -0.551 -0.011*
(1.093) (0.006)
Governor Power 0.667 -0.010
(1.067) (0.010)






Cycle: 2011 -1.807* -0.029
(1.059) (0.023)
Partial VRA Coverage 5.462 0.012
(3.742) (0.015)










The Macro and Micro level competition (columns 1 and 2) present the OLS results with robust clustered standard errors
of expected change in the MMM and HVD Index respectively. A one unit increase of the MMM within the Macro Level
Competition model reflects a one percentage point increase in the percentage of voters necessary to flip majority control. A one
unit increase of the HVD Index in the Micro Level Competition model represents an increased average of the winning percent of
the vote, winning margin, number of safe seats, and number of uncontested seats, within a state chamber. The first and second
stage residuals from as employed for the models in Table 3.3 are dropped. Instead, the second stage residuals are replaced with
whether a non-legislative body redistricted. 146
Table A.6: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Ran Vote % 29.65 23.92 0.16 100.00
Stage 1 Residuals 0.59 0.30 0.00 1.00
Diff. from Max Overlap 0.45 0.44 0.00 1.00
Open Seat 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
Open Seat x Same Party Vote 21.95 31.64 0.00 100.00
Same Party Vote 51.68 25.97 0.00 100.00
Leg. Professionalism 0.11 1.02 -3.26 3.12
Years in Office 5.88 4.29 0.00 18.00
Off Year Elections 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Observations 782,896
Summary descriptive statistics of the continuous data from the first stage analysis.
Table A.7: Length of Legislative Terms by Time Left in Office
2-year term 4-year term
No term limit 90.86% (631,794) 9.14% (63,569)
Last term 92.81% (35,965) 7.19% (2,785)
Second to last term, 2 year 100% (48,489) 0%
Second to last term, 4 year 0% 100% (288)
Data presented by row percentages. Number of observations are the dyads over time. Data from the first stage analysis.
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